Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

ROYAL ASSENT

Mr. Speaker: I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that the Queen has signified her Royal Assent to the following Acts:

Census (Confidentiality) Act 1991
Standard Life Assurance Company Act 1991

PRIVATE BUSINESS

CARDIFF BAY BARRAGE BILL [Lords] (By Order)

Order for further consideration, as amended, read.

To be considered on Thursday 14 March.

MIDLAND METRO BILL (By Order)

As amended, considered; to be read the Third time.

LONDON UNDERGROUND (No. 2) BILL (By Order)

Order for Second Reading read.

To be read a Second Time on Tuesday 12 March.

Mr. Speaker: As Bills 2 to 12 have blocking motions, with the leave of the House I shall put them together.

CATTEWATER RECLAMATION BILL (By Order)

HOOK ISLAND (POOLE BAY) BILL (By Order)

LONDON DOCKLANDS RAILWAY (LEWISHAM, ETC) BILL (By Order)

BIRMINGHAM CITY COUNCIL BILL (By Order)

BRITISH RAILWAYS BILL (By Order)

EAST COAST MAIN LINE (SAFETY) BILL (By Order)

LONDON REGIONAL TRANSPORT (PENALTY FARES) BILL (By Order)

LONDON UNDERGROUND (KING'S CROSS) BILL (By Order)

REDBRIDGE LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL BILL (By Order)

BRITISH RAILWAYS (No. 3) BILL [Lords] (By Order)

MIDLAND METRO (No. 2) BILL (By Order)

Orders for Second Reading read.

To be read a Second time on Thursday 14 March.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOME DEPARTMENT

Television Licences

Mr. McAllion: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department when he next intends to review the regulations relating to concessionary television licences for pensioners in sheltered housing.

Mr. Skinner: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what recent representations he has received on the need for legislation to provide free television licences for all pensioners; and if he will make a statement.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Peter Lloyd): My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary announced on 28 February our intention to clarify and consolidate the wireless telegraphy regulations. The new ones will be laid very shortly. They will remove the "communal facility" condition for the concessionary television licence, which in practice has proved unnecessary to the operation of the more tightly defined scheme that we introduced in 1988. Since 1 January we have received 30 letters about free or reduced-price television licences for pensioners. We have no plans to review further or to extend the present concessionary scheme.

Mr. McAllion: Concessionary licences are granted to some but not all pensioners who live in warden-controlled houses, they are granted to some whose incomes are well above income support levels, but denied to others whose incomes are on or below income support levels, and they are denied to those who need them most—single pensioners living alone without family or friends to visit them. Has not the time come to end such cruel contradictions? Will the Minister stop such random discrimination against pensioners and undertake to grant concessionary licences to all pensioners who need them?

Mr. Lloyd: Our scheme is fair because it applies to all those in local authority or housing association homes that are clearly within an exclusive boundary and where there is a warden at work for 30 hours a week. The hon. Gentleman suggests that we should extend that to all pensioners. If we did, many pensioners would be enjoying a benefit which is not enjoyed by others who are very much worse off. The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) recognised that when he made it clear last week that the concessionary scheme should not apply to all pensioners. He was talking about a scheme that extends to those who are least well-off. The hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner), whom I hear chuntering, should address their questions to their own Front-Bench spokesmen.

Mr. Skinner: I do not have any problem with that. I addressed questions to Members on my Front Bench when the Labour party was in power and I shall do it again when we return to power after the general election.
There is nothing fair about the system when some pensioners do not get free television licences because there is a means test, some because they are not disabled in a


certain way and some because they do not live on the right side of the street. Now the Government have introduced another anomaly whereby pensioners have to have qualified before May 1988. Why cannot they be treated in the same way as those at Buckingham palace?

Mr. Lloyd: The hon. Gentleman has shown why the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook has such difficulty drawing up a scheme that he can agree with his Front Bench, let alone the rest of the Labour party. The scheme that we have is carefully constructed to enable people in the original scheme—those in local authority homes with some warden control—to have the concession, and there it remains.

Mrs. Maureen Hicks: To illustrate my question to my hon. Friend may I draw his attention to one of my constituents, Mr. Rushton? Perhaps he can visualise Mr. Rushton, who lives in a high-rise block of flats in the middle of Heathtown in Wolverhampton in which many other elderly people live. He has a concierge on duty to look after his needs. Next door——

Mr. Speaker: Order. Could we have a question about it, please?

Mrs. Hicks: I shall be brief, Mr. Speaker. Next door are two high-rise blocks of flats, Tremont house and Lincoln house, which have wardens. People in the two blocks of flats next door to Mr. Rushton have £5 television licences, but the elderly people in the adjacent building, Longfield house, have to pay the full price because they have no warden. Does not he think that there is a ridiculous anomaly in that system and will he investigate it?

Mr. Lloyd: Whichever way one draws up a scheme, there will be someone on the wrong side of the rules. The rules enable local authorities so to organise their provision for the elderly that they can come into the scheme. That is why, since the scheme was introduced in 1988, more people enjoy the concessionary licence than before. It is quite possible for local authorities to organise themselves within the scheme.

Mr. Roger King: Is my hon. Friend aware that the level of licence fees is directly related to the cost of the provision of broadcasting services by the BBC? Is he fully satisfied that we are getting the correct value for money from that organisation, or does he agree with some industrialists that the costs should be gone over with a fine-toothed comb and some of the waste sorted out?

Mr. Lloyd: As my hon. Friend knows, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary allowed the BBC to increase its licence fee by less than the retail prices index for the coming year, because he took on board suggestions that there was scope for the BBC to increase its efficiency. No doubt by addressing itself to that, the BBC will be able to make further savings in due course.

Mr. Corbett: Will the Minister confirm that in the coming changes in the regulations, which have been announced, he will deal with the case of my constituent who is in a block of properties that were otherwise council-tenanted? Under the right to buy, a flat was bought and then sold to someone under pensionable age, so all the people in the block lost that concession. Will the changes at least end that anomaly? Does the Minister understand that Labour will exempt low-income groups,

including pensioners, from the licence fee and raise the cash to do so by ensuring that the fee is paid for each set in a hotel or other commercial premises?

Mr. Lloyd: That is the suggestion at the moment. I wonder whether it will be the same when the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends have done their figures, because he proposes to increase the take from the retail and hotel trade from £5 million to £100 million. I hope that the trade knows that this extra impost is being placed on it. Labour will do that only by a massive increase in the fee, but I quite understand that the hon. Gentleman has not yet fully thought out the policy.
The hon. Gentleman asked whether I would make the matter clear. Our rules are clear beyond peradventure. If a local authority sells a flat in a block that qualifies under the rules, it is being extremely foolish, because there is no obligation on an authority to sell in those conditions.

Sir Anthony. Grant: Will my hon. Friend take into consideration pensioners—there are some in my constituency—who pay taxes but who absolutely loathe television and do not understand why they should be expected to subsidise it for others?

Mr. Lloyd: As the regulations clearly say, those capable of receiving a British broadcasted programme must pay the licence fee, which goes to the BBC. That matter will come under review as we move towards the renewal of the BBC charter in 1996.

Fire Cover, West Yorkshire

Mrs. Mahon: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will carry out an urgent review of fire cover in West Yorkshire, and if he will make a statement.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. John Patten): It is for the West Yorkshire fire and civil defence authority to assess the fire risks in its area in the light of guidance issued by the Home Office. The authority must then determine what resources are necessary to meet those risks. The Government are concerned to ensure that all fire authorities conform to the minimum nationally recom-mended standards of fire cover and that they do so as efficiently and economically as possible. Her Majesty's inspectorate of fire services will pay particular attention to those points during its next inspection of West Yorkshire fire service, which is to take place very soon—during April this year.

Mrs. Mahon: Is the Minister aware of the damage that the poll tax is doing to authorities such as the West Yorkshire fire service? Does he realise that this year alone the authority—although it has wisely decided to save Sowerby Bridge fire station—faces cuts of £1·5 million, which will lead to the freezing of 100 posts and the axing of seven special firefighting appliances? Is not that disgraceful and does not it show that the Government are exercising double standards? When will they get rid of the poll tax, which is so damaging to both people and services?

Mr. Patten: The authority has been allowed a 19 per cent. increase in standard spending assessment for next year. That shows the Government's considerable commitment to the provision of good fire cover in the interests of people in West Yorkshire and elsewhere.

Mrs. Peacock: Why is the West Yorkshire fire authority being pressured by the Home Office to cut some of its services?

Mr. Patten: Her Majesty's inspector of fire services will go to West Yorkshire in April to carry out a full inspection of efficiency, effectiveness and the cover and needs of the fire service. He will report to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary.

Mr. Allen McKay: Will the Minister also consider the problem of firefighting mains in West Yorkshire and other areas? Will he consider the possibility of an agreement between the fire service and the water authorities, so that the cost of an extra main does not fall on the poll tax payer?

Mr. Patten: That point has not been made to me before, but I shall certainly pursue it and write to the hon. Gentleman.

Magistrates Courts

Mr. Andrew Mitchell: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will request the Audit Commission to undertake a comparative study of the efficiency and effectiveness of magistrates courts.

Mr. John Patten: My hon. Friend is right to draw attention to an audit gap in the present arrangements for the management of the magistrates court service. We are considering how best to fill that gap, including the possible involvement of the Audit Commission, as part of the process of reaching decisions on the magistrates court scrutiny. At this stage, however, given the scrutiny findings, I do not think that a further value-for-money study would be helpful until my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has made clear his views on the scrutiny in an announcement which I expect not to be too long delayed.

Mr. Mitchell: Is my right hon. Friend aware that a survey carried out recently by the Audit Commission showed that productivity in our courtrooms can vary by a factor of 10—from 250 summonses dealt with in one session to over 3,000? Will he take into account the importance of a survey of not only productivity but the efficiency and effectiveness with which our courtrooms conduct their business?

Mr. Patten: It is perfectly true that the unit costs in magistrates courts vary widely from one place to another and that unit costs have risen considerably in recent years. The outcome of the scrutiny may lead to further value-for-money studies, possibly conducted by the Audit Commission, but at present there is no legislative provision, as my hon. Friend will know from the Local Government Finance (No. 2) Act 1982.

Mr. Randall: Is the Minister aware that it is more than a year since the publication of the scrutiny report? Does he realise that the Government's slowness in deciding what to do about it is delaying the implementation of a number of proposals that could tackle, for example, the serious problem of inconsistency in sentencing and poor cost-effectiveness? Will he be more specific and tell us exactly when we can expect a decision about the report?

Mr. Patten: With respect, the hon. Gentleman seems a little muddled. The scrutiny related to the effectiveness and efficiency of the management of the magistrates court system, which is a £280 million-a-year undertaking. It had nothing to do with sentencing issues. We are committed to preserving both local justice and magisterial independence in sentencing. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will be able to make an announcement in the near future.

Sir John Wheeler: When he is considering the efficiency and effectiveness of the magistrates courts service, will my right hon. Friend look again at the Home Affairs Select Committee report on the Crown prosecution service, in particular the recommendation that draws attention to the efficiency proved by the Hampshire experiment, in which the use of information technology enables the police, the Crown prosecution service and the magistrates courts service to be more effectively used?

Mr. Patten: My hon. Friend, who is the chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee, is aware that I keep all his distinguished reports next to my bed for reference in the evening. I shall certainly dig out the one on the Crown prosecution service and look at the point to which he referred. The Hampshire experiment is excellent. It is within our grasp to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the magistrates courts service.

Anabolic Steriods

Mr. Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if it is his intention to introduce legislation to make anabolic steroids controlled drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Kenneth Baker): No, Sir. The Misuse of Drugs Act deals mainly with drugs of addiction. We have decided instead on a range of measures designed to prevent misuse, particularly among young people.

Mr. Campbell: Does the Secretary of State understand that that is a most disappointing reply, in the light of the fact that as long ago as November 1988 the Home Office announced that it intended to make anabolic steroids prescribed drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act? Does he appreciate that these drugs are freely available throughout the United Kingdom, in gymnasia and fitness centres, that they are acknowledged to cause damage to health and that in at least one case they have caused death? In those circumstances, is not there ample justification for making it a criminal offence to possess the drugs, or to possess them with the intention of supplying them to others?

Mr. Baker: I appreciate the great interest that the hon. and learned Gentleman takes in the subject. The Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs has advised that the possession of anabolic steroids should not be an offence, since they are not addictive. That view is shared by our European Community partners. I am, however, concerned about the hon. and learned Gentleman's point that these drugs have dangerous side-effects, particularly for young people in training. We have decided, therefore, that the giving of anabolic steroids to minors—there is no trade in most of these drugs—shall be an offence. We are also undertaking additional research into the extent of steroid misuse and we intend to improve our testing and detecting


methods. In addition, we are increasing our educational efforts, the intention being to demonstrate to people that those drugs can be very harmful.

Mrs. Currie: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the national competition of the amateur powerlifting association will be held in Derby in June and that amateur powerlifters feel very strongly that further controls are needed for anabolic steroids? Will he guarantee to keep the issue under review and to take into account the views of such valuable bodies?

Mr. Baker: Yes, indeed. It is irresponsible of those who are training youngsters to participate in such sports to provide them with these drugs. There is no doubt that they have harmful side-effects. We are taking strong action. I agree entirely with my hon. Friend that as much publicity as possible should be given to their harmful effects.

Juvenile Courts

Mr. Michael: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what arrangements he intends to make in the way juvenile or youth courts are organised, particularly in relation to waiting room arrangements and supervision once the age limits are raised to 18 years.

Mr. John Patten: Responsibility for listing arrangements in magistrates courts rests with justices' clerks. There are already statutory provisions to ensure that defendants attending juvenile courts are kept apart from adult defendants. The Justices' Clerks Society and the Magistrates Association are being consulted about ways of arranging youth court hearings and we have asked the best practice committee to consider practical best practice procedures for courts to adopt in future, if these are found to be necessary.

Mr. Michael: But it is the Government who are changing the age limit upwards by a year in relation to the juvenile or youth courts. Does not the Minister accept that the message given to young people, particularly young offenders, in the waiting room and in the area around a court, is in some cases almost as important as the message given to them in the court about their activities and future behaviour? Does he agree that the message that they frequently get is entirely wrong and completely contrary to the one that society would like them to receive? Does he further agree that a mechanism should be devised—whether it be advice or instructions—to ensure that 18-year-olds and very young people appearing before such courts are separated, so that very young people do not get the messages that might be given to them by more sophisticated offenders?

Mr. Patten: I agree with both points. The messages that juveniles get from rubbing shoulders with tougher and older accused people who are waiting outside a court can be very bad. That is why, as I pointed out in my initial answer to the hon. Gentleman, we wish to move as quickly as possible towards ensuring that we use the procedures drawn up by the best practice committee, under the Home Office magistrates courts adviser, to ensure that court clerks and others separate younger from older juveniles. We shall also be building into the guidance on the design of court houses exactly the points that cause concern to the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. John Greenway: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the Government's decision to create youth courts under the Criminal Justice Bill has been widely welcomed throughout the criminal justice system? On the likely bad impression on young offenders, does my right hon. Friend agree that the worst possible impression is made on them when they are held on remand in prison? Does he further agree that the arrangements that the Government have introduced to ensure that we have a better system of looking after young people—whether in bail hostels or in remand prisons, which the private sector might build—will be conducive to ensuring a much reduced rate of recidivism among young offenders?

Mr. Patten: My hon. Friend is right. The provisions for the introduction of a youth court under the Criminal Justice Bill have been widely welcomed across the spectrum—from those who describe themselves as penal reformers to those who want young people to get the punishment that they think they deserve. I also agree that it is important to end as soon as possible the practice of remanding juveniles in custody in prisons. That is why my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary published his consultation paper on the issue two or three weeks ago. That, too, has been widely welcomed.
On the last part of the question, my hon. Friend has already carved out for himself a considerable reputation as a proponent of the involvement of the private sector in prison and remand issues and we listen carefully to what he has to say.

Iraqi Nationals

Mr. Dalyell: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement on the Amnesty International report on British treatment of Iraqi nationals.

Mr. Kenneth Baker: I have placed in the Library a copy of a reply sent to Amnesty International on 18 February. I am satisfied that the action taken against Iraqi nationals is in accordance with domestic law and our international obligations. The International Committee of the Red Cross has visited all Iraqis detained and has stated that they are being treated in accordance with the Geneva conventions.

Mr. Dalyell: In view of the recent heavyweight criticism that current United Kingdom law, which allows people to be detained on grounds of national security without being given a reason for their detention, is in breach of international law, do the Government have plans in any way to synchronise United Kingdom arrangements and bring them into line with the proposed international arrangements?

Mr. Baker: I appreciate the interest that the hon. Gentleman has shown in the matter in recent weeks. I do not accept that the action that we have taken is in breach of international standards. In certain other countries, Iraqis were bundled out very quickly indeed. The hon. Gentleman is familiar with the procedures that operate in such cases. The advisory panel is headed by a lord justice of appeal and it has so far dealt with 54 cases. In his judgment on the Cheblak case, the Master of the Rolls examined the basis of the three advisers' procedures and


took the view that the arrangements struck a proper balance between the protection of individual rights and the requirements of national security.

Mr. Alexander: Have not we behaved impeccably to the Iraqis during the Gulf conflict? My right hon. Friend mentioned, for example, the due judicial process which must be gone through before any of them is ejected. Does my right hon. Friend recollect the threats, emanating from Baghdad of increased terrorist activity? Were not we wise to be safe rather than sorry?

Mr. Baker: I fully support what my hon. Friend says. At the outbreak of hostilities, Saddam Hussein called on Iraqis and other sympathisers across the world to take action to support him. We were absolutely right to follow the principle that it is better to be safe than sorry. Although hostilities in the Gulf have now ceased, it would be imprudent to believe that international terrorism, whether from the middle east or from other countries, will cease. We must therefore continue to be vigilant.

Mr. Winnick: Is the Home Secretary aware that I, for one, totally accept that while we were in military conflict with a notorious terrorist dictatorship it was necessary on national security grounds to take various actions? [HON. MEMBERS: "Shame."] I am not going to apologise for that —least of all to those who did not support the military conflict in any way.
Is the Home Secretary aware, however, that I should like to see progess in one form of activity? Is not there a strong case for those who appear before the three advisers to have legal representation or some other form of representation so that our democratic process is not harmed?

Mr. Baker: I have known the hon. Gentleman in the House for many years, dating back to when he represented another seat. I have always thought of him as an hon. Member who is not afraid to stand up and speak his mind on any subject, as he has done with great fearlessness in the past few weeks. I appreciate the concern that he and others have expressed about this matter. In practice, lawyers have made representations—sometimes directly to the three advisers, who have seen those lawyers if that was what was wanted. Representations have also been made to me by the lawyers. There is, therefore, some flexibility. I believe that those cases have been handled fairly—in fact, with impeccable fairness.

Mr. Andrew MacKay: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the overwhelming majority of people in this country will be gratified and relieved at the action that the Government have taken, which has ensured that no terrorist incident has taken place? Is he further aware that they will equally contrast what has happened to Iraqi nationals in this country with what happened to the Kuwaitis when Iraq moved into that country?

Mr. Baker: The despicable behaviour of some Iraqis during their occupation of Kuwait is not a standard to be followed by any country. We have behaved according to the highest standards. I appreciate that the powers are unusual and as Home Secretary I have therefore been especially careful to ensure that everything has been done to give those people a fair hearing.

South Yorkshire Police

Mr. Duffy: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department when he next expects to review manning policy for the South Yorkshire police.

Mr. Kenneth Baker: I announced on 20 December 1990 that I had approved 18 additional police posts for South Yorkshire with effect from 1 October 1991, subject to confirmation from the police authority that it is prepared to meet its share of the costs of those posts. Any application that the authority makes for our approval to further establishment increases will be most carefully considered.

Mr. Duffy: Will the Home Secretary confirm that those 18 posts did not meet the application of the South Yorkshire police? Given the findings of the Sheffield Star, which I conveyed to him through the post in recent days, about the erosion of the fabric of the South Yorkshire police force, does he agree that those 18 posts do not meet the needs of that police force either? Will he confirm that, during the November inspection, South Yorkshire came out as the least resourced but the most productive of the family of six forces? My hon. Friends and I know what the problem is—it is not the Home Secretary, but the Department of the Environment. Will the right hon. Gentleman seek a firm assurance from the Department of the Environment that it will not allow the capping criteria to prevent the South Yorkshire police from manning up to his standards?

Mr. Baker: The South Yorkshire police asked for a further 50 police officers and we allocated a further 18. However, as I said in my main answer, it may be possible to increase that number later in the year. I am concerned that police services are maintained at a proper level. The level of budget of each authority is not my responsibility. With the agreement of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment, I have set out the criteria according to which the police authorities should set their budgets. In a letter to Councillor Bundred on 18 February, I stated:
It is now for each authority to set its budget. In doing so, it should take into account all relevant considerations, including its statutory duties, the approved level of police manpower, the Government's intended capping criteria, the need, as appropriate, for expenditure restraint and the scope for greater efficiency.

Mr. Shersby: Will my right hon. Friend confirm that if South Yorkshire encounters difficulties over its police manpower, he will be willing to consider whatever representations South Yorkshire police authority may make on that important point?

Mr. Baker: I will, of course, undertake to do that. As I have said to the House before, I have provided for an increase in police resources for the country as a whole in the coming year of 700 uniformed police officers and 1,100 civilians. However, I am well aware that hon. Members are interested in their own police forces and I can give my hon. Friend the undertaking for which he has asked.

Mr. Hattersley: Is the Home Secretary aware that the South Yorkshire police authority told me on Friday that, far from expanding to meet its new establishment, it will be cutting the number of officers because of poll tax capping? How many other police authorities are similarly afflicted? Will the Home Secretary confirm the estimate given by the


chairman of the Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, that poll tax capping is likely to mean 1,700 fewer police officers than last year?

Mr. Baker: That is highly unlikely. It depends on whether the authority is a multi-purpose authority or a single service authority such as South Yorkshire. Within that context, I expect metropolitan police authorities to set their budgets to maintain operational police manpower at the level that I and my predecessors have approved. I do not expect that to be done by moving police officers into posts held by civilians. I expect police officers to pursue vigorously a policy of streamlining administration, cutting out waste and maximising value for money.

Radio Stations

Mr. Robert G. Hughes: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department when he last discussed the future of incremental radio stations with the chairman of the Radio Authority.

Mr. Peter Lloyd: My right hon. Friend meets the chairman of the Radio Authority from time to time to discuss a range of matters, but he has not specifically discussed with him the future of incremental radio stations.

Mr. Hughes: I thank my right hon. Friend for his answer. Will he and the Secretary of State note the success and popularity of Sunrise Radio, an Asian radio station operating in west London and my constituency? Despite its popularity, it is rather hemmed in by an inadequate frequency on the medium wave, which means that people living within the reception area find it difficult to receive that station. Will my right hon. Friend talk to the Radio Authority to see whether successful incremental radio stations which broadcast to a loyal audience, as Sunrise does, can move on to a better frequency so that people who want to enjoy it can do so?

Mr. Lloyd: Sunrise Radio is to be congratulated on offering a varied programme which is proving particularly successful in attracting Asian listeners. It suffers from some interference, especially at night. Increasing broad-cast power might help, but it would be expensive. Sunrise should contact the Radio Authority—I understand that it has not yet done so—but I will draw my hon. Friend's concerns to the attention of the Radio Authority.

Mr. Darling: When the Minister next meets the chairman of the Radio Authority, will he discuss the growing problem of local and smaller radio stations being increasingly acquired by larger conglomerates? The first casualty is often local output, especially local news, with increasing dependency on Independent Radio News which, however good it may be, is not a local news output. Does the Minister agree that local radio stations such as Sunrise should be encouraged? If concentration continues, it will create little more than another national radio station.

Mr. Lloyd: Local stations should certainly be encouraged. As the hon. Gentleman knows, the licence is given to a broadcasting company to produce a particular

sort of broadcasting. If ownership changes, the licence does not change and the station is expected to continue the same output.

Domestic Violence

Mr. Ashley: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what recent discussions he has had with chief constables about the law and domestic violence.

Mr. John Patten: Chief officers were consulted over the drafting of a Home Office circular on domestic violence which was issued last July. It has been widely welcomed.

Mr. Ashley: I welcome the setting up of domestic violence units, but when will they be open at night, when many women need them? When will there be enough of them to give access to those who require them and when will social workers be attached to them?

Mr. Patten: I am extremely grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, who has a long-standing interest in the subject. Domestic violence units exist in police force areas such as the Metropolitan area and West Yorkshire. There is none yet in the Greater Manchester area or in the right hon. Gentleman's area, although I am happy to report that the force general order states that all allegations of domestic violence should be treated as crimes—and quite right, too. There is also close co-ordination with other agencies, such as social workers and the probation service.
By July, Her Majesty's inspectorate of constabulary will have visited exactly half the forces in this area, asking for a specific answer to the question, "What has been done so far on domestic violence?" I shall report back to the House at that stage, in July this year.

Mr. Holt: Will my right hon. Friend take five minutes to discuss with the chief constables the problem of young and juvenile crime in relation to the school leaving age? The highest crime level is currently among those in the year below the school leaving age and has been for 80 years. Would not a more flexible approach to the school leaving age allow those who wish to study to do so, those who wish to train to do that, while those who wish to play truant would not have the opportunity to do so? Our current rigid school leaving age is out of line with that of our colleagues in the European Community and should be looked at by the Government.

Mr. Patten: The school leaving age is not a matter for my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, but I entirely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Langbaurgh (Mr. Holt) that we need to do more about truancy, on which my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science is to make an announcement in the near future.

Remand Prisoners

Ms. Quin: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he intends to bring forward any new proposals for the treatment of remand prisoners.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mrs. Angela Rumbold): We intend to provide cardphones at all establishments holding unconvicted prisoners and we are abolishing routine censorship of the correspondence of unconvicted prisoners, except those in category A. In addition, planning is in hand for the provision of fuller


regimes for unconvicted prisoners as new accommodation comes on stream and overcrowding is reduced over the next two years.

Ms. Quin: The Minister will be aware that the number of remand prisoners has risen dramatically during the Government's period of office. Is he aware that the Woolf report stated that conditions for remand prisoners. were often worse than those for convicted prisoners? That is disgraceful. Will the Government undertake to implement in full the recommendations of the Woolf inquiry in relation to remand prisoners?

Mrs. Rumbold: I am aware of the hon. Lady's interest in remand prisoners and I note her interest in the outcome of our deliberations on the Woolf inquiry. I am sure that she will join me in congratulating the Government on tackling the problem of provision for the unconvicted prisoner by providing 13 new prisons and 8,000 more places, and ensuring that bail hostels and bail information schemes are available to unconvicted prisoners.

Mr. David Shaw: Does my right hon. Friend agree that accommodation provision for remand prisoners could be allocated to the private sector and that the introduction of privatisation would be welcomed?

Mrs. Rumbold: My hon. Friend will know that the Criminal Justice Bill, which has just completed its passage through the House, contains provision for remand prisons to be contracted out to the private sector. I share my hon. Friend's optimism that they will provide adequate and good accommodation for unconvicted prisoners.

Mr. Lofthouse: Is the Minister aware that police stations in South and West Yorkshire will have great difficulty in housing some of the young remand prisoners, which they have not done hitherto, because of the budgets set for South and West Yorkshire police? The budgets were set in accordance with the standard spending assessment, which means that hundreds of police officers will have to come off the beat to man police stations. Will the Home Secretary assure us that, at this late stage and bearing it in mind that the police budgets in South and West Yorkshire have been set outside the criteria given this afternoon, he will give further consideration to the prospect of meeting the authorities and will assist them in maintaining the force that he requires them to have?

Mrs. Rumbold: The hon. Gentleman will be relieved to know that the problems of young offenders who are unconvicted prisoners in police cells will be alleviated in the West Yorkshire district by the opening of Moorland prison, which will provide accommodation for young remand prisoners. It will take out of police cells a number of the young offenders who are currently in them, and thus save money.

Ashford Remand Centre

Mr Wilshire: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement on the future of the Ashford (Middlesex) remand centre site.

Mrs. Rumbold: We are at present carrying out a review of the prison estate as a whole. The future of the Ashford site will be considered in the context of that review. In the

meantime, we plan to make the site suitable for recreation by local people and are discussing with Spelthorne borough council the detailed arrangements for this.

Mr. Wilshire: I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply, but does she recall that at a meeting before Christmas she told Spelthorne borough council that the site could be made available for between five and 10 years? Is she aware of my recent letter pointing out that her local officials now say that it can be made available for one year? Will she please clear up the confusion once and for all?

Mrs. Rumbold: My hon. Friend will be glad to know that a letter is in the post to him, following my discussions with officials on that matter. I think that he will find the answer satisfactory.

London Traffic

Mr. Adley: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what recent discussions he has had with the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis about traffic in London: and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Kenneth Baker: I have had no recent discussions with the Commissioner on that subject. Regular contact is, however, maintained by officials with the Metropolitan police on a number of traffic issues.

Mr. Adley: Will my right hon. Friend confirm that the Conservative party is still the party of law and order? That being so, is he aware that in the Commissioner's view, the effect of coach deregulation on his police force has been "horrendous", with the proliferation of illegal parking and coaches leaving their engines running for hours on end? Will my right hon. Friend please have a word with the Secretary of State for Transport to see whether it is not too late to amend the Road Traffic Bill to deal with such serious considerations?

Mr. Baker: I assure my hon. Friend that no resources are spared in dealing with the problems of keeping traffic moving in London: 2,500 police officers and traffic wardens are on traffic duty; in 1989, there were 2·5 million traffic and parking offences; in 1990, there were 160,493 wheel clamps, and special wheel clamps have been arranged for coaches. I assure my hon. Friend that we are busy in that area.

Oral Answers to Questions — PRIME MINISTER

Engagements

Mr. Colvin: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 7 March.

The Prime Minister (Mr. John Major): This morning I presided at a meeting of the Cabinet and had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in the House, I shall be having further meetings later today.

Mr. Colvin: The House will wish to congratulate my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on being the first allied leader to visit the Gulf since the successful cessation of hostilities. When he spoke to our forces there, he spoke for the whole nation. Can he now tell the House when we can expect our forces home so that we may give them the heroes' welcome that they deserve? Does he agree that it


might not be a bad idea to send out to the Gulf 10 builders to assist with the reconstruction of Kuwait for every service man and service woman whom we welcome home?

The Prime Minister: I can assure my hon. Friends that we are making plans for an appropriate welcome home when the majority of our troops are back. We hope to announce details of that quite soon. I am sure that the House will be pleased to have the excellent news that our forces will start to return home this weekend. The first to come back will be medical reservists, including 205 general hospital, which is returning to Glasgow. The first Tornados, their crews and support staff will also be starting for home in a few days' time. Some ships are already on their way home. The House will be especially pleased to know that 7th Armoured Brigade, which has been in the desert under the command of Brigadier Cordingley since last October, will begin to leave early next week and we hope that its withdrawal can be completed in two weeks or so. That brigade includes one of the Scottish regiments in the Gulf—the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence will publish details later this afternoon.

Mr. Hattersley: I, too, congratulate the Prime Minister on his visit to the Gulf yesterday, but may I now ask him to turn his mind to domestic politics? Why is Britain the only western European economy in which manufacturing exports are falling, manufacturing output is falling, manufacturing investment is falling and manufacturing employment is falling, all at the same time?

The Prime Minister: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his opening remarks, but less so for the rest. As the right hon. Gentleman knows—but, alas, neglected to mention—the United States and Canada are in recession and growth is slowing in France, Italy and a number of other major economies. In our own economy, inflation is falling and interest rates are beginning to fall. The effects of our policies are beginning to be felt benevolently.

Mr. Hattersley: The Prime Minister has not even attempted to answer my question. He will not be able to run away from these issues for ever. As he has failed to attempt an answer, I offer him the answer provided to my question by the House of Lords yesterday—that the problem for British manufacturing industry is doctrinaire Government policies and incompetent Ministers at the Department of Trade and Industry.

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman should read the report more carefully. If he does so, he will find a number of recommendations welcoming actions that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry has taken in recent months. They have advanced further since their report's publication and include, for example, the doubling of support for technology transfer and extra support for smaller firms. The right hon. Gentleman should be less selective and more accurate.

Mr. Hattersley: The Prime Minister must know that the two criticisms that I quoted are exactly the view of the House of Lords. I have no doubt that even the least literate members of the other place will regard the Prime Minister's answer as a bogus sham.

The Prime Minister: I had not expected to find such a literate right hon. Gentleman guilty of such tautology. The

policies that we have followed are those which assist success in all sectors of the enterprise economy. The right hon. Gentleman forgets the reductions in inflation, on which his party had no policy, the change to one of the lowest rates of corporation tax in the world, when his party would raise taxation, and a labour market surplus which has given this country the lowest number of days lost in strikes for 50 years.

Sir Peter Tapsell: Does my right hon. Friend agree that a start cannot even begin to be made to bringing Iraq back into the peace-loving family of nations while Saddam Hussein remains in power in Baghdad?

The Prime Minister: I can most certainly agree with my hon. Friend about that. As I said in the House last week, and am happy to repeat, I believe that Iraq will remain a pariah among nations while Saddam Hussein is there and rules it.

Mr. Leadbitter: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 7 March.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Leadbitter: Will the Prime Minister now turn to some specifics of the highly critical report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, which was published this week? Is he aware that the report makes it clear that there has been no support for industry from the Government's policies? The report concludes that there is a grave risk of having no British owned and based manufacturing industry as a result of present policies. Does the Prime Minister agree with the final conclusion in the report—that the Government's policies show no commitment to industry and no commitment to the national interest?

The Prime Minister: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman can explain why manufacturing productivity grew faster in this country in the past decade than in almost any other major industrialised country. As the hon. Gentleman should know, a great deal of the ground lost in previous decades has been made up. We still need to be better at implementing the scientific discoveries made in this country and we are determined to improve on that.

Mr. Jessel: Can my right hon. Friend confirm that the victory parade will include British Army bands trained at the Royal Military School of Music at Kneller hall in Twickenham?

The Prime Minister: I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will have heard my hon. Friend, even if my right hon. Friend is not at the House.

Mr. Archy Kirkwood: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 7 March.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Kirkwood: I congratulate the Prime Minister on his recent visit to the Gulf. Now that he has been able to see for himself the ecological consequences of the Gulf war, does he agree that it is necessary to mount an ecological task force almost on the same scale as the military task force that was needed to liberate Kuwait in order to deal


with those consequences? Will he do what he can to ensure that the United Nations takes an international initiative to deal quickly with the pollution in the Gulf?

The Prime Minister: The action necessary to cure the pollution in the Gulf will require an international effort. Quite how that will be organised is a matter which is still open. The hon. Gentleman will know that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment made a cash donation yesterday towards clearance of the pollution.

Mr. Oppenheim: Bearing in mind the Government's economic policy and the fact that some people claim that credit controls represent a painless cure for inflation, would my right hon. Friend care to comment on where, under such a system, home buyers might come in the queue for credit, and how, in any case, such a system could be effective without the reimposition of exchange controls?

The Prime Minister: It is extremely unlikely that credit controls could make any worthwhile contribution to economic management. They are a legacy of the sort of economic management that existed in the 1950s, to which the Opposition seem keen to return.

Unemployment (Scotland)

Mr. Tom Clarke: To ask the Prime Minister when he next expects to meet the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities to discuss unemployment in Scotland.

The Prime Minister: I have at present no plans to do so.

Mr. Clarke: Does the Prime Minister recall that during his last brief visit to Edinburgh he said that he would not forget Lanarkshire? Given the huge job losses that we have seen since then, including 3,000 in the steel industry, is not the Prime Minister appalled at the stage of employment training in Lanarkshire? Do a 32 per cent. reduction in funding, trainer job losses and lost trainee places, including places for those with special needs, represent the Government's commitment? Will the Prime Minister, tomorrow, meet real people with real problems or will his visit to Lanarkshire be simply a public relations charade?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman will be interested to know that the Lanarkshire working group has been set up to co-ordinate action to tackle the problems facing Lanarkshire on the back of the steel job losses that have occurred. The working group met for the first time on 11 January and will report to me around the end of April.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: Does the Prime Minister agree that the admittedly serious problems in Lanarkshire and elsewhere in Scotland would become much worse if the House of Commons were daft enough to accept the Labour party's proposal for an elected assembly with tax-raising powers? Does he agree that such an arrangement would simply scare jobs away from Scotland?

The Prime Minister: I am in no doubt about that Were Scotland to have a tax-raising assembly, it would undoubtedly become the highest taxed part of the United

Kingdom. That, in turn, would drive away the investment which in the last decade has increasingly made Scotland more efficient, effective and wealthy.

Official Visits

Mr. Allen: To ask the Prime Minister if he will make an official visit to Nottingham.

The Prime Minister: I am making a series of visits to all parts of the country, and very much hope to include Nottingham among them.

Mr. Allen: The right hon. Gentleman will be very welcome. When he comes, will he make a point of meeting mothers and children who have been robbed of £2·30 per week by the Government's failure to link child benefit to inflation? Arising from the deceitful words in the Conservative manifesto, which said
Child benefit will continue to be paid as now",
will the Prime Minister, first, answer a question— something he has not done so far today—and, secondly, will he tell the House, and mothers at home— [Interruption] May I continue, Mr. Speaker?

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman is making rather a meal of it.

Mr. Allen: Will the Prime Minister tell mothers at home of his own complicity in the drafting of those very words in the 1987 manifesto—words which cheated mothers and their children?

The Prime Minister: As the hon. Gentleman knows, the Government have an obligation to review child benefit annually, and do so. On each occasion that child benefit has not been fully uprated, those on the lowest incomes have been fully compensated or more through other social security benefits.

Engagements

Mr. David Evans: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Thursday 7 March.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Evans: Does my right hon. Friend agree that under his outstanding leadership we have become a united party determined to defeat inflation and the Labour party when the general election comes? Does he approve of all of us on this side of the House paying our community charge, supporting the prevention of terrorism Act and supporting our troops in the Gulf? If so, is that not in stark contrast with that lot on the other side who are busy scheming to remove their leader and his deputy through supper clubs —[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that that is enough.

The Prime Minister: I certainly hope to be in sharp contrast with Opposition Members on many issues. I am delighted to see that normal service has now been resumed.

Business of the House

Dr. John Cunningham: Will the Leader of the House tell us the business of the House for next week?

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. John MacGregor): Yes, Sir. The business of the House for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY II MARCH—Until seven o'clock Estimates Day (1st Allotted Day, 2nd Part). There will be a debate on class VII, vote 3, transport industries, in so far as it relates to London Regional Transport, followed by a motion on the Northern Ireland (Appropriation) Order.
At ten o'clock the Question will be put on all outstanding supplementary estimates and votes.
TUESDAY 12 MARCH—Second Reading of the Planning and Compensation Bill [Lords], followed by a procedure motion relating to the War Crimes Bill.
WEDNESDAY 13 MARCH—Opposition Day (9th Allotted Day). Until about seven o'clock there will be a debate on an Opposition motion described as "The crisis in national health service hospitals". Afterwards there will be a debate on an Opposition motion, subject to be announced, followed by a motion to take note of the report by the European Court of Auditors for 1989. Details will be given in the Official Report.
THURSDAY 14 MARCH—Motion for the Easter Adjournment followed by proceedings on the Consolidated Fund (No. 2) Bill.
FRIDAY 15 MARCH—Private Members' motions.
MONDAY 18 MARCH—Second Reading of the War Crimes Bill.
The House will also wish to know that European Standing Committee A will meet at 10.30 am on Wednesday 13 March to consider European Community Documents Nos. 9228/88 and 10333/90 relating to seat belt wearing.
European Standing Committee B will also meet at 10.30 am on the same day to consider European Commuity Document No. 9025/90 relating to nuclear fusion.
It may be for the convenience of the House to know that, subject to the progress of business, it will be proposed that the House will rise for the Easter recess on Thursday 28 March until Monday 15 April.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I wish to refer to a matter which is not part of the business for next week. I understand. Mr. Speaker, that you have today announced that you do not propose to stand as a parliamentary candidate at the next general election, whenever that may be. This is not the occasion for tributes, and, indeed, since this is not part of next week's business, I run the risk of being called to order, Mr. Speaker, but as Leader of the House I should like to say on behalf of us all that we gladly acknowledge that since you were unanimously chosen Speaker you have presided over the proceedings of the House with distinction, fairness and impartiality in historic times. I would like particularly to draw attention to how well you have looked after the interests of Back Benchers on both sides of the House.
Your decision today, Mr. Speaker, means that you will not serve in the Chair in the next Parliament, and, as I have

said, the time for proper tributes will come later. Can I say now that we are all delighted to know that you will continue to preside over our proceedings until then.

[European Standing Committee A

Wednesday 13 March

Relevant European Community Documents

(a) 9228/88
(b) 10333/90 }Compulsory use of seat belts in road vehicles

Relevant Reports of the European Legislation Committee
(a) HC 15-vi (1988–89), HC 15-xxxi (1988–89) and HC 29-xiii (1990–91)
(b) HC 29-viii ( 1990–91)

European Standing Committee B

Wednesday 13 March

Relevant European Community Documents
(a) 9025/90 Nuclear Fusion Research
(b) 8305/90 Nuclear Fusion Programme

Relevant Reports of European Legislation Committee
(a) HC 29-i ( 1990–91)
(b) HC 11-xxxiii (1989–90)

Floor of the House

Wednesday 13 March

Relevant European Community Document

Unnumbered Court of Auditors' Report for 1989

Relevant Report of European Legislation Committee HC 29-xiii (1990–91)]

Dr. Cunningham: I begin by echoing the sentiments expressed by the Leader of the House on behalf of the Government and associate my right hon. and hon. Friends with them. You have today, Mr. Speaker, announced the beginning of the end of a long and honourable career as a Member of the House, serving the people of Croydon for 27 years, and culminating in the distinguished holding of the historic office of Speaker of the House of Commons.
That election to the Chair by your colleagues must have been the highlight of your career, indicating the trust and confidence that Members in all parts of the House placed in you when they unanimously elected you the Speaker. I can well understand that, among other things, your ultimate retirement will allow you to devote more time to your hobbies, among which, I notice, you number your grandchildren.
May I ask the Leader of the House, who has announced an inordinately long Easter recess, why an important measure that completed its Committee stage more than a month ago, the School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Bill, has still not come to the Floor of the House for its Report stage and Third Reading? If the Government can find time for such a long recess, surely they can find time to complete the consideration of such an important measure. Why has the Bill suddenly disappeared down some black hole in the Department of Education and Science?
Frankly, if the Government can find time for such a long recess and are not interested in bringing business before the House, they should simply announce the dissolution, have a general election and let us bring more important business before the House for consideration.
The Leader of the House announced the Government's intention to employ provisions of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1948 in respect of the War Crimes Bill. There is a certain irony in the Conservatives, of all Governments, invoking the provisions of that Act against their


colleagues, in the majority, in the other place. But for the moment, since we shall be debating the matter at length next week, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman to confirm that he is following the normal processes and procedures in introducing the provisions of the Parliament Acts next Tuesday?
If the Government ever reach a conclusion about their review of the poll tax—we hope that they will, since each day we learn of further horrendous costs to local authorities and their poll tax payers—may we be assured that an oral statement about that matter will be made in the House and that an announcement will not be slipped out on Maundy Thursday as the House rises or at some time during the Easter recess?

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Chris Patten): Don't you worry.

Dr. Cunningham: From a sedentary position, the Chairman of the Conservative party tells me not to worry. I suggest that right now he has more to worry about than I have—[Interruption.] We shall be first in the real election when it comes.
Has the Leader of the House seen the story on the front page of the Daily Mirror today about yet another increase in prescription charges? Does he recall the promise made to the nation by the right hon. Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher) in 1979, when she said,
We have no intention of raising prescription charges"? There have been 13 increases in prescription charges under this Government.

Mr. Richard Holt: What has this got to do with next week's business?

Dr. Cunningham: Will the Leader of the House assure us that, if the Daily Mirror story is true, the Secretary of State for Health will face the House and make an oral statement about why, for the 14th time under this Government, the Government have ratted on their promise on prescription charges which hon. Members like the hon. Member for Langbaurgh (Mr. Holt) supported on every occasion?

Mr. MacGregor: It seems to me that most of the right hon. and hon. Friends of the hon. Member for Copeland (Dr. Cunningham) have already left for the recess. They did not seem to complain very much about the length of the Easter recess.
The House will have completed a great deal of business in the 11 weeks that we will have been sitting by Maundy Thursday. We have dealt with a considerable amount of Government legislation and a great deal has been done in Standing Committees. We have also debated events in the Gulf at some length. I believe that the arrangements that I have announced will be for the general convenience of the House. Arrangements will be made for the private Members' day set down for. Friday 12 April to be rescheduled.
The hon. Member for Copeland must not become over-anxious about' the School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Bill. It is essential next week to pass the Northern Ireland (Appropriation) Order and the Consolidated Fund Bill and hence the allotted estimates day. Next week, there will be the Second Readings of two major Bills referred to in the Gracious Speech, as well as an Opposition Supply day. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that it is a few weeks since we had one of those. If

I had not come forward with one, I suspect that he would have criticised me. That is a full programme by any standards, and I remind the hon. Gentleman that the House will not rise until Thursday 28 March. He must contain his enthusiasm for the rest of the Government's programme for a little longer.
The hon. Member for Copeland is aware that the Gracious Speech contains reference to the War Crimes Bill. I can confirm that the procedure with regard to that Bill is consistent with the usual practice in these matters. Indeed, it is entirely consistent with the last time that it occurred. It may be for the convenience of the House to learn that the procedure motion that we are taking next week before the Bill's Second Reading is a procedural means to keep open the possibility of the use of the Parliament Acts if the Lords were to propose changes that the Commons could not accept; but of course the Government hope that we will end up with a Bill in a form that commands the support of the majority in both Houses.
As for the community charge, we always make statements where and when appropriate. It was hardly for the hon. Member for Copeland to complain about the comparative positions on prescription charges. I remind him that 70 per cent. of the population do not pay prescription charges and 80 per cent. of the items are dispensed free, compared with 60 per cent. in 1978 under the Labour Government at the time about which he was speaking. There is a big difference between us. We shall make an announcement on charges for 1991–92 at the proper time and in the usual way.

Mr. Robin Maxwell-Hyslop: As, in his statement about the end of Mr. Speaker's tenure, my right hon. Friend, though saying that he was unanimously elected, omitted to state that he is the first Speaker in living memory to be elected against the wishes of the Government of the day by the House of Commons, can my right hon. Friend find time during this week to make a statement reminding the House that, for the first time in living memory, it has brought back to itself not only the fiction but the fact of electing its Speaker, and to give an undertaking that, while he is Leader of the House, no Government will again attempt to impose a Speaker upon the House?

Mr. MacGregor: It will be at least some time before that matter will have to be considered. I am sure that my hon. Friend will happily agree with all the tributes that I paid to you, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. James Molyneaux: I am not suggesting that you, Mr. Speaker, do not have the right to make such an important personal decision, but it will be received with much regret not only on this Bench but by all Northern Ireland Members of Parliament. The Leader of the House mentioned the next Parliament, which we fear will be very much poorer as a result of your retirement.

Mr. Patrick Cormack: Mr. Speaker, I am sure that every Back Bencher will wish to be associated with the tributes that have been paid to you.
Will my right hon. Friend reconsider what he said about the War Crimes Bill? Is he aware that many people will think it grotesquely inappropriate that, while the butcher of Baghdad remains in power, we are turning our attention to aged men? I am not suggesting that some of


them may not have done terrible things, but will my right hon. Friend please at least guarantee a free vote on that Bill?

Mr. MacGregor: Yes, indeed. My hon. Friend expresses his own view on the matter, but I know from the pressures on me that many hon. Members feel differently. The House should have another opportunity to debate the Bill. I confirm that there will be a free vote on it.

Sir David Steel: Mr. Speaker, may I join the Leader of the House and the shadow Leader of the House in expressing gratitude for your services in the Chair? Despite your somewhat shady past in a previous incarnation, you have been assiduous in dealing fairly with the minority parties, for which we are grateful.
Is the purpose of the two-week Easter recess to enable the Government to prepare for a general election? If so, will the Leader of the House be kind enough to give us the date of it as soon as possible—the sooner the better for most of us?
Before the election is held, will the right hon. Gentleman, as a Scotsman, pay attention to the scandal that the Scottish Office remains the only Department of State that is not scrutinised by a Select Committee? As the Government resist all wider constitutional change in Scotland, when will they respond to the comments of the Select Committee on Procedure on the issue?

Mr. MacGregor: I do not associate myself with the right hon. Gentleman's remarks about you, Mr. Speaker, having a shady past. I remember that period, which you will also well recall, with much affection.
I entirely agree with the right hon. Gentleman that you, Mr. Speaker, have acted in the interests of the whole House throughout the period in which you have served with such distinction as our Speaker. We look forward to you continuing for some time.
There is no connection between my announcement of the Easter recess and the date of the general election. The right hon. Gentleman will have to wait patiently to decide where and when, and in what country, he wishes to stand. I have nothing to add to what I have already said many times about the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs.

Mr. Anthony Coombs: Hostilities in the Gulf have ceased and the allied prisoners of war have begun to return, but is my right hon. Friend aware that a number of Conservative Members are concerned to ensure that human rights abuses in Kuwait are properly investigated, and that they are concerned that the Iraqi Government seem unable or unwilling to acknowledge that they are holding no fewer than 30,000 Kuwaiti civilians and soldiers, contrary to the Geneva convention and to United Nations resolution 686, which underpins the ceasefire? May we soon have a debate on those important issues?

Mr. MacGregor: As always, we must decide when it is appropriate to make statements or hold debates on the Gulf. I cannot comment on the number of detainees whom my hon. Friend mentioned, but he will know that both the points that concern him concern the whole House and are being pursued by the Government.

Mrs. Gwyneth Dunwoody: Has the Leader of the House received a request from the Minister who has responsibility for the Stock Exchange for an opportunity to make a statement on the sale of the shares in Bioplan Ltd., which has built 10 hospitals on NHS land and which apparently is holding talks with a French company and an American health company about taking over those facilities? If it did so, American Medical International would have a monopoly of private health care, including facilities within the NHS. I trust that, by next week, his hon. Friend will come forward with a statement before the deal goes ahead, without any consultation with the NHS.

Mr. MacGregor: I know nothing of such a matter. The short answer to the question is no.

Sir Robert McCrindle: When we discuss transport votes on Monday in relation to London Regional Transport, can my right hon. Friend confirm that it will be within the restrictions of such a debate to refer to such matters as the deregulation of London buses, for example, and the possibility of road pricing in central London to discourage some commuters from bringing in their cars as they do at the moment?

Mr. MacGregor: I would think that it would be possible to discuss any matters that relate to London Regional Transport.

Mr. Andrew Faulds: I shall hope to pay my respects to you, Sir, in due course. Those valuable words can wait a while.
Since it appears that it is my private Member's Bill to deal with the illegal sale of cigarettes to children under 16 that cannot be pursued now on 12 April, may I have an assurance from the Leader of the House that it will be dealt with on the first Friday after we come back, since I was No. 1 in the ballot?

Mr. MacGregor: Clearly we shall have to reschedule the business for that day, as I have already said. I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. Obviously I have no wish to do anything that would upset the arrangements that were already in train.

Mr. Bob Dunn: Is the Leader of the House aware that many of my hon. Friends are very concerned about the continued anti-Government bias shown by the BBC, especially through the agency of the "Today" programme? Is my right hon. Friend aware that that view was also shared by the leader of the Liberal Democrat party in an article in The Sunday Times last weekend? Will he therefore arrange for us to have an urgent debate on the continuing anti-Government bias and invite the leader of the Liberal Democrat party to take part in that debate?

Mr. MacGregor: I cannot promise my hon. Friend a debate on the matter next week.

Mr. Peter Hardy: The Leader of the House will recognise that the House of Lords report on manufacturing industry, already referred to today, is of enormous importance. It is of sufficient importance to justify perhaps the unusual step of suggesting that this House, as well as the other place, debates it. If he will not agree to a debate on the broader issue, will he at least consider the urgent problem which is developing in heavy energy-using industries, not least in Rotherham


Engineering Steel, which faces enormous difficulty as a result of impending electricity price rises? Will he accept that our competitor countries will make jolly sure that they do not leave their similar industries at the mercy of market forces? Do we really have to see the remaining significant industry in my area being wiped out, along with coal, glass and everything else?

Mr. MacGregor: I do not want to get into the policy issues now, because that would be inappropriate. The hon. Gentleman will know that the Budget statement will be made on 19 March and that there will be the usual Budget debates thereafter, when matters relating to the economy and to manufacturing industries can all be discussed.

Mr. David Tredinnick: My right hon. Friend will have seen reports of President Bush's address to the joint session of Congress in which he referred to the importance of a major peace settlement in the middle east, including Israel, and referred to resolutions 242 and 338. Does my right hon. Friend agree that, having won the war, it is as important to win the peace, and that we should have an early debate to discuss the whole peace issue in the middle east while it is at the forefront of our minds?

Mr. MacGregor: My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has frequently talked about these matters. Certainly I shall bear in mind my hon. Friend's request. We shall have to consider at what appropriate time we should debate them.

Ms. Diane Abbott: Will the Leader of the House make time for a debate on foreign affairs in relation to the middle east so that, among other things, the House can debate the recent report by UNICEF, which shows that tens of thousands of civilians in Iraq face death by cholera and typhoid because of the effects of bombing on the water supply, sewerage, communications and medical services?

Mr. MacGregor: I hope that the hon. Lady is even more concerned about what has happened in Kuwait as a result of Saddam Hussein's aggression. Those matters are debated frequently. I have already said that we will have to find an appropriate time to debate affairs in the Gulf.

Mr. Richard Tracey: First, Mr. Speaker, I should say that London Members wish you well.
Is there any chance of a statement in the House next week on the management of the London borough of Lambeth, which seems to have singular difficulty in setting a fair community charge, and where there are thousands of uninhabited council houses and millions of pounds worth of uncollected rent? Even Labour Members of Parliament from that borough seem to be tearing their hair. As the situation there is almost as bad as it was in Liverpool a few years ago, should not something be done about it?

Mr. MacGregor: I am sure that many of my hon. Friends and others will wish to refer frequently in the House to the maladministration of the London borough of Lambeth and its proposed community charge. I myself referred to that during Prime Minister's Question Time on Tuesday. I understand that we are still waiting to hear what its community charge will be, but hon. Members will undoubtedly frequently refer to the contrast between Lambeth and Wandsworth, as well as to the fact that some members of Lambeth council are still not paying their community charge.

Mr. Robert N. Wareing: May we have a statement next week on the poll tax, which apparently still has to be paid by members of the anned forces serving in the Gulf, a problem which I understand arises from a recent High Court ruling? Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that members of the armed forces serving in the Gulf are more keen to know the Government's attitude on that than on war medals or victory parades?

Mr. MacGregor: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for asking that question. He will have heard the statement that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment has already made about that in order to reassure service men and others serving in the Gulf. The Department of the Environment is currently working out proposals on how to ensure that all uniformed service personnel do not have to bear the cost of the personal community charge while serving in the Gulf.

Mr. Ivor Stanbrook: Is it not the case that the procedural motion on the War Crimes Bill will deprive the House of any chance of amending that Bill, whether in order to ensure a fair trial for defendants or in any way at all? Is that not deplorable, and will the vote be whipped?

Mr. MacGregor: I have already replied to the second part of my hon. Friend's question. As to the first part, we had a full debate on the Bill in the House in the last Session, and it was passed with a large majority. It is right to follow the procedures that have been adopted in the past in relation to the Parliament Acts, which is what we are doing; that is why we are having the procedural motion next week, when my hon. Friend can make his points. It will then be a matter for the other place to decide what to do. If it amends the Bill, it will come back to this House.

Mr. Archy Kirkwood: Has the Leader of the House yet had a chance to study the debate that we had this week after 10 o'clock on the tie-up order for the fishing fleet? Is he aware that that was a debate on an amending order, that the original order is still within time, and that, if the Government chose, they could have a debate on that order in the near future? Having regard to the unsatisfactory nature of this week's debate, will he consider carefully and with some sympathy an early debate on the original order some time next week?

Mr. MacGregor: I am sorry that I cannot promise such a debate next week. We have already debated the matter twice recently in the House.

Mr. Roger King: Is my right hon. Friend aware of strong evidence that his programme for the week's business tends to interfere with the Opposition's dining arrangements? Is he aware that, during the concluding session of debate on the Criminal Justice Bill last week, the shadow Home Secretary was addressing the "thousand club" of 1,000 lawyers paying £1,000 a time?

Mr. Speaker: Order. Questions should relate to business next week, please.

Mr. King: Will my right hon. Friend arrange the business for next week so that it does not interfere with such arrangements?

Mr. MacGregor: It is for the right hon. Gentleman to decide his own programme. I am sure that he has a capable


and hard-working social secretary who will enable him to do that. I am afraid that I cannot adjust the business of the House around any hon. Member's programme.

Mr. Max Madden: Can the Leader of the House arrange an early debate on the police? He was here during Home Office questions, when he heard colleagues from south and west Yorkshire mention the ludicrous situation whereby the Home Office recommends police levels, but if police authorities budget accordingly they are in danger of being poll tax-capped by the Department of the Environment. Will he urgently investigate that, because to many of our constituents it appears to be madness to take bobbies off the streets with crime soaring? Will he look into this matter so that we can provide proper protection for all parts of Yorkshire and for all our constituents?

Mr. MacGregor: We have been carrying through a heavy Government legislative programme and trying to ensure that a number of other issues of major importance, such as the Gulf, get full time in the House. I have also been endeavouring to give the Opposition every opportunity in Supply days, and if the hon. Gentleman wishes to pursue that matter, that is one way in which it can be done.

Mr. Roger Knapman: When the House debates the War Crimes Bill, will it be in order to volunteer an obvious candidate—Saddam Hussein? Is it not a peculiar religious creed which allows Saddam Hussein to say that the allies must not destroy the holy cities of Iraq when, now that there is civil war there, he seems to have no compunction about fighting in them?

Mr. MacGregor: My hon. Friend has clearly made his point in relation to Saddam Hussein. He will know that there is no relationship between the War Crimes Bill and the recent conflict in the Gulf. Both are entirely separate. The measures that we are taking in the War Crimes Bill relate to the second world war, and are no longer necessary for any other conflict.

Mr. Harry Ewing: To avoid misunderstanding, I shall join my hon. Friend the Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds) in paying my warm tribute to you at a later date, Mr. Speaker. I assure you that it will be worth waiting for.
After the announcement that troops will be returning from the Gulf in the early part of next week, and with particular reference to the Territorial units that will be returning, will the Leader of the House arrange for an urgent statement to be made on Monday or Tuesday of next week about those members of the Territorial forces who were conscripted on the basis that their jobs would be protected and would be there when they returned home?
Clearly that will not be the case for many Scottish Territorial soldiers who volunteered for service in the Gulf. Before they start coming to Members' surgeries, could the Leader of the House arrange early next week for the House to be informed who will honour the commitment to these men—a commitment made by the Secretary of State for Defence to encourage them to join up?

Mr. MacGregor: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said this afternoon that our troops will start to

return shortly from the Gulf. Obviously, that will be phased over some time. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, as I understand it, is making a statement about that later this afternoon. I shall draw the hon. Gentleman's question to the attention of my right hon. Friend.

Mr. John Bowis: Those of us who were not in the House before the last election and were therefore not responsible for your election to your place of honour, Mr. Speaker, are grateful to those hon. Members who were responsible for enabling us to benefit from your unfailingly kind, courteous and patient care for new Back Benchers.
My right hon. Friend the Leader of the House referred to Easter. One aspect of Easter is an area of transport which will not be covered by next week's debate—river transport. Will he bear in mind the anxiety about river safety, especially in Thameside constituencies? Although we cannot discuss the full report on the Marchioness until prosecution has taken place, nevertheless the recommendations of that report, especially regarding visibility of craft and the noise levels on such craft, are known, and it would be helpful if the House could have an early opportunity to discuss them.

Mr. MacGregor: My hon. Friend has already pointed out the problem about the timing of a debate on the full report. I cannot promise him a debate in the near future, but I shall bear in mind what he has said.

Mrs. Alice Mahon: Will the Leader of the House find time before the recess for a debate on housing? Is he aware that we are in the midst of the worst housing crisis since the war? People come to hon. Members' surgeries and tell us that their homes are being repossessed because of mortgage problems. They cannot obtain council housing; there are 7,000 people on the waiting list in my authority.
The past 11 years of Tory policies are responsible for all that. Do not the Government owe it to the thousands who have suffered under those dreadful policies to do something about it? Let us at least debate the matter in the House.

Mr. MacGregor: That is an extraordinary distortion of the true position. The progress is very much in the other direction. I am afraid that there will not be time for such a debate in the near future.

Mr. Patrick Nicholls: Will my right hon. Friend reconsider the possibility of a debate along the lines suggested by the hon. Member for Halifax (Mrs. Mahon)? Would it not give him an opportunity to remind the House that there has been a 12 per cent. increase in the rent arrears owed to English housing associations, and that, while £361 million is now outstanding, the overwhelming majority of that arose under Labour? Is it not entirely wrong for the tenants who pay to have to carry the burden that that represents? Is it not about time that high-spending Labour authorities realised that no rent from some means no homes for others?

Mr. MacGregor: My hon. Friend has made his point extremely well. Many other points could be made on the subject, and I hope that they will be made continually at Question Time, in Adjournment debates and on other


occasions in the House. I cannot, however, envisage that a debate in Government time will be possible in the near future.

Rev. Martin Smyth: The Leader of the House has already given us an extended Easter break. Yesterday, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Bill was passed, along with a Northern Ireland order. In future, may we legislate for Northern Ireland by means of Bills? Our debates would then proceed much faster than the arguments that go on in relation to orders.

Mr. MacGregor: I cannot immediately promise any change in the procedure. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will acknowledge that we have conducted a good deal of Northern Ireland business in the past few days.

Sir Bernard Braine: Unfortunately, owing to an appointment with the dentist, I was not present when an extremely important announcement was made about you, Mr. Speaker. Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind the fact that many hon. Members on both sides of the House would like to be given a special time at which to pay tribute to the urbanity and good will with which you have presided over our affairs throughout the current Parliament?

Mr. MacGregor: I am sure that my right hon. Friend speaks on behalf of the whole House from his distinguished position. I entirely share his view. I have already said that this afternoon is not the time for proper tributes to be paid, but I personally want an opportunity to say a great deal more than I have today.

Mr. Speaker: Perhaps it would be right if I said now that, although I am grateful to the whole House, I think that we should deal with next week's business. We have a busy day ahead of us.

Mr. Bob Cryer: May we have a debate next week on proportional representation and the first-past-the-post system, so that we can outline the virtues of the first-past-the-post system and the anti-democratic elements of proportional representation?
The Leader of the House has mentioned the Easter recess. Will he assure the House that he does not propose to introduce legislation after the recess to allow members of the royal family to resign their comfortable offices and take part in the political process, and that until then they should keep their mouths shut?

Mr. MacGregor: I do not know what was said, so I shall not comment on the second part of the hon. Gentleman's question; but I am rather surprised to find myself in agreement with his comments about proportional representation.

Mr. Simon Coombs: My right hon. Friend will be well aware of the recent publication of reports by the core curriculum working parties on the teaching of music and history. He will also be aware that great interest and concern has been expressed both in this House and elsewhere about the implications of the reports. Does he have a sufficiently fond regard for his previous incarnation to put pressure on his right hon. and learned Friend the present Secretary of State for Education and Science to arrange for a debate on those most important matters?

Mr. MacGregor: I certainly do have a fond regard for my previous position. The matters that I dealt with then

and that my hon. Friend raises now relating to the teaching of history and music are extremely important. The House will certainly have an opportunity to discuss them when the appropriate orders come before the House.

Mr. Harry Cohen: When we debate London Regional Transport on Monday, will whatever is on the Order Paper be amendable? Will those hon. Members whose constituents have suffered from bus cuts be able to put on the agenda the fact that services should be restored, or that those who are responsible for the overcrowding and shabbiness of our public transport should be sacked? Alternatively, will we have to wait for the general election to do that to this Government?

Mr. MacGregor: It is simply to be a debate on part of the estimates.

Mr. Jacques Arnold: Now that the community charges that are being set for the coming financial year are pouring out in a vast torrent from the town halls, will my right hon. Friend try to find time for the House to discuss the rapidly growing disparity between the low community charges set by Conservative authorities and the high ones set by Labour authorities?

Mr. MacGregor: Those matters will be raised frequently in the House and among the public at large. I am sure that the general public will draw their own conclusions—that the vast majority of prudent authorities with reasonable community charges are Conservative ones, and that the high-spending ones are Labour authorities.

Dr. Dafydd Elis Thomas: In view of your strictures, Mr. Speaker, that we should confine our questions to debates that are to be held next week, may I ask the Leader of the House to arrange a debate next week on the role of Mr. Speaker in maintaining democracy within the House? In the context of that debate, does the right hon. Gentleman accept from our Bench our view that Mr. Speaker has ensured that the minorities in the House have been heard?
Does the right hon. Gentleman also recollect the statement of Mr. Speaker Selwyn Lloyd when I first arrived here 17 years ago—that we are all minorities? In view of my impending retirement from the House, along with Mr. Speaker, does the right hon. Gentleman also accept that I hope that parliamentary democracy and the recognition of minorities will continue in this Chamber long after we have both retired?

Mr. MacGregor: I do not think that it will be necessary to have a debate. As I said at the beginning, there is general agreement in the House that you, Mr. Speaker, have behaved with great fairness and impartiality, apart from all your other qualities. The point is already well taken.

Mr. Holt: My right hon. Friend, and many right hon. and hon. Members in all parts of the House, will have constituents who lost their savings as a result of the fraudulent and swindling way in which the savings bank on the Isle of Man operated. No one has yet been brought to justice for that. As a veneer of respectability is given to the Isle of Man by virtue of its allegiance to the Queen and by the fact that we supply its judiciary, is it not time that the House held a debate on the Isle of Man and its


relationship to this House and how we can get justice for our constituents who have lost their life savings as a result of fraud by the gangsters who run that island?

Mr. MacGregor: I cannot comment on the points raised by my hon. Friend, because I do not know enough about them. However, I cannot foresee a debate being held in the near future in Government time on these matters.

Mr. Ron Brown: As the Leader of the House is an Edinburgh man, he will understand that many of my constituents, particularly those with relatives in the Gulf, feel betrayed. The local comprehensive, Ainslie Park high school is about to close. They feel betrayed because they were never consulted. It has come to light that, several years ago, there was a secret deal with World Markets, a finance house. Telford college, which is nearby, sold ground to World Markets. Part of the kickback system was that Telford college benefited from the grounds owned by Ainslie Park high school.
We believe that the matter should be debated, because it is of vital importance. May we have an early debate— perhaps next week—so that we can go into the fine details of this complex matter? I know that that may upset the right hon. Gentleman's friends in high places—the financiers in Edinburgh, who have certainly benefited at the expense of the local community—but it is most important that we should have the facts. If the right hon. Gentleman believes in open government, I believe in open government. Let us get down to the nitty-gritty so that we can explain the issues to the people back home and to the returning soldiers, who are very angry about this matter.

Mr. MacGregor: I also believe in being precise, and I thought that the hon. Gentleman rambled a bit. Let me correct him on one point: I come from exactly halfway between Glasgow and Edinburgh. I think that the hon. Gentleman will have to find his own opportunity to raise the matter.

Mr. Phillip Oppenheim: Will my right hon. Friend arrange a debate on voluntary bodies as soon as possible so that Conservative Members can raise the question of the so-called "thousand club", which has been set up by the shadow Leader of the House to give wealthy socialists privileged access to the shadow Cabinet at £1,000 a time? Does my right hon. Friend agree that only under a Tory Government can people afford to join such a daft organisation, and that most people would require payment to meet the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, East (Mr. Prescott)?

Mr. MacGregor: For once, I am lost for words. My hon. Friend has made some good points most effectively, but I cannot think of a suitable reply. I hope that he will have opportunities to raise the matter again.

Mr. Harry Barnes: What are the exact plans for debates on the Gulf? Should we not have a series of debates—one on the setting up of a separate Palestinian state, one on the great humanitarian problems in both Iraq and Kuwait, which is covered by United Nations resolution 666, and one on the supply of arms in the area? We also need a debate on the

environmental problems in addition to the welcome debate initiated by my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell).

Mr. MacGregor: I was going to say to the hon. Gentleman that there will be a debate on environmental matters next Friday, on a motion tabled by the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), and an appropriate Minister will take part. The hon. Gentleman has raised important matters, and the occasions on which we debate them should be a matter for discussion through the usual channels in the normal way. I am quite sure that these matters will be discussed quite often in the House in the months ahead.

Mr. David Trimble: Has the Leader of the House seen the reports in this morning's papers to the effect that the Lord Chancellor has said that he and the Attorney-General would be quite happy to have a Select Committee established to deal with their functions? Does the Leader of the House think that that happy precedent will be followed by the Northern Ireland Office and that that Department will now stop blocking the creation of a Select Committee to deal with Northern Ireland affairs?

Mr. MacGregor: I think I am right in saying that the recent Procedure Committee report on Select Committees deals with the Law Officers, and the Government will be responding to that report in due course.

Mr. George Howarth: Has the Leader of the House had an opportunity to look at early-day motion 538?
[That this House calls on the Government to provide parliamentary time at an early day for proceedings on the Veterans Bill.]
The motion has now been signed by nearly 200 hon. Members representing every shade of opinion in the House. Will the Leader of the House consider whether time can be found in the parliamentary schedule to allow the Bill to have its Second Reading at a proper time, when hon. Members can vote on it, as there is clearly some enthusiasm for it?

Mr. MacGregor: On the policy issues and the creation of a veterans' department, the Government's position has been made clear, and I want to concentrate on the procedural matter that the hon. Gentleman raises. As he knows, the allocation of private Members' time is agreed by the House at the beginning of the Session. It has not been the Government's practice to grant additional time, and I therefore cannot undertake to do so in this case.

Mr. Dennis Skinner: Will the Leader of the House arrange for a statement to be made by the appropriate Minister about arms sales from this country to the middle east, which are continuing on a grand scale? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Iran, which is now flexing its muscles in the middle east, is receiving contracts and equipment for computer systems for its weapons technology and that, in spite of all the efforts made to raise the matter, those sales continue? In the past few weeks, we have heard a lot of talk about selling arms and about merchants of death, but arms are still being sold to other countries in the middle east, and it is time that we had a blanket assurance that the Government will stop the arms trade to dictators in any part of the world.

Mr. MacGregor: My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence has already made clear the position on arms sales to Iraq. The hon. Gentleman will know that all proposed arms exports beyond Iraq are considered case by case and are subject to stringent licensing procedures.

Mr. Cryer: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. During business questions, the Leader of the House said that his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence would make a statement—he used those specific words—about the returning soldiers. This is an important topic and a statement would be welcome to the House, but I believe that the Leader of the House was referring to a planted parliamentary question, which is less than satisfactory. However, he used the word "statement".

Mr. MacGregor: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I was repeating what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said earlier this afternoon. I believe that he made clear what will happen in the early stages of the withdrawal of our troops from the Gulf and their repatriation. My right hon. Friend gave the main outline of what will happen in the near future.

Consolidated Fund (No. 2) Bill

Mr. Speaker: I have a short statement to make about the arrangements for the debate on the motion for the Adjournment, which will follow the passing of the Consolidated Fund (No. 2) Bill on Thursday 14 March.
Members should submit their subjects to my Office not later than 10 pm on Tuesday 12 March. The list showing the subjects and times will he published the following day. Normally, the time allotted will not exceed one and a half

hours, but I propose to exercise discretion to allow one or two debates to continue for rather longer, up to a maximum of three hours. Where identical or similar subjects have been entered by different Members whose names are drawn in the ballot, only the first name will appear on the list. As some debates may not last the full time allotted to them, it is the responsibility of Members to keep in touch with developments if they are not to miss their turn.

BILLS PRESENTED

WAR CRIMES

Mr. Secretary Baker, supported by the Prime Minister, Mr. Secretary Hurd, Mr. Secretary King, Mr. Secretary Brooke, Mr. Secretary Hunt, Mr. Secretary Lang and Mr. John Patten, presented a Bill to confer jurisdiction on United Kingdom courts in respect of certain grave violations of the laws and customs of war committed in German-held territory during the Second World War; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 8 March, and to be printed. [Bill 105.]

OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS (GENERAL PROVISIONS)

Mr. Tony Benn, supported by Mr. Jeremy Corbyn, Mr. Dennis Skinner, Mrs. Alice Mahon, Ms. Diane Abbott, Mr. Harry Barnes, Mr. Bernie Grant, Mr. Ron Brown, Mrs. Audrey Wise and Mr. Dave Nellist, presented a Bill to provide for the trade union representation, security of employment, health and safety, and training, of personnel serving on offshore installations and in vessels and other craft working in conjunction with such installations: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 15 March, and to be printed. [Bill 99.]

Piper Alpha (Cullen Report)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Neil Hamilton.]

The Secretary of State for Energy (Mr. John Wakeham): I am very grateful that time has been found for a full debate on this important subject. There are, as always, a great many demands on the time of the House, but this is a matter which deserves our particular attention, involvement and action.
I received a letter last week from the widow of one of the victims of the Piper disaster. She said that, two and a half years later, his family and friends miss him as much as ever; but they felt that the issue of North sea safety was in danger of being forgotten by the press, the public and Parliament. I said to her, and I say to the House today, that the Government have not forgotten. On the contrary, we are pressing ahead in the endeavour for better arrangements for safety, not least through the prompt and effective implementation of the Cullen report.
The House will recall that I announced on 12 November the Government's immediate acceptance of Lord Cullen's conclusions and recommendations. Since then, the reputation of Lord Cullen's report has grown, and there is no danger of exaggeration in saying that it has won acclaim and respect from all sides.
The report confirms where responsibilities for safety should, and must, lie; and reformulates those responsibilities in a way which will have far-reaching effects on the way in which offshore safety will be organised in the future. It amounts to a fundamentally new regulatory system centring on requirements for operators of offshore installations to carry out formal and comprehensive safety assessments of their operations. These should be presented to the regulatory body as a safety case, demonstrating the adequacy of the company's safety management system; the identification and control of risks to personnel from potential major hazards; and the provision, in the event of a major emergency, of temporary safe refuge for the personnel on an installation, and of means for their safe and full evacuation, escape and rescue.
In the light of those far-reaching recommendations, Lord Cullen considered the most appropriate location of regulatory responsibility. He concluded, on balance, that it would be best located in a separate and identifiable division within the Health and Safety Executive.
Many Members will be particularly interested in this transfer of responsibility, and I think it right to mention at this point that the transfer has been an urgent priority since the publication of the report. Excellent progress has been made on the large number of organisational changes and agreements that are necessary. Subject to the agreement of the Health and Safety Commission, I hope to announce shortly the date on which the transfer will take effect. I hope that that date will be before the end of April.
That transfer to the HSE of the day-to-day responsibility for regulating safety on offshore installa-tions on behalf of the HSC can be effected by administrative action. Consideration has also been given to the legislative implications of Lord Cullen's report, and a package of necessary changes has been identified. I hope those can be introduced as soon as practicable. However, they are mainly technical changes to existing statutes to

reflect the intended reallocation of responsibilities, and to lay the foundations for a future programme of new regulations in line with Lord Cullen's recommendations.

Mr. Alex Salmond: Will the Secretary of State say a little more about the likely location of the health and safety inspectorate? Is he aware of the strong feeling among Scottish Members that it should be located in north-east Scotland, with the front end of the industry? It is not just a question of geography but of oil industry psychology. A health and safety inspectorate located in north-east Scotland, where the oil workers are, would have more contact with and knowledge of the industry than if it were located in London, where the oil company executives and headquarters are.

Mr. Wakeham: I understand that view—it has been put to me several times—but the location of the new offshore safety division is a matter for the Health and Safety Executive. The chairman of the Health and Safety Commission has said that he sees the need for a substantial increase in present staff numbers in Aberdeen but that a comprehensive relocation of existing staff at present would cause serious difficulties. It is he who will have the responsibility of deciding.

Mr. Robert Hughes: I shall return to this question later, but before the Secretary of State leaves the issue of transfer of responsibility from his Department, will he say whether agreement has been reached about extra costs necessary to provide the safety regime? Can he confirm that the total amount sought by the Health and Safety Executive has been made available?

Mr. Wakeham: Satisfactory progress has been made on all the negotiations, which has enabled me to say what I said about making transfers next month. A few minor matters are still to be finalised, but I understand that they do not involve any dispute about money. Therefore, there is broad agreement on all those matters, but there are procedures to deal with them.
The hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) need not be concerned. The Government have made it abundantly clear that those arrangements will not be held back through lack of resources; adequate resources for the purpose will be found. I have also said that the other matter that could delay the arrangements—the legislative implications of Lord Cullen's report—affected mainly technical issues, and will not delay the transfer to the HSC.

Mr. Ernie Ross: Will the Secretary of State give way?

Mr. Wakeham: I think that I had better make a little more progress. I shall give way in a moment.
Safety in offshore petroleum operations is, of course, and always has been, the responsibility of the operators themselves. Lord Cullen makes it clear that a regulator cannot be expected to assume direct responsibility for the ongoing management of safety. There may be circumstan-ces in which inspectors can and should take direct enforcement action, but those are the exception. He says that, for all practical purposes, the management of safety is and remains in the hands of the operators.
Lord Cullen's conclusions draw on, and confirm, the conclusions of many eminent committees and inquiries, not least those of the Robens committee, whose recommendations formed the basis of the Health and


Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974. Lord Cullen goes on, however, to propose a sharpening of the operators' responsibilities. He says that specific duties should be laid upon them to organise their operations in a systematic way; management should structure and document their systems for securing safety, analyse the hazards present or foreseeable, and implement the necessary controls. Most crucially, they should monitor their own performance in every aspect of the system. The role of the regulatory organisation should be to probe the adequacy of the assessments and the controls, audit the monitoring and test the actual results.
The essence of such an approach is not that the regulatory organisation should produce minutely detailed rules prescribing for every necessary safety procedure and every situation. That would in practical terms be impossible, because of the enormous variety and complexity of the actual working situations on offshore installations. Worse, it would be self-defeating, because it would obstruct the flexibility which is necessary to make use of new technology and advances in safety techniques.
The oil industry is one of our most dynamic industries. It has shown great inventiveness and resourcefulness. It ought to have the freedom to apply that drive and ingenuity to providing the best resolution of safety problems.
It is tempting to say that there must be detailed rules and a clearly prescribed approach, but in real life—not least in the very complex and closely packed circumstances of offshore installations—safety objectives often conflict with each other. Achieving a better standard of safety depends on finding the best balance between different approaches or aims, not on some prescriptive, rule-book approach. The right role for Government is to provide a broad framework to ensure that the operator fully discharges his responsibilities for securing safety.

Mr. Malcolm Bruce: I think that it is right to make the companies responsible for their own safety. However, does not the Secretary of State acknowledge that one problem on offshore installations is the division between the employees of oil companies as operators and contractors? Is there not a case for making oil companies or the operators legally responsible for all personnel on their platforms and for the conditions under which they operate, including their working conditions and their pay?

Mr. Wakeham: That question is not exactly correct— the employer has considerable legal responsibilities. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker. If he expands on his case, we shall listen to it with interest and take note of what he says.
Effective safety depends on the active involvement of every worker. Each must know what his role is and what is expected of him, and he must be able to contribute from his experience and have a voice.
Where I think that there is a difference between the Government's approach and that of the Opposition is in the necessity that they see for trade union recognition. They believe that there is an inevitable equation between involvement of the work force and representation of trade unions, and that only recognised trade unions can effectively represent the work force in these matters

Mr. Gavin Strang: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Wakeham: If the hon. Gentleman will let me continue a little longer, I shall then give way.
The Government's approach is based on the conviction that effective involvement of the whole offshore work force is essential to the promotion and improvement of safety. Every employee working offshore has a right to be represented on a safety committee and to make a positive contribution to improving health and safety in his workplace, whether or not he is a member of a trade union.

Mr. Strang: No member of the Opposition would say that an offshore oil worker who is not in a trade union is not concerned about his safety. We are saying that if an independent safety representative has the backing of a trade union, he is more likely, on average, to be effective and to have power where it matters when compared to one who does not have the backing of a trade union. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the Cullen report was not as clear-cut on that issue as we might have wanted, as was made clear in our exchanges on 12 November. I suggest that there is a strong case for extending the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974 to give offshore oil workers the same rights as onshore oil workers. Will the right hon. Gentleman at least say that the Government are prepared to continue a dialogue on the issue?

Mr. Wakeham: I understand the strength of the hon. Gentleman's views, and he has a perfect right to them, but they are not supported in Lord Cullen's report. The Government's position is closer to Lord Cullen's.

Mr. Strang: I shall not intervene again.
Constituents come to our surgeries who are blacklisted by the oil companies or who know that the oil companies have secret information about them from the first day that they start working for them. We know that the companies pursue that policy; that is why it is essential that trade unions should be a countervailing force as, for example, they are in the Norwegian sector.

Mr. Wakeham: Those people should produce evidence to back their allegations. We will not tolerate victimisation, and we should take a serious view of it if it were proved.

Mr. Chris Mullin: The right hon. Gentleman must be aware that there is a climate of fear among contract workers in the offshore industry. They live in the knowledge that, if they ask questions—even about safety—they will have "not required back" put on their file. That makes people sceptical about the possibility of raising safety issues. Many people who come to my surgery —and to that of my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Strang)—live in such a climate. Some are faced with the prospect of long periods of unemployment simply because they raised their head above the parapet on issues such as safety.

Mr. Wakeham: The hon. Gentleman speaks with much conviction. Almost every hon. Member has constituents employed in the offshore industry. I believe that, if anybody had evidence of victimisation, he would produce it. Somebody must have some evidence if the allegations are true. It should be sent to us, and we shall deal with it.

Mr. Frank Dobson: I wrote to the right hon. Gentleman about the matter, and his reply can be summarised as, "It is nothing to do with me: it is a matter for the employers."

Mr. Wakeham: That is not necessarily an accurate summary of either my reply or of the question. I am trying to be as conciliatory as I can. I do not deny that trade unions can have a valuable contribution to make in improving safety. I had a useful discussion with Mr. Norman Willis and a delegation from the Trades Union Congress safety committee the other day in which we had a fruitful exchange of views. The trade unions already play a role at the highest level through their representation on the Health and Safety Commission.

Dr. Michael Clark: I have never worked offshore on a platform, but I have worked in the chemical industry for many years, operating the type of plant on land that the platforms use offshore. Will my right hon. Friend therefore accept from me that safety represen-tatives, when putting their case to the employer, want not power but common sense? Their employer wants to listen with good will, and both need to take a responsible attitude.

Mr. Wakeham: I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. We also believe that representatives offshore should have the added authority of being elected by all the staff who work offshore. That is the best way in which to do it.
I referred to the valuable role that the trade unions play in improving safety. Some unions have drawn together real expertise on these matters, and many have relevant expertise to contribute. They can make representations on health and safety matters to the offshore employers at any time and there are established channels of discussion through, for example, the oil industry advisory committee of the Health and Safety Commission. If these unions make genuine representations, there and elsewhere, on behalf of their members, they will have my full support. If they make representations on behalf of offshore workers who are not their members, they will also have my admiration.
As Opposition Members have regularly quoted Lord Cullen in support of their views, I have refreshed my memory on just what he has to say. At paragraph 21.83 of his report he explains that his remit did not extend to matters of industrial relations and that he was therefore not concerned with the merits of the recognition of trade unions offshore. He thought that the appointment of offshore safety representatives by trade unions—I quote his precise words—
could be of some benefit".
However, he went on to recognise, in paragraph 21.85, that the position offshore is complicated by a number of factors: the limited extent of trade union membership in relation to the total offshore work force, the limited recognition of trade unions and the complex structure of offshore employment.
Lord Cullen did not favour replacing the 1989 regulations with the extension offshore of the 1977 regulations. That would remove safety representatives from a large part of the work force and would undo the progress that was achieved by the making of the 1989 regulations. He endorses the Government's intention to review their effectiveness two years after their coming into force. I think that it is fair to say that that is a pragmatic and balanced view. The Government's approach to the appointment of safety representatives and the constitution of safety committees in this industry is no less pragmatic and balanced. Under the 1989 regulations, safety representatives are elected by the whole work force. That

ensures their effective involvement in the development and improvement of health and safety procedures, and promotes co-operation between management and work force towards the common goal of a safer offshore environment. The regulations mark a significant advance towards the greater involvement of the work force, which Lord Cullen's report recommends. The trade unions will have a full opportunity to present their views during the review.
I now turn to the steps that the Government have taken to implement Lord Cullen's recommendations and to the way in which we see this going forward. I have already mentioned progress with the transfer of regulatory responsibilities to the HSE. Lord Cullen commented that this change would take time to implement and would inevitably involve disruption. That is only realistic, but I must point out that we are doing all we can to keep the necessary time, and the extent of disruption, to the minimum.
Intensive and urgent discussions have been going on between my Department, the Health and Safety Executive and the other bodies concerned on the best strategy for taking forward the implementation of the report and on the resources that this will require. We have also been doing all that we can to strengthen and expand the safety directorate. Safety has been upgraded to a full division to reflect the importance of its work. That will also help to pave the way for the transfer.
Mr. Tony Barrell, lately head of the HSE's technology division, has been appointed to head the new offshore safety division. Proposals will shortly be put to the Commission on its organisation. Further staff have been recruited to strengthen the division in its existing tasks and to tackle the new responsibilities recommended by Lord Cullen. A major recruitment programme is under way to provide the right mix of skills in a further strengthening of the division. Urgent steps are also being taken to expand the training and instruction of the inspectors, and to reinforce the capacity to probe and assess management's arrangements to secure safety in their operations.
Those important steps have involved close co-operation between the Departments involved, with my Department taking the overall lead. Once the transfer takes place, it will, of course, be for the Commission and the executive to consider the priorities for the work of the offshore safety division and for the broader implementation of the report.

Dr. Norman A. Godman: I am grateful to the Secretary of State for showing his characteristic courtesy.
Will the inspectors he mentioned a few seconds ago be concerned with the assessment of standby vessels? Surely the Secretary of State will recall that one of the major criticisms of Lord Cullen's report was directed against the inadequacy of the aging side trawler Silver Pit. It should never have been used as a standby vessel.
How many similar aging side trawlers are still engaged in the operation of standby vessels in both the southern and northern sectors of the North sea? How many purpose-built standby vessels have been ordered by the companies in addition to the one that is to be built in my constituency at the Ferguson shipyard? I suspect that the single vessel ordered at Ferguson is the only new standby vessel that has been ordered since this terrible tragedy.

Mr. Wakeham: Yes, standby vessels will be of concern to the Health and Safety Executive. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that one of its first tasks will be a full review of the standby vessels. The hon. Gentleman makes some points that are highly relevant to that review, but I do not have the detailed answers, which will come up in the review, which has not taken place yet. I have some expert advisers near at hand, but they cannot tell me the answers to a review that has not taken place. That is beyond even them. The hon. Gentleman makes an important point and the matters are of concern.

Mr. Ernie Ross: The Secretary of State described how the transfer will go ahead and how his Department and other departments—he mentioned the Health and Safety Commission and the Health and Safety Executive—are involved. He will know that Lord Cullen specifically identified one individual—Mr. Rimington, the director-general of the Commission—as responsible for ensuring that sufficient funds are available so that he, as director-general, can carry out his new responsibilities. However, the director-general reports to a different Secretary of State.
Does the Secretary of State accept Lord Cullen's directive that Mr. Rimington will be responsible, as he does not negotiate with the Treasury? The Secretary of State for Employment will have to negotiate with the Treasury. If the Secretary of State for Employment does not find enough money from the Treasury for Mr. Rimington to carry out his responsibilities, how can he be held responsible? Is the Secretary of State for Employment involved in the continuing dialogue during the transfer period?

Mr. Wakeham: Mr. Rimington, who is a senior and experienced man, and I have had discussions, as has my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Employment. The hon. Gentleman is concerned that there should be adequate finance for the tasks that the Health and Safety Executive will have to carry out. Obviously, Mr. Rimington would not accept responsibility for carrying out tasks if he did not have adequate finance. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that adequate resources will be made available. When all the loose ends have been tied up, the transfer will be made. There is no problem about dealing with these matters.

Mr. Ross: Either the Secretary of State does not want to answer the question, or he does not understand it. Lord Cullen identified Mr. Rimington specifically as the person whom he will hold responsible if there are not sufficient funds. If the Secretary of State for Employment is to negotiate with the Treasury, how can Mr. Rimington be held responsible?

Mr. Wakeham: Mr. Rimington is a very senior person in the Health and Safety Executive, but as he does not have resources, the Government will have to ensure that he is given sufficient funds for his task. He and the Health and Safety Commission must be satisfied that they have adequate resources. Those are the arrangements that we are making. There will not be a shortage of finance. This is not a personal responsibility of anybody.

Mr. Ross: That is not what Mr. Rimington told the Select Committee on Employment.

Mr. Wakeham: If the hon. Gentleman were to listen, he would realise that I am giving a very satisfactory answer to the question whether there will be sufficient resources to implement the recommendations of the Cullen report, which the Government have accepted. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that there will be no problem about finding adequate resources—no problem for Mr. Rimington, no problem for me, no problem for the Secretary of State for Employment, and no problem for the Chief Secretary to the Treasury. We all agree on the arrangements that should be made.
The hon. Gentleman can phrase his question 15 different ways, but he will get the same answer. As the Secretary of State who will be responsible for these matters until they have been transferred, I can assure the hon. Gentleman that proper arrangements have been made.
It will be for the Commission and the executive to consider the priorities for the work of the offshore safety division and the broader implementation of the report. I understand that strategy proposals are to be put to them, in parallel with the detailed proposals for the transfer of responsibilities. Clearly it would not be right for me to anticipate any of that strategy in detail until they have been able to consider it. I can say, however, that priority is being given to developing the centrepiece of the new regulatory system—that is, the new requirement for safety cases—with a view to putting forward early drafts of the necessary regulations and guidance.
I should like to conclude by saying a few words about two particular aspects of the new regulatory system, and specifically about what should be expected of the companies. These two aspects are the safety cases and the process of learning from experience.
What the safety cases really require is that each operator should assess the risks of its operation, ensure that every measure has been taken to reduce these risks, and demonstrate that it has discharged its responsibilities properly. A safety case should identify all major accidents that could pose a threat to human life, and analyse the causes and consequences of these accidents. Our objective itself is enough to enable all operators to put work in hand straight away towards the preparation of future safety cases. Indeed, I should be very surprised if any operator on the United Kingdom continental shelf had not already initiated work in this direction.
By assessing the risks, companies can then carefully consider ways in which they will control and minimise those risks, and ensure that safety measures and operational procedures are adequate to secure safety in operations and are carefully monitored. Although drawn up and submitted at one point in time—in particular, in the case of a new offshore installation, it will be required that a submission should be made before operations start —a safety case will not be a one-off exercise, an exercise that is carried out once, put on the shelf and forgotten. It should be a live document that develops as the operations, the techniques and the potential control systems, and the men and management themselves, change and evolve. It should reflect a continuing process of improving the controls and reducing the risks in the light of practical experience.
This feedback should come from many sources. It should come from the operator's auditing and monitoring of his own systems, on which Lord Cullen has placed particular stress. That auditing should not be merely a


routine check, but should include serious probing of the earlier thinking. One of the most important sources of feedback should be the analysis of incidents.
For every serious accident, there are many minor accidents or dangerous occurrences, which, although they may not themselves have serious outcomes, can be analysed to uncover weaknesses in the systems, which on some other occasion might lead to serious injury or even fatalities. But the largest and broadest resource out of which lessons can be learned is the work force itself. Every operator should have arrangements for gathering and making use of the experience and observation of the work force. Every worker should have something to contribute, and should have, albeit in a small way, a role as safety inspector.
In conclusion, I again welcome the opportunity for the House to debate a matter of absolutely central importance to the deeply felt issue of offshore safety. I have to own that the timing of the opportunity is not quite ideal for me, in that I am not quite at the point of being able to announce the final details of the agreement on the transfer of regulatory responsibility to the Health and Safety Executive. But hon. Members will make good use of the chance to put their concerns to the Government before the arrangements for the transfer are fixed. I shall consider carefully the matters that have been raised by hon. Members before giving final approval to the necessary arrangements.

Mr. Frank Dobson: On the night of 6 July 1988 there were 226 men on the Piper Alpha platform, where they earned their living. At 10 o'clock that night 62 men were working, and 164 men were off duty. Just after 10 o'clock there was an explosion and a fire. Further explosions followed, and the platform became an inferno as gas from other installations continued to be pumped to Piper Alpha. Only 61 of those men survived —scrambling and leaping to safety as best they could. Of those who died, 14 perished while trying to escape. The fire was so intense that it melted the structural steel of parts of the platform, and literally laid waste the fire protection that was intended to help survival.
No words can describe the horror of the explosions and the fire, but the horror can perhaps be gauged by the fact that some of the survivors, and, indeed, some of those who died, jumped into the sea from high up on the platform, although, in training, they had been warned that this would mean almost certain death. Five people even jumped from the heli-deck 175 feet above the water. Great courage was displayed by many on the platform, and this was matched by the bravery and self-sacrifice of the crews of the rescue vessels, some of whom laid down their lives attempting to save people from Piper Alpha.
Lord Cullen's inquiry set out to answer two questions. First, why did the disaster happen? Secondly, how do we try to avoid a future disaster? Lord Cullen's report catalogues fatal shortcomings in the design and operation of the Piper Alpha platform; unforgivable negligence on the part of the operators, Occidental Petroleum; and equally unforgivable failure on the part of the Department of Energy to do its job properly.
The immediate blame rests with Occidental Petroleum. In law and in practice, the primary responsibility for safety rested with it. It failed to discharge that responsibility. Piper Alpha was not a safe place to work. On the fatal night of 6 July, the night shift did not know what the day shift had been doing. The result was a gas leak and the first explosion. The automatic fire pumps did not work because they were switched to manual control. Piper Alpha had no means of stopping gas from being pumped on to the platform. Other installations continued to pump gas to Piper Alpha and so discharged yet more gas on to the already blazing platform.
Safety and rescue equipment on Piper Alpha did not work. Life rafts did not inflate. Lifeboats could not be launched. Practice emergency drills had not been carried out. Staff were not properly trained for the emergency. The standby vessel Silver Pit was, in the words of Lord Cullen,
essentially unsuitable for the purpose of effecting the rescue of survivors.
The searchlight was not working. The Silver Pit was not sufficiently manoeuvrable. Its bow thruster broke down within five minutes, making manoeuvring it even more difficult. Its layout was unsuitable for handling the injured. The Department of Trade and Industry boat was unsuitable, unserviceable and could not be launched and the crew was seriously undermanned.
I have a question for the Secretary of State: is it true that the Silver Pit, found by Lord Cullen to be essentially unsuitable for effecting the rescue of survivors and for handling the injured, was subsequently bought by Cam Shipping of Grimsby, was renamed the Cam Spirit, and is once again on standby duty in the North sea? Has the Cam Spirit been surveyed? If so, does it meet the standards which Lord Cullen said should be required of standby vessels? In other words, does it meet the standards that he laid down in recommendation 89?
Is the vessel highly manoeuvrable and able to maintain its position? Is it rigged out is such a way that it provides full visibility from the bridge of the water line in all directions? Does it have at least 360 degree searchlights, capable of being remotely controlled? Does it have two fast rescue craft fitted with VHF radio and an adequate portable searchlight? Is there a means of rapidly launching those fast rescue craft? Are there adequate means of communication by radio between the Cam Spirit and its fast rescue craft, the installation, nearby vessels and the shore? Does the newly rigged Cam Spirit have at least two methods of retrieving survivors from the sea?
If the Cam Spirit does not meet all those requirements, it makes a mockery of the Government's claim to have accepted all Lord Cullen's recommendations. I am not in a position to answer the question myself because when I approached the Cam Shipping company yesterday, one of its staff was eventually told by the boss that he could not talk to my office. But above and beyond those individual items, however important, Occidental Petroleum was responsible for safe operation, safety training and the arrangements for dealing with an emergency.
Lord Cullen's report referred to failures in training, failures to resolve technical problems, superficial attitudes and deficient practice. He said that the system for coping with an emergency was almost entirely inoperative and little command control was exercised over the movements of personnel. The importance of that is highlighted by the fact that most of those who followed the emergency procedures laid down perished in the fire. Most of those


who survived are alive because they decided instead to chance it. There can be no greater indictment of those responsible for the safety of the platform than that the emergency arrangements led to mortal danger and almost certain death.
In the light of that fact, the Secretary of State was right last November to refer Lord Cullen's report to the Lord Advocate for him to decide whether to prosecute Occidental Petroleum. Almost four months have passed but the Lord Advocate has not yet taken action. I only hope that the delay means that he is building up an unanswerable case and that Occidental will be brought to book. Is a company which runs a rig in the way in which Occidental ran Piper Alpha fit to continue operating in the North sea?
Occidental does not bear all the responsibility for the disaster. Some of the blame lies at the door of the Department of Energy because of its abject failure to establish and monitor a safe system of working in the North sea. Responsibility for that failure does not lie only with the safety directorate or other officials of the Department. It also lies with successive Secretaries of State for Energy and other Ministers at the Department.
Under our system of ministerial accountability, it is Ministers who take the credit when things go well and it is they who must take the blame when things go wrong. According to the Government's own figures, at the time of the Piper Alpha disaster there were 217 installations in the North sea. To inspect those 217 gigantic and complex structures, the Department of Energy employed just six professional full-time field inspectors. Lord Cullen found that their inspections were
superficial to the point of being little use … the inspectors were inadequately trained, guided and led … Persistent under-manning had affected not only the frequency but also the depth of their inspections.
Only 40 per cent. of fatal and serious accidents were investigated because, in Lord Cullen's words,
Limitations on manpower prevented the Department from investigating all accidents.
He went on even to doubt whether the type of inspection practised by the Department was in any case an effective means of assessing or monitoring the management of safety by the operators.
Since Lord Cullen reported, questions that I and others have tabled have revealed further inadequacies in the Department of Energy as a supervisory body for offshore safety. For example, the Department cannot say how many prosecutions of operators have followed accidents and how many have resulted from routine inspections. We know that no prosecutions resulted from routine inspections in 1987, 1988 or 1989 but that seven accidents in that time led to prosecutions.
The Department's statistics currently do not distinguish between accidents to operator staff and accidents to contractor staff, information which everyone recognises as vital to any assessment of the state of offshore safety. The Department does not even seem able to distinguish between the number of serious accidents and the number of casualties. It holds no information on the hours spent on each inspection, whether routine or following an accident. No record has been kept of prohibitions issued under the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971. All that we know is that only 13 such notices have been issued offshore under the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974 in the past 12 years.
Lord Cullen's criticisms go much deeper than that. In 1980, the Burgoyne committee reported on offshore safety. It was dissatisfied with
The current arrangements for offshore safety
which had
become a tangle of divided responsibility.
It laid down that the role of the Government—I emphasise this—was to
set objectives designed to achieve a uniformly high standard of safety throughout the Industry and to ensure their achievement through monitoring and enforcement procedures.
It recommended that the Government should discharge that responsibility for offshore safety via a single agency, whose task would be to set standards and to ensure their achievement.
The only dispute on the committee was about the role of trade unions and whether that single agency should be the Department of Energy or the Health and Safety Executive. All the members of the committee agreed that the tasks laid down for the agency were so important and immediate that no delay in dealing with them could be allowed.
Lord Cullen took a hard look at what had happened to the Burgoyne committee's recommendations and com-pared the development of safety offshore with the development of safety onshore during the last decade. He concluded harshly that the Department of Energy policy over the last decade had
set back the development of the offshore safety regime by many years.
He found that, although Burgoyne had recommended that future regulations should specify objectives, there had been
virtually no progress towards the creation of new goal-setting regulations since the publication of the report of the Burgoyne Committee.
Lord Cullen went on to say that the effect of the policy of the Department of Energy had been to distance offshore regulation from the influence of the mainstream of practice in modern regulations on health and safety. He also concluded that nothing appeared to have been learnt from the experience of the Norwegian Government's petroleum department, with which the Department of Energy was in regular contact. Despite all that, the present Secretary of State was reported by the Financial Times as denying that the Cullen report was an indictment of his Department and inspectors.
Lord Cullen endorsed the main recommendations of the Burgoyne committee and accepted the view of the minority report to the Burgoyne committee that the single offshore safety agency should be the Health and Safety Executive and not the Department of Energy. That is the policy of the trade unions involved and the Labour party —a policy for which we voted on 6 November 1980, and which five of the present Cabinet, including the Prime Minister, voted against. I am glad to report that on that occasion, before you reached your present elevated position, Mr. Deputy Speaker, you voted with us for what Lord Cullen said was the right thing.
Why, despite the eminently sensible recommendations of the Burgoyne committee, did the safety directorate of the Department of Energy fall so far short of the standards required? Some blame must attach to some of the officials concerned, but more blame attaches to the politicians. Clearly, none of the succession of Tory Secretaries of State for Energy gave offshore safety the priority it deserved.
Four people served as Secretary of State for Energy between the publication of the Burgoyne report and the Piper Alpha disaster—Messrs Howell, Lawson, Walker and Parkinson. All must take some share of the blame. So must the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, the present Chief Secretary to the Treasury and the present Secretary of State for Wales, all of whom served in the Department of Energy at what the lawyers would call the material time. None of them gave top priority to offshore safety.
When we last debated Piper Alpha—on the day of the statement in November—I asked the Secretary of State what was given a higher priority by his predecessor than offshore safety. Answer came there none. Since then, I have discovered a public insight into what those priorities were. In May 1983, the right hon. Member for Blaby (Mr. Lawson) was asked what had been the principal achievements of his Department. Similar questions were put to the right hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. Walker) in May 1984 and March 1985. Reams of self-congratulation followed—2,405 words in total—but one word was missing, and that word was "safety."
There was much crowing about privatisation, much talk of market forces and whole paragraphs were devoted to oil exploration and development and its benefits to the British economy, but there was not a word about the safety of the 30,000 people whose hard and dangerous work make it all possible. Implementing the recommendations of the Burgyone committee on offshore safety got no mention.
Similarly, no priority was given to safety by other Government Departments. Part of the responsibility for that lies with Lord Young, now discredited as a liar by the Select Committee on Trade and Industry. At his instigation, the Government produced the scruffy document that I hold in my hand, a White Paper published in July 1985 entitled "Lifting the Burden." Its stated object was to reduce what it called
burdens on business imposed by Government regulations.
All that contributed to the atmosphere in which those civil servants responsible for safety, including those at the Department of Energy, had to do their work. In relation to safety, that document encouraged employers to question inspectors' decisions and called for employers to be advised on how to question inspectors. It also called for clearer guidance on the law governing the onus of proof. That was intended not to stimulate the zeal of the inspectors but to stiffen the resistance of the inspected. It was all part of the atmosphere which allowed the development of an ineffective offshore safety directorate.
It is said that when a fish deteriorates, the rot sets in at the head. It is the same with Government Departments. Lord Cullen exposed all of that. He answered the first question about why the disaster happened. He dealt equally incisively with what must be done to try to stop it happening again. He rightly placed great emphasis on the requirement to prepare a safety case—the approach that has been applied successfully onshore and which, to their credit, has been developed by some offshore operators.
Each operator would be required to produce a safety case for each installation, detailing how specified safety objectives have been met in the design and construction, and how they will be met in the operation of the installation and all its equipment, identifying potential

major hazards and risks to personnel and providing for measures to protect staff in the event of a major emergency.
That will require a great deal of expertise and effort by the contractors and the regulatory body, now to be the Health and Safety Executive. The report makes a large number of recommendations, but the shift of approach to the safety case and the shift of responsibility to the Health and Safety Executive are probably the most important.
The Government say that they accept all the recommendations, but we must be vigilant. They said the same about the recommendations of the Burgoyne committee in 1980. In 1989, the year after Piper Alpha, the number of serious accidents per 1,000 employees in the North sea fell only from 2·9 to 2·8, and the number of dangerous occurrences per 1,000 employees shot up from 7·7 to 10·2, the highest level ever. There is clearly a long way to go.
My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran) will deal at length with the future arrangements for offshore safety, so I shall confine my remarks to what I see as a number of especially important points. The offshore safety division of the Health and Safety Executive will have an enormous task on its hands. North sea safety arrangements have been shown by Lord Cullen to be a mess. A massive amount of work needs to be done in three spheres—safety cases submitted by operators will need to be assessed, accepted, amended or rejected; new and improved regulations and guidance will have to be drafted; and much more, and better quality, inspection must be carried out.

Mr. Mullin: Is my hon. Friend aware that, even after the Cullen report, things have not changed much on some rigs? I was contacted in January of this year by someone on Brent Bravo who had inquired about how long it would take to allocate the 150 men on his shift to lifeboats in the event of an alert. He was told that it would take between one and a half and two hours. When he said that that was not satisfactory, he was told that the matter was being considered. He made repeated representations to everyone in authority over many days, but he received more or less the same answer, which was capped by, "We're not breaking any law." On 12 January, there was an alert on the Brent Bravo, when about 150 men were stranded for many hours because there was no way to get them off. Is that satisfactory in the light of what we now know?

Mr. Dobson: The situation described by my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) is clearly unsatisfactory. I hope that Ministers and those who are here to advise them will have heard what is happening and will ensure that a special visit is paid to that platform to discover exactly what is happening and to ensure that standards are improved.
There is an enormous amount of work to be done. The decision to require the submission of a safety case—which is the correct decision—for all existing and new installations has created an instant backlog that will take a long time to clear. That will be bad enough for the operators responsible only for their own installations, but it will be a truly awesome task for the safety directorate, which will have to cope with all the installations. The likely top priorities will be the oldest installations and those currently being built.
The high level of activity in the North sea will also create additional demands on the time of the offshore safety directorate. The task is enormous and of immense importance. It must be done well, thoroughly and as quickly as possible.

Mr. Peter Hardy: The death of one of my young constituents, to whom I have referred before in the House, demonstrates the need for that job to be done properly. However, would it not be odd and inconsistent for the Government, the Department of Employment and the Health and Safety Executive to be undertaking that task offshore while they were at the same time relaxing, dangerously and excessively, the safety regulations in the mining industry onshore?

Mr. Dobson: I have made it clear to the management and to the workers and their representatives in the offshore industry that I regard the transfer of responsibility for safety from the Department of Energy to the HSE as a necessary, but insufficient, change. The HSE is conniving with British Coal to reduce in British coal mines safety standards which at present are the highest in the world. I want those standards to remain the highest in the world, and so do the miners. Apparently the HSE does not.
There are no guarantees of North sea safety simply because of the transfer of responsibility to the HSE. There must be commitments, one of which must be a Treasury guarantee that the HSE will be given the financial resources to recruit, train and, equally important, retain the staff necessary for the job. Such a guarantee must be made in public before the HSE takes on the job.
However, money may not prove to be the biggest problem. The biggest problem is likely to be finding enough staff with the experience and qualifications to perform the various tasks required. The tasks demand the application of complicated analytical techniques which will have to be applied to every installation. In the light of recent history, it is vital to the restoration of confidence among the work force in the North sea that the HSE adopts a high-profile approach to offshore safety.
That would be assisted if the main office of the offshore safety division was located in Aberdeen. That would also have obvious practical advantages. Equally, it will be necessary not to ignore the needs of the southern-basin gasfields and the interests of the staff involved must also be borne in mind.
People with some or all of the expertise will have to be drawn from the chemical and nuclear industries and their inspectorates, and possibly from the Norwegian sector if they can be spared. They must be drawn from anywhere that the best people are available. It is important riot to forget the contribution that can be made by those who earn their daily living in the North sea and who know what they are talking about.
The general principle behind Lord Cullen's report is to apply offshore the safety regime which has been applied onshore. We believe that that will be assisted by the application offshore of the trade union rights to recognition and involvement in safety that apply onshore. Whatever this Government may decide, that is what the incoming Labour Government will ensure.
Good industrial relations are good for safety. Bad industrial relations are bad for safety. Industrial relations in the North sea are bedevilled by the multitide of

contractors whose employees do most of the work on the rigs, barges and platforms, and whose relationship with the operators is at times somewhat strange.
The difficulties of organising trade unions on so many separate, distinct and distant workplaces are made worse by the varying interrelationships between the seven unions involved, and between them and the offshore industry liaison committee.
In November, we urged the Secretary of State to take the opportunity presented by Lord Cullen's report to make a fresh start, to call together all involved and to end the blacklisting. He has done little or nothing. Indeed, he denied that there was any blacklisting. The blacklisting, which was admitted by those who were doing it, was ended but more as a result of representations to the oil companies by me and some of my hon. Friends than by anything that the Government did. We have been promoting meetings and discussions between all concerned, and we hope that they will bear fruit.
Our country needs the oil and gas in the North sea, but we do not need it so badly, or so cheaply, that our fellow citizens have to die to get it for us. Lord Cullen has done a fine job in producing his report. We must ensure that those who contributed to the disaster are rightly punished. We must also ensure that future accidents are not allowed to turn into disasters through the fatal combination of poor design, faulty operation and equipment failure revealed in this case.

Dr. Godman: On the basis of his negotiations with the Secretary of State and other Ministers, can my hon. Friend confirm whether a copy of the Cullen report has been sent to the European Commission? Has not the Commission drawn up a draft directive on the health and safety of offshore installation workers as well as for miners and others? Surely that draft directive must take cognisance of the very important recommendations contained in the Cullen report.

Mr. Dobson: I hope that the Secretary of State or officials at the Department of Energy have done what my hon. Friend has suggested is necessary to ensure that the Commission and ultimately the European Parliament are fully aware of Lord Cullen's excellent report and first-class recommendations. I assume that that has happened. However, I have not had talks and negotiations about blacklisting and such matters with the Secretary of State and his colleagues, because it is difficult to have discussions about something with people who deny that it exists. We had discussions with leading people in the oil industry who have actually done something to get rid of the blacklisting.

Mr. David Porter: With regard to trade union membership, when the hon. Gentleman raised the mythical spectre of the incoming Labour Government, did he mean to imply that he would force all offshore workers to be members of trade unions?

Mr. Dobson: We could do without such clownish interventions. The hon. Gentleman should know that onshore workers have the right to join a trade union but are not obliged to do so. We agree with Lord Cullen that onshore safety measures should also apply offshore, and the right to trade union recognition and the involvement of trade unions in safety measures onshore and offshore— [Interruption.] There seems to be some deafness among Ministers. I am not attributing those remarks to Lord


Cullen, but they follow the principle that he enunciated. Lord Cullen's impeccable logic would lead all but the prejudiced buffoons on the Government Front Bench to conclude that trade union recognition is good for safety.
The least that we can do for the memory of those who died unnecessarily on Piper Alpha is to ensure that the safety motto of du Pont de Nemours, the owners of Conoco, is applied on every North sea installation:
Nothing is so important that it can't be done safely.

Mr. Alick Buchanan-Smith: I have a considerable and direct interest in this subject. As I have declared previously, I have some interests in the offshore industry, the most important of which, especially in the light of the speech of the hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson), is that I was responsible for it in the early 1980s. Like my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, I do not duck any responsibility that I may have had. By accepting all the recommendations of the Cullen report, he has shown beyond peradventure that there is no question of anyone trying to duck their responsibilities.
I was a little disappointed by some of the speech of the hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras.

Mr. Ernie Ross: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: There have already been many interventions, and I should like to get on with the debate.
I should not like to let the opportunity pass without recording my sympathy, and I believe that of the whole House, for those who were involved in the Piper Alpha accident. I visited all the families in my constituency who were affected by it, so no one is more conscious than I am of what the tragedy meant in human terms.
I add my praise for those who were involved in the rescue. I pay tribute to the crew of the Silver Pit, regardless of the deficiencies in its vessel that were identified. I am sure that I express the view of the whole House when I say that I recognise the gallantry of those who were involved, which was recognised in the recent honours list, and the involvement of those on the shore. Those who have been recognised represent only a tiny fraction of the number who showed gallantry and total disregard for their personal safety in the operation that followed this tragic incident.
Once the moments of emotion and publicity of accidents such as Piper Alpha and the Chinook accident, in which families in my constituency were involved, have passed, there is an understandable feeling among the families of the victims that they have been forgotten. The Piper Alpha support group in Aberdeen was outstanding in supporting the families of the victims. Its work has become an example for others and was copied in the Lockerbie air disaster. The Rev. Andrew Wylie, industrial chaplain to the North sea installations, made a tremendous contribution during and after the accident. The services that he conducted and his continuing commitment to the interests of offshore workers are an example to everyone.
I pay tribute to Lord Cullen not only for the way in which he conducted the inquiry but for the lucidity of the

report and its findings. The report will go down in the annals of public inquiries as one of the best conducted and presented. I have heard no criticism of it, and I am sure that the House will join me in paying tribute to him.
Everyone shares the objective of ensuring safety onshore and offshore. There will be times, alas, when deficiencies arise, but the Government, the industry, offshore workers and the unions have a common interest in ensuring that safety is paramount. We must always ensure that that interest is shared. We must make the North sea a safer place in which to live and work. To that extent, I welcome my right hon. Friend's immediate acceptance of all the recommendations.
There is no question but that the Cullen report revealed deficiencies, but I suggest that they related more to the safety structure rather than to those in the Department of Energy who had the daily task of carrying out safety functions. The Burgoyne committee was set up to examine and to make recommendations on safety. The fact that 69 of its 70 recommendations were adopted shows that, on the basis of the best knowledge and experience available at the beginning of the 1980s, the Government set up what was thought to be the correct structure to ensure safety in the North sea.
Perhaps insufficient attention was paid to the fact that safety is a continuing consideration. With the benefit of hindsight and the Cullen recommendations, perhaps steps should have been taken in the mid-1980s—I accept responsibility for this as much as anyone else—to see whether the Burgoyne recommendations were working properly. That is a fair criticism.

Mr. Ernie Ross: Does the right hon. Gentleman believe that there is insufficient distance between the regulatory body and the body that was responsible for safety? Those who carried out the investigations into safety were subject to the same pressures as those in the Department to achieve the maximum extraction and finance, which the Treasury wanted to use for a range of matters. The oil companies themselves wanted to exploit the extraction rate. We argue that the control of the examination of safety should be within another Department.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I disagree totally with the hon. Member. He is wrong. I shall deal now with objectivity, but I remind the hon. Gentleman that the Burgoyne committee—with a minority report, which I acknowledge, from only two members—recommended that responsibility for safety should rest with the Department of Energy. Therefore, the Government acted on a clear recommenda-tion. At a meeting in the House a few months ago, Dr. Burgoyne said that he did not move subsequently from the original recommendations. The hon. Gentleman should recognise that basic but important historical fact. There are reasons now for a change, which I shall deal with, but that was the basis of the best recommendation and the best advice available at that time.

Mr. John Greenway: Is not the real issue the fact that the Government have twice been faced with majority recommendations—first by Burgoyne and then by Lord Cullen—and that on both occasions they have accepted the recommendations?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: That is significant. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention.
I might point out that, in the Department of Energy, I worked with staff in the inspectorate who dealt with safety. I want to make it clear that I have rarely worked with a body who, as individuals, showed greater integrity or higher objectivity. When it came to the crunch, and prosecution was under consideration, I never found any of them with any fear of pursuing prosecution if they felt that it was necessary. It would be unfair if criticism were directed at any of those individuals.
I should like to comment on the main thrust of the report. The most important point identified by the report is the importance of human motivation and human involvement in safety. If Lord Cullen has done one service beyond any other, it is to establish that fact, which many people acknowledged and to which many people paid lip service before, but which has never been enunciated so clearly or with so much authority as it was by Lord Cullen.
We can have the best equipment, the highest technology and the safest in terms of hardware and everything else, as many of our platforms had, yet the installation is only as safe as the weakest operator or the weakest individual on it. That will always remain the case. We can never legislate totally for human or individual failure.
The report recommends, and my right hon. Friend is implementing, the safety case approach of Lord Cullen. That is the right approach. Working through a safety management system should ensure that safety becomes a philosophy and a major motivation of every individual, not just from the offshore installation manager right down to the most junior operative on the platform, but also right up to the senior management of the oil company.
Given the safety case approach that Lord Cullen advocates, we must make certain that it is comprehensive and involves everyone. When I say "everyone", I mean not only those employed by the oil company but also contractors, subcontractors and their staff who work on an installation. I am glad that many offshore operators have already adopted much greater vetting of contractors. With new arrangements for longer contracts, the operator is taking much more responsibility for contractors and the conditions of work of contractors' staff, rather than being concerned just with oil company staff.
I regret that on some installations there has been too much of the culture of "them and us"—the oil company staff on the one hand and the contractors' staff on the other. Once people are offshore, no matter who their ultimate employer is, they must belong to one team, with the same responsibilities. Let us never forget that the buck stops with the operator. Therefore, it is on the operator that responsibility must be placed to make sure that every individual is involved. If contractors or subcontractors are not prepared to comply with that, I hope that operators will get rid of their services and ensure that there is co-operation.
The safety case approach must not be a once-and-for-all new idea. It must be continuing, and it must develop as experience develops in future.
I wish to make two other points of substance.

Mr. Mullin: rose——

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I would rather not give way, because many hon. Members wish to speak, and I have spoken for long enough.
We do not want to underestimate the importance of the establishment on installations of safety committees. The

possible role of unions in safety committees is a central point in the debate. There may be a role for unions, but I am not convinced that it has to be prescribed in legislation.
Coming back to the main thrust of Cullen, I do not believe that the involvement of unions would mean that everyone on a platform would be involved. There will always be on platforms individuals who are not members of unions. The current system of the election of safety committees, which thankfully has been developed since Cullen, gives the opportunity to anyone, whatever his interest, to become involved in the safety of the installation.
Victimisation is a question that we cannot ignore. Although I have heard many allegations, I have seen very little substantiation of them. There has to be a system, such as was set up following Cullen, whereby individuals can make complaints anonymously, through a telephone number or whatever, so that the authorities have the opportunity to investigate whether there is substance behind a complaint. Victimisation may be overdone, but I do not think that it can be ignored.
Transfer of responsibility for safety to the Health and Safety Executive has been raised. Here I come back to the point made by the hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Ross). Experience post-Cullen shows that it is important that whoever is responsible for offshore safety is objective —having worked with the staff of the safety inspectorate within the Department of Energy I know that they were objective—but Cullen underlined the need for them to be seen to be objective as well. That is important for credibility. That is one thing which Cullen brought out, and I endorse his recommendation on it.
The new offshore safety division will be only as effective as the quality of its staff and the skills that they have. I say to my right hon. Friend, and through him to the Health and Safety Executive, that they must be people with technical skills equal to those of the inspectorate staff who have to deal with safety in the oil companies. They must be able to deal on equal terms with the oil companies. To use the analogy of the petroleum engineering division of the Department of Energy, its strength, recognised by oil companies around the world, is that its staff match the quality of staff in the oil companies. We must ensure that in the inspectorate there is the same matching of staff both in quality and in technical qualifications. That will mean paying salaries equivalent to those in the oil companies. There must be no economies in acquiring staff of the right quality and number.
The offshore safety division should be situated in Aberdeen because the interplay between those involved in the regulation of the industry and those who are working at its sharp end is important if those in the inspectorate are to know and understand what is happening in the industry. I am not pleading for one particular area of Britain against another; I am seeking to make the inspectorate more effective than it might otherwise be. I beg that that be given the most serious consideration possible.
I am glad to have been able to contribute to the debate. Again I emphasise that I hope that we have a continuing interest in offshore safety. Even one accident offshore is one too many. If it is humanly possible, it must be our objective to eliminate such accidents altogether.

Mr. Ken Eastham: I am most grateful for being called to speak today. This is one of the most serious debates that there has been in the House for many a long year.
It is appropriate for me to declare my interest as a member of the Amalgamated Engineering Union and honorary secretary of the AEU parliamentary group, although I receive no funding or considerations. Nevertheless, I have an interest in the engineering industry and a feeling for the people who perished on the night of the terrible disaster.
First, I want to pay tribute to Lord Cullen. He has produced in a highly professional way two of the most detailed volumes that I have ever seen. I think that all hon. Members will agree that it was well worth waiting the 18 months that it took to prepare them.
I also want to pay tribute to the television companies. They made a valuable contribution in bringing home to the general public the danger faced by our engineers and the contribution that they make on offshore oil rigs. I am sure that many hon. Members saw the documentary that was made about the disaster, which showed the horrendous conditions that existed and the horrendous mistakes that were made on that night, from which all the consequential suffering ensued.
The Piper Alpha disaster occurred in July 1988. Only the other day I found myself comparing the 167 fatalities which resulted from that disaster, probably within one hour, with the number of British fatalities in the Gulf war. During the Gulf war, people have been glued to their television sets, watching events day by day and worrying about our casualties, but, thankfully, British fatalities, after all those weeks, were only one quarter of those that resulted from the Piper Alpha disaster.
It is recognised that Piper Alpha was the biggest offshore oil disaster that the world has ever known. It left many dead. It also left survivors, some of whom are still under medication. They will be haunted by the disaster for the rest of their days. The disaster also left widows and orphans, and no financial compensation will replace the loss of their husbands and fathers.
The report is a complete catalogue of sloppy and indifferent management, even wilful neglect bordering on sheer wickedness. People who read the report of this debate will not necessarily appreciate the contents of that document. The right hon. Member for Kincardine and Deeside (Mr. Buchanan-Smith) said that everyone was doing his best and that there were some of the best conditions and the best safety possible. I contend that that was not the case. There is no doubt in my mind that the evidence shows that that is not the case, and that view is confirmed by the Cullen report.
For the sake of the record, therefore, it is important that I, as an engineer, extract one or two references from the report rather than simply say that we have the document, that nothing was wrong, that nothing could be done and that it was a pure accident. Many of us do not feel that it was a pure accident at all. It was partly due to wilful neglect.
Page after page of the report refers to the permit to work system. The system being used—or not used—regarding the issuing of permits when there was a change of shift from one group of engineers to another became the big issue.
It is important to note that most of the dead—79 out of a total of 167—died in the accommodation as a result of being overcome by smoke. The death toll could have been lessened had safety training been more effective. The report says that, as those men innocently waited in the accommodation for their instructions, their chances of survival were diminished and they perished.
Chapter 6, page 121, says that the contractor responsible for carrying out the maintenance on the valve had not received training in the permit to work system from his own company. Cullen finds that the failure of the permit to work system led directly to the accident, particularly in the light of the fact that a fatality had already resulted from a breakdown of that system in 1987.
In chapter 7, Lord Cullen states:
The strong impression with which I was left after hearing the evidence as to the response of Claymore and Tartan was that the type of emergency with which the senior personnel of each platform was confronted was something for which they had not been prepared.
He then talked about poor Occidental management.
Chapter 11 again refers to the permit to work system and shift takeovers. On pages 194 and 195, Lord Cullen concludes that there was no adequate training procedure for the permit to work system, that much reliance was placed on ad hoc methods and/or "on the job" training and that the permit to work system was not adequately monitored by the rig's safety department. The deficiencies in the permit to work system are constantly mentioned.
Page 196 of the report states that the system of shift handovers was a major factor in the disaster, and mentions critical comments by a Mr. Clark, who was a survivor of the disaster, and criticised the operation of the permit to work system in a meeting with senior Occidental management in early 1988. No action was taken.
Page 197 of the report mentions the death of Mr. Sutherland, in 1987. He was a rigger who died after falling from a canopy above a pump while carrying out maintenance. Occidental was prosecuted under the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974 for failing to ensure that persons in its employ were not exposed to unnecessary risks. Occidental pleaded guilty and was fined £400. The crucial factors in that incident were shortcomings in the permit to work system. The report states:
The complaint to which Occidental pleaded guilty also specified 'inadequate communication of information from the … day-shift to the night-shift'.
So, once again, the permit to work system is mentioned.

Dr. Michael Clark: I agree with the hon. Member about the permit to work regulations. As a practical engineer who has worked in plant and on shift, does he agree that if a company cannot get its permit to work handovers working satisfactorily, and if it cannot get shift handovers organised, it is right at the bottom of the safety league?

Mr. Eastham: I certainly do. I am trying to demonstrate that this was not a one-off mistake. There was case after case of sloppy management. The company was not administering or managing the rigs as they should be operated, even though the permit to work procedure was laid down to establish that a certain valve was safe, or had been disconnected, so that at the beginning of his 12-hour shift the next operator knew what was going on. I am trying to show the importance of the Cullen report and to shoot down any idea that everything was good and that


the report says that the accident was an act of God. It was not an act of God—it was management neglect, and as Members of Parliament we must do something about it.
I do not want to bore the House, and I apologise for going on, but it is important to deal with the parts of the report which examine emergencies, fatalities and the seriousness of the situation. Chapter 13 deals with training for emergencies. Page 214 mentions
understanding on the part of all personnel as to how to react in the event of an emergency.
The significance of that is that it appeared that people who died in the rig's accommodation were waiting to be rescued by helicopter, unaware that smoke from the fire made such a rescue impossible. Cullen believes that, if more of them had tried to make their way out of the rig, more could have survived—that assumes that they knew how to escape.
Chapter 14 concerns Occidental's management of safety and is so critical of the company that it should be re-titled Occidental's "mismanagement" of safety. I am giving chapter and verse because this is important and I do not want hon. Members to think that it is all in my imagination.
Page 227 of the report states that Occidental Commissioned a report on the risk of riser ruptures and the effects that they might have on rigs. Mr. Saldana prepared a report which states that ruptures represented a more serious hazard than Occidental had thought. Occidental's senior management responded by questioning Mr. Saldana's qualifications and experience. That provokes the question, why was he Commissioned to write the report in the first place if the management intended to ignore it because it did not like some of his conclusions? That is a complete contradiction. Occidental nominated him to undertake the study.
On page 235, the report mentions that a large maintenance programme was being carried out on Piper Alpha at the time of the disaster and yet oil production continued at the maximum. Lord Cullen describes that as "puzzling". Some people might call it reckless, and I might even call it sheer greed—the company could not even turn the taps down during a major maintenance operation to ensure that less fuel was flowing. The company was extracting the maximum amount of fuel, even though a vital valve was being worked on when the horrendous accident happened.
On page 251, the report says that there was a shortfall in the number of safety inspectors in the North sea. Two out of five inspectors' jobs had remained unfilled for two years before the disaster. The report says that safety inspectors were, and are, inadequately trained and that persistent undermanning has affected the frequency and the depth of inspections.
Chapter 20 refers to evacuation, escape and rescue, and says that it is a statutory requirement for every rig to have a standby vessel. My hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson) described the type and quality of standby vessels, sp I shall not bore hon. Members with the details, but it is all there, chapter and verse, in the report.
Lord Cullen considers union involvement in the offshore oil industry in chapter 21. Although he recognises that industrial relations are outside his remit, he makes a number of statements which could be used to show the benefits for safety of a well organised union structure.
The Director-General of the Health and Safety Executive said that in the onshore industry union-appointed
safety representatives could play a valuable part in the promotion of safety and in relation to inspections".
The United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association, however resisted the appointment of similar personnel offshore on the ground that there were very few installations with recognised trade unions. That prompts a reasonable question—why were those unions not recognised?
The remains of Piper Alpha are still at the bottom of the North sea, despite protests by environmentalists, the Royal Navy and local fishermen. Leaving those remains rotting in the sea may even violate the 1958 Geneva convention.
Anyone who considers the tone of the Cullen report to be less than scathing must not have read the same document as me. It is critical from start to finish, and tonight no Minister will be able to avoid making a commitment about the Government's future conduct.
The offshore oilfields have experienced major difficul-ties for some time. The Amalgamated Engineering Union —my union, and a very responsible one—has used its best endeavours to be helpful and co-operative. In the months following the disaster I was contacted by the engineers' executive council, which seemed alarmed about the indifference of the employers. As secretary of the AEU parliamentary group, I wrote to the Secretary of State for Energy; he was courteous and co-operative, and I was grateful for that. We had two meetings. The Secretary of State invited three members of the executive to join us at the first meeting, and two attended the second. I took the minutes. The Secretary of State said that he had accepted all the recommendations in the report, and that good progress was being made. He also mentioned the transfer of responsibilities to the Health and Safety Executive, and told us that Mr. A. Barrell had been appointed head of that organisation.
One of the executive councillors, Mr. James Airlie, said that he recognised the difficulties relating to, for instance, resources and training. He also inquired about visits to installations, and about the location of the HSE in Aberdeen and Morecambe. The question of health and safety committees on individual sites was raised, as were the issues of victimisation and short-term contracts. As we explained to the Secretary of State, the position was ludicrous: many engineers were on two-week contracts, and any engineer who complained about matters of safety could be sure that his contract would not be renewed.

Mr. James Lamond: My hon. Friend gained day-to-day experience of the trade union movement before he came to the House. Does he agree that such attitudes on the part of these firms were greatly encouraged by legislation enacted not only in the past 11 years, but by the 1970–74 Government, who seemed to regard the union movement as a group of extremists determined to bring down British industry if they could? The Government entirely ignored the daily bread-and-butter work done by the unions every week of the year, which is of such value not only to union members but to all the workers in the oilfields and elsewhere—and, indeed, to the country as a whole.

Mr. Eastham: I entirely agree. We observe the Government's anti-union attitude day in, day out. They


seem to hate trade unionists, and not even to consider them British. That attitude changes only in times of emergency. When there is a war and they want engineers to work in munitions, it is all shoulders to the wheel, and trade unionists suddenly become good workers—people with whom the Government can negotiate and do business.
At the meeting, the Secretary of State made three points. First, he assured us that there would be no lack of resources. Secondly, on personnel, he said that a practical regime would be introduced, and that its organisation would be left to the HSE. Thirdly, he accepted Lord Cullen's recommendations about safety representation. Mr. Tom MacLean, a member of the executive, mentioned inspector understaffing and the quality of staff. The Secretary of State said that he had already improved pay and that he "was not hanging about", which pleased us greatly.
I mentioned the excessive hours worked by the men on the rigs, and the consequent risks to safety and efficiency. The Secretary of State said that he too considered that important. When he made his first statement about the disaster, I told him that engineers on the North sea oil rigs were working far more hours per year than those in the Norwegian fields. That still requires earnest consideration. Later, the Secretary of State wrote to me privately, saying that directives were being issued containing work guidelines.
We appreciated what seemed to be co-operation from the Secretary of State, and felt that the exercise had been useful. Since then, I have received some encouraging letters, but I hope that we shall soon get down to practicalities.
I made some other approaches, again with the help of the executive of the AEU. I received a letter that concerned me greatly. It did not make good reading. The executive referred to continuing anxieties long after the Piper Alpha disaster.
In February 1990, I received a letter from Mr. Tom MacLean, who has responsibility for the construction industry in the AEU, in which he drew attention to correspondence relating to the Montrose platform and asked me to note an enclosed copy of a fax dated 26 February 1990 from the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee. It said that there were deficiencies in Amoco's working practices which were a source of great concern and that the committee called on the right hon. Member for City of Chester (Mr. Morrison), who was then the Minister with responsibility for oil installations, im-mediately to shut down the Montrose platform until Amoco's fitness to manage had been reassessed. It also argued that new fireproof accommodation should be installed.
That was picked up by the newspapers. On 25 February 1990, there was a report in Observer Scotland under the headline
Rig gas leak 'a whisper away' from second Piper".
I thought that I ought to approach the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association to see whether we could get together to talk about these serious matters. On 7 March 1990 I wrote to Dr. Hughes and said:
we are now wondering whether it would be possible to convene a meeting at your offices to discuss further some of the issues which are seriously concerning our members. We

have also exchanged correspondence with our Executive Council who obviously are most interested in the pursuit of some better arrangements. Ideally, from our point of view, I should like to suggest a deputation of 3 AEU MPs plus 3 Executive Council members with a special interest in the subject.
Although some organisations profess that they want to co-operate, the message that came back to me from UKOOA was that it would meet the three AEU Members of Parliament but it refused point blank to meet the three AEU executive council members.
Despite UKOOA's refusal, the three AEU Members of Parliament thought that it would be wise to meet UKOOA at its offices. The three hon. Members were my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford, East (Mr. Orme), my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) and me. No trade union officials were allowed to be present for the discussion. We were received courteously. Dr. Harold Hughes is the chairman. Mr. Christopher Ryan, a director, said that there are 36 companies in the industry, all of which are members of UKOOA. The companies are members of an association; I wonder whether the engineers on the oil rigs would have been regarded as more acceptable if they had been members of an association rather than a trade union. UKOOA might then have been prepared to meet them. An association does just the same work as a trade union. We were told that there are 160 platforms and that the total investment amounts to £166 billion. That is a lot of money. We recognise how important the industry is to the United Kingdom.
We gave notice to Dr. Hughes that the engineering group intended to raise the profile of this very serious problem. I told Dr. Hughes—it is quoted in the Glasgow Herald of 28 February 1990, long after the Piper Alpha incident—that certain rigs were working with faulty electrics and that a survey had revealed that 95 per cent. of the explosive-proof equipment in the Brent field had faults. The article also referred to the fact that workers were convinced that faults had shut down Cormorant Alpha and Brent Charlie and that similar electrical faults were to be found on at least three other Shell installations.
The issue rumbled on in the House of Commons for a long time after that. One of my hon. Friends tabled an early-day motion on North sea safety and trade union recognition, after which I received a letter from UKOOA. I was told that all workers offshore had the right to elect their own safety representatives and that there were safety committees on every platform. The letter also pointed out that a recent study by the Institute of Offshore Engineering, an independent body, had reported similar accident rates in both Norway and the United Kingdom. The implication was that the number of fatalities and accidents was just as great in Norway as in the United Kingdom. According to the information that we have received, that is nowhere near the truth. The letter said that £750 million was being invested to redress some of the problems. In an important paragraph, UKOOA said:
As far as trade union recognition is concerned, all workers have equal rights offshore—including the right to join a trade union and join safety committees. Recognition is a matter between workers and their employers, the contractors. You may be interested to know that there is an obligation under every licence for the operator to provide facilities for trade union officers to go offshore for the purposes of recruitment.


That is a bit rich when we know what happens if full-time trade union officers attempt to get to the rigs, even to speak to the workers.
When I replied to Mr. Ryan's letter I referred him to an article in The Scotsman dated 26 October under the heading
North sea men face worst death risk in the world.
An independent team of analysts—Smith Rea Energy—calculate that the average cost to United Kingdom-based companies in lost production and compensation amounts to £180 million a year. That was before the Piper Alpha disaster, which raised the 1988 total to £1·2 million. Surely there must be something wrong with the rigs if so much money is lost, if there are so many fatalities and injuries, if so many rigs are closed down and if so much energy is lost. I base my argument not on my assumptions or calculations but on those of so-called experts.
The House will appreciate that my correspondence with UKOOA has been going on for some time. In November 1990, I received a letter saying:
Since Lord Cullen reported, all engaged in the offshore industry have adopted a very positive approach to the recommendations made and there is a common desire to implement the report in the interest of North Sea safety … Therefore UKOOA would be pleased to host a farther meeting with you and your AEU colleagues.
That was a breakthrough; it was the first time that UKOOA had said that it was prepared to meet members of the executive as well as AEU-sponsored Members of Parliament. The letter concluded:
I will telephone you upon your receipt of this letter.
UKOOA never telephoned me; I am still waiting for the call.
A letter from the AEU executive illustrates the brutality of what was happening in the oilfield. [Laughter]. I know that this seems a bit of a joke to those who do not work in the oilfields, who simply do not understand. Perhaps if they got themselves a boiler suit, rolled up their sleeves and did six months' work in the North sea, they would appreciate how much engineers contribute to oil companies' wealth.
The letter from the executive, dated 3 December 1990, illustrates the brutal hire-and-fire policy in operation in the North sea. One can hardly say that 3 December 1990 is a long time ago and that matters have improved. The letter refers to dismissals following the dispute about safety on oil rigs. It gives a breakdown of dismissals following the stoppages. Apparently 534 Offshore Construction Contractors employees were dismissed. There was no mutuality and there were no negotiations. It seems that the companies have returned to their old ways—the practices that we have tried so hard to leave behind us. They merely say, "There is no job for you. Too bad, you're off." To this day, there is no consideration and no understanding.
In January, I received another letter from UKOOA, in which Mr. Ryan wrote:
My purpose in writing is to invite you and your colleagues to meet us … when we could brief you on UKOOA's reaction to the current recommendations and discuss other matters of mutual interest. You may recall that we were of a mind to suggest a meeting with appropriate AEU national officials".
UKOOA was "of a mind" to do that and said that it would call me. The last sentence of the letter reads:
I will get in touch with you on your receipt of this letter.
Once again, I never received the call. Perhaps UKOOA keeps that line on its computer—"We will get in touch with

you after you have received this letter." I want to make it public, therefore, that the AEU Members of Parliament and the union's executive council would very much appreciate a meeting. It is not difficult to get in touch with me. Everyone else seems to be able to get in touch with me and I can always be left a message. If I receive that call, I shall be only too pleased to meet UKOOA's representatives.
Allegations of blacklisting have sometimes been denied. Hon. Members may be aware that the Select Committee on Employment undertook an inquiry into recruitment practices. We dealt with the employment of the disabled and minority groups and decided to have a look at the Economic League and at blacklisting. I have a letter here —[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh no."] This is important. I am trying to illustrate that this is fact; it is not in my mind. The Employment Select Committee received a letter from one of the unions about blacklisting of anyone who dares to complain about safety on the oil rigs.
Those who complain get worked off. The Select Committee was sent a transcript of some of the communications that such people had received. The unions are getting a bit more skilled at recording these things and, in this case, they also recorded telephone conversations. The transcript proves that on North sea oil rigs, blacklisting continues apace.
I know that people say that blacklisting does not exist but we know that it does. Paragraph 30, on page 392 of the Cullen report, says:
Safety representatives should be protected against victimisation by a provision similar to … the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978".
Even Lord Cullen, who said that he did not propose to become involved in discussions of blacklisting or the trade unions, recognises that it is going on and thinks that the workers should have some protection.
I refuse to believe that nobody is to blame for the disaster. The Cullen report certainly concluded that people were to blame. We need better management. North sea oil workers are entitled to full trade union rights. We want less secrecy regarding safety problems and adequate health and safety resources. Above all, we ask for increased co-operation, despite Conservative Members' laughing and tittering about the livelihoods and working conditions of those who work on the rigs.
There is nothing irresponsible about our desire for more co-operation. We are trade unionists and we are far more responsible than some of the hooligans on the Conservative Benches when it comes to dealing with the serious matter of the loss of hundreds of lives. None of those on the Conservative Benches will die on the oil rigs because none of them wear boiler suits and none of them have ever taken such jobs. It is the workers who do that, and that is why we want more co-operation in future. Trade unionists are entitled to work in dignity, and the whole House should be determined not to allow a repeat of Piper Alpha.
This afternoon I was passed information by a colleague who has a relative in a senior position in the oilfields from which I discovered that compensation has still not been paid to all the survivors of the disaster, which occurred in July 1988. We are now in March 1991. I was also horrified to learn that it is believed that the new replacement platform is of the same design as the original Piper Alpha platform, yet one of the main criticisms concerned the type


of accommodation on the platform. If that is the case, it is a complete disgrace and the Minister should do something about it.
There is no doubt that Occidental has a dreadful record. It is interesting that, although some of the other oil companies, such as Esso, have already held one-day conferences on safety, Occidental has still to hold its first safety conference.
I could talk about many things. I could speak for about two hours on some of the deficiencies and scandals in the North sea oilfields. It is time that we put a stop to all that.

Dr. Michael Clark: I shall certainly follow what the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Eastham) has said, but I shall do so later because I too must begin by saying that that few disasters have had more impact on us or have been more distressing than that which occurred on 6 July 1988 in the North sea and in which, as the hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson) said, 167 men died. The hon. Member for Blackley put that number in the context of the casualties of the Gulf war.
It may surprise the hon. Member for Blackley to know that I have worked in a boiler suit and have worked shifts. I have not done so offshore—I doubt if I ever will now because what is left of my hair is too grey—

Mr. Eastham: I am grateful to learn that and I am greatly encouraged by it because as a result of that experience the hon. Gentleman's understanding of this matter will be very different from that of his hon. Friends sitting beside him.

Dr. Clark: As I have said, I have worked in boiler suits and have worked shifts in the chemical industry onshore, but not offshore, and I should like to take up some of the time of the House to describe two accidents of which I have knowledge. I was not responsible for them, but I was involved, in the aftermath. Neither was anything like Piper Alpha—the results were a fraction of what happened on Piper Alpha—but I know something of the distress that any accident causes to the surviving work force, the managers and, above all, the relatives.
In 1965 on Teesside, there was an accident at an ICI plant when a pressure vessel was about to be cleaned out. It had been used for the polymerisation of hydrocarbons and for making polymers. As it was known that some hydrocarbon would be left in the vessel, permit-to-work chits were issued so that men could go inside it with bronze spades to clear it out. The spades were bronze because it was known that a metal spade would cause sparks and that a spark would probably cause an accident. To show that it was thought to be a safe procedure, the manager of the plant went in the vessel first. He cleared out some of the debris from the bottom of the vessel for an hour before any other man went in—[Interruption.] I am sorry that those Opposition Members who have accused Conservative Members of not having any industrial experience do not wish to listen to an account of the little industrial experience that we have had—it would encourage us to gain more such experience if Opposition Members would listen when we talk about it.
After the manager had tested the vessel by working in it himself for an hour, two members of the work force went in, using the proper equipment and following the proper procedures, but they disturbed a pile of highly unstable peroxides which immediately exploded. One man was blown out of the vessel dead. The other was blown out on fire, severely hurt, and was in hospital for a long time recovering from appalling injuries.
I was not the manager of the plant at the time, but I became the manager three months later and I know of the effect that that accident had—three months later—on the rest of the work force. They were dispirited and demoralised. There was also compassion for the relatives and sadness about the incident.
What happened there is a classic example of what Lord Cullen described in his report. I refer to the difference between safety through regulation and safety through having a safety case. On that plant, everything had been done right by regulation. All the permits had been signed, all the working methods had been approved, and all the regulations had been abided by, but a proper safety case had not been made for working inside that vessel. After the accident, the scientists and chemists at ICI investigated how it could have happened and found a type of chemical —a highly unstable peroxide—which had not been known about before the accident and which exploded when it was simply disturbed. The work that was carried out after finding that highly unstable peroxide showed that men should never have entered that vessel at any time.
Some people talk about being wise after the event, but I do not think that that is a correct analysis. Instead, we learn after the event. We do research and carry out investigations after the event which, if we had safety case procedures, we would carry out before the event. We should investigate all possibilities. All the scientific research and engineering possibilities should be carried out and ascertained before the event—and they would be if a safety case procedure were in existence instead of a regime of regulation which simply tells people, "You will work in a certain safe way", or in a way that is presumed to be safe. That is one of the main points of Lord Cullen's report.
Immediately after the Piper Alpha disaster, the Government set up a technical investigation. The Government, the Department of Energy and the Secretary of State at the time are to be commended for the speed at which they set up that technical investigation and for the speed at which it reported—in September the same year, just over two months after the incident. Although the inquiry reported quickly, there is no evidence to suggest that it reported in a slipshod way. In fact, the evidence shows that it reported as professionally and as thoroughly as it could in the time available. In his own painstaking report, Lord Cullen praised that technical inquiry.
Lord Cullen's report became available to us on 12 November. He concluded that an initial explosion set in train an escalating series of fires. He showed how there was a series of events, happenings or situations, each of which on its own might have allowed a certain amount of occupational leeway which would not have led to the accident. However, as was stated by the hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras when he went through the series of events involving negligence, neglect or forgetfulness, that combination and series of events allowed the fire to escalate and the explosion to take place. And so it is with most accidents. One event on its own can probably be


accommodated by the safety procedures, by individuals, and by experienced operators, but accidents happen when several things occur simultaneously—as with Piper Alpha.
I will give the House an example of another accident, which occurred 10 years after the one that I have already described. Although I like to think that I was not directly responsible for it, I have to take some responsibility because I was the plant manager at the time. A man started working on a mixer which was used to mix plastic materials. He did so without permission. The fuse had not been withdrawn from the electric motor. Unknown to him, the mixer blade had jammed the last time it was used and the motor was switched on with the blade in that jammed position. The man broke all regulations by placing his hand in the mixer to try to make the blade go round, and it started to go round because the motor was still switched on and the fuse had not been withdrawn. The man was not wearing gloves and when the blade went round, instead of the gloves taking the shock of the mixer, his hand took the shock and he lost fingers from his right hand.
Had any one of those five things not occurred, the accident would not have happened. If the man had applied for permission to work, he would not have got it, so he would not have had the accident. If he had been granted permission to work, the fuse would have been withdrawn from the motor. If, by chance, the blade had not jammed when the last person used it, the mixer would not have been jammed with the motor still switched on. If he had not placed his hand in the mixer, there would have been no accident. Had he been wearing thick leather gloves, the blades would have taken the gloves into the mixer and his hand would have been bruised but he would not have lost his fingers. Five separate incidents happened in that accident. If any one of them had not occurred, the man would not have lost his fingers.
Lord Cullen described many such accidents in his report. Procedures can be made to work to a degree and must be made to work so far as they are relevant. We must not work on probability, with a safety ethos to the effect that the probability of an accident is only 0·1 per cent., so if three mechanisms are operated and there is a 0·1 per cent. risk on any one of them the probability of an accident is negligible. At some time, the combination will occur —if one spins a coin enough times it may come down heads 10 times in succession. We want safety not by probability but by safety-case analysis—safety by design and by engineering. In the last resort, we want safety by regulation and procedure--but built into equipment, not worked into it by human and fallible operators.
There are three roles on any operating platform or in any factory—those of operators or employers, those of employees, and collective responsibility. The Government do not have a monopoly on the role of collective responsibility. It applies to many places of work and, in some ways, applies least of all to the Government.
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside (Mr. Buchanan-Smith) said, the operators or employers know that the buck stops with them and that we cannot legislate to prevent accidents. We can legislate to ensure that certain types of equipment are available on a platform but we cannot legislate for its reliability. We can legislate that there should be systems, such as alarms, safety systems or fire systems, on a platform, but not for their complexity. We can legislate that manuals must be written—even that they should be read—but we cannot legislate for their quality, nor for the quality of the

teaching when their contents are transferred to the minds of the employees and plant operators. Furthermore, we can legislate, through the Department of Energy or the Health and Safety Executive, that checks should be carried out on all equipment, but not for the enthusiasm with which the checks are carried out. In other words, we cannot legislate for safety culture, which is so important if we are to have safe working practices, not only in the North sea but in the use of complex equipment on any plant.
In his report, Lord Cullen says that operators should sharpen their responsibilities for analysing hazards and documentation of systems—and so they should. Operators in the North sea should never forget that 36,000 people work offshore there. The Government can provide a framework for the employment of those people, but it will be a broad framework and there can be no alternative to operators sharpening their procedures, awareness and responsibilities. The Government must be responsible and diligent in pursuing the analysis of documentation and equipment, but the quality of both and the responsibility for the employees who work on the platforms must rest well and truly with the operators.
The employees, whether they are platform managers or those who prepare food in the mess room, are entitled to trade union recognition if they so wish, but trade unions should not necessarily represent employees with regard to safety.

Mr. Salmond: The hon. Gentleman says that he is prepared to support workers' rights to trade union recognition. How does he think that that could be brought into effect? How could workers' opinions on the matter be properly tested, and what legislation or moves does he suggest should be made to put that theoretical right to trade union recognition into practice?

Dr. Clark: Recognition must be twofold. First, the work force must be organised; secondly, it must seek recognition from the employer. I support everyone's right to trade union membership, but recognition is a matter between the trade union and the employer. The trade union would probably find it difficult to achieve recognition if the number of its members was well below the majority of those working on the platform. All workers have a right to trade union membership, but recognition depends on the size of the representation and will be negotiated between those who belong to the union and the employer on whose premises they work.
When I worked for ICI in County Durham and north Yorkshire, way back in the early 1960s, we had a successful system of safety committees. ICI's safety record was second to none. When the Health and Safety Executive was established some years ago, ICI's model was taken into account, as it was considered to be the best practice at that time. As a manager, I had regular meetings with the trade unions—especially the Transport and General Workers Union—and with the safety committee. There were sometimes trade union shop stewards on the safety committee. I found that their style and presentation were more appropriate to trade unions which deal with terms and conditions of employment. They enabled them, as trade union representatives, to present their case in a manner best able to achieve what they sought, and with a negotiating stance generally understood by the manager. Some shop stewards were robust and could put a case


forcefully. They often asked for more than they expected to receive and a compromise would be reached. However, such a negotiating method is not always a suitable tactic when seeking to achieve safety.
When one asks for safety, it should be because it is needed and it should not be negotiable. Even if, in the debate, it is found that there is a better way to overcome a safety hazard or problem, the person asking for the safety of himself and his colleagues must believe that it is needed and will not be watered down through negotiation. The type and style of negotiating that would usually be expected from a health and safety committee representa-tive and a trade union representative may thus be quite different. Therefore, I do not regard it as essential to have safety representation through trade unions, but I believe that it is essential to have such representations through safety councils, with people who are diligent, known for their common sense, trusted by their fellow employees and respected by the management at their workplace.
The third category is collective responsibility. In my place of work I always tried to get rid of the feeling of "us" and "them" and to create a feeling of "we". There is no issue on which a feeling of "we" is more important than safety, especially on a platform in the North sea where everyone is together. People may have different coloured boilersuits, hard hats, salaries and jobs, but on the safety issue we must think in terms of "we" because everyone is in the same boat—literally, if there is a disaster such as the Piper Alpha. Collective responsibility is of paramount importance. The Government have told us that they believe that every employee has a right to be represented on a safety committee, and the committee members should be elected.
Several letters have been read out to us and discussed by the hon. Member for Blackley. I, too, received a letter from the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association and found parts of it distressing. The letter is dated 6 March and was sent not only to me, but to all hon. Members, although the copy that I have here has my name at the top, as it was sent to me.
I realise that the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association is a trade association, representing most of the companies which operate in the North sea. The letter states, as though it were something to be proud of:
as at December some 900 elected safety representatives were involved"—
in safety committees—
of which over two-thirds had already received formal training to help them in their responsibilities.
The Piper Alpha disaster was two and a half years ago, but only two-thirds of the 900 safety representatives are properly trained. If we accept, as I think we probably can, that more than half of them were trained before the disaster because some operators would have sent safety representatives on training courses, there have been only an extra one-sixth trained during the past two and a half years. I say to UKOOA and, more importantly, to its members, "What have you been doing for the past two and a half years? Why have not 100 per cent. of the people been trained and a further 10 per cent. held in reserve ready to go on the safety committees if anyone drops out or resigns from the company?" It is not good enough.
The letter also states:
Chief among these"—

the Cullen recommendations—
is the systematic use of the Safety Case and Formal Safety Assessment, the full acceptance by the Operator of his responsibility for the safety of his installation and of the workforce, and the change away from the present prescriptive regulation to goal-setting regulations.
That is fine—those are Lord Cullen's recommendations, which we all applaud—but the letter then state:
All these had been UKOOA recommendations in evidence to Lord Cullen.
It is incredible that when Lord Cullen set up his inquiry, the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association was able to make to him—or so it claims—three recommendations which are now acknowledged as the main recommendations of the Cullen report. If it was able to do that after 167 men had died, what were UKOOA and its member companies doing before July 1988 and before 167 men died? It is not something to be proud of to be able to say, two and a half years after such an accident, "Those are the recommendations that Lord Cullen made, we made them to him and we are proud that we did so." The association should have made them five years earlier. If it had, we probably would not be having today's debate and, hopefully, the men would not have been killed.
Phrases such as "safety cases" and "formal safety assessments" sound like, and probably are, new phrases, but the ideas are not new. The North sea is a hostile environment, the technology is sophisticated and the consequences of failure are severe. But there are other industries with those characteristics—the space and nuclear industries. I know from experience that the nuclear industry has safety cases, safety assessments and designed-in safety. Although I do not have personal experience of it, I have no doubt that the space industry has the same features. Why has it taken so long for the safety case assessment to be brought to North sea platforms, when so many characteristics of work in the North sea are similar to those of the nuclear and space industries? Thank God—and I really mean that—that we have brought pressure to bear now, but what a shame that we did not bring it to bear some time before.

Mr. Malcolm Bruce: The concluding comments of the hon. Member for Rochford (Dr. Clark), the Chairman of the Select Committee on Energy, are pertinent to the issue not only of where we are now, but of where we are going. By way of introduction, it is important to say that the fact that the Cullen report is excellent and the Government have accepted all its recommendations can, in some ways, be a danger rather than a benefit. There is a tendency for people to think that we have looked at the safety issue, that it is all there in the book—we have agreed to it. When the debate continues, some people, for example in the media, often ask why we are asking for this and pressing for that, because surely all has been taken care of by the Cullen report. The answer is that such matters will be taken care of only when the industry gets it all together. That will not happen overnight—we must ensure that as much is done as fast as possible and the regime is brought up to a higher standard than existed before.
It is not surprising that no fewer than five Members from Grampian region are seeking to speak in the debate, of which I am the second to have spoken, when we consider the basic importance of the industry to our district. When I checked the most recently available figures, I found that, in Grampian region, 51,200 people


are employed in the oil and gas industry and a further 18,400 in related jobs—a total of 69,000, or 33 per cent. of the total work force. Therefore, the issue is in the minds of a high proportion of that region's population, because they are directly or indirectly involved in and concerned about what goes on offshore and the safety standards that operate.
I shall not make general accusations, but until the moment that Piper Alpha went up there was a general belief that the safety regime, while not perfect, was good. There were incidental accidents, but nobody believed that the Piper Alpha disaster could happen, and nobody went offshore worrying about it. However, now that it has happened, nobody can go offshore again without being aware that it has happened and that, no matter what the regime, it could conceivably happen again. Such thoughts concentrate the mind, but it is an awful way to have it concentrated.
In my intervention in the speech of the Secretary of State, I said that I wholly supported the idea of the safety case. I was aware that it was promoted in the industry before the Piper Alpha disaster—I echo the remarks of the hon. Member for Rochford. It is a pity that the procedure was not established earlier, but it is the right approach to say that operators must look at every aspect of the design and operation of their platforms and imagine all possible events to ensure that all factors have been taken into account. That does not preclude the modification of design factors and regulations.
It is still a matter of concern to me that I have not yet received a satisfactory answer to a question that I raised as a direct consequence of the disaster. The Piper Alpha platform was substantially modified from its original installation, and it appears that the modifications contributed to the scale of the disaster. It has not been satisfactorily explained who approved the modifications and why. Those questions were not asked, but I am sure that a safety case regime would have demonstrated that the modifications were risky and unsatisfactory. That led to questions about escape mechanisms from platforms.
I asked a senior executive of Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Ltd. why no downward escape routes, as well as escape routes via the heli-deck, were incorporated into the design and into evacuation procedures from the platform. I was amazed to hear him say that he thought there were. That shows some of the problems that existed before the disaster. I believe that the safety case approach is correct.
I want to speak briefly, and perhaps predictably, about the case for locating the offshore safety division of the Health and Safety Executive in the north-east of Scotland. I have believed for a long time—before the Piper Alpha disaster—that there was a case for separating the offshore safety role from the Department of Energy. The right hon. Member for Kincardine and Deeside (Mr. Buchanan-Smith) acknowledged that point towards the end of his speech. He said that the real point was not necessarily that the Department of Energy was compromised—although it may have been, and some people say that it was even though the right hon. Gentleman, who held office in that Department, said categorically that it was not—but that it was seen to be compromised. The offshore safety role should be taken away to ensure that such confusion does not arise.
The case for putting the centre of gravity of the offshore safety division in the north-east should not be lost. The

arguments that I hear suggest strongly that the centre of gravity is likely to be in London, with subsidiary operations in Bootle and Aberdeen, but I am not convinced that the case has been made properly.
In a reply to me on 21 January 1991, the Under-Secretary of State for Employment, the hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire (Mr. Forth), while suggesting that he would not preclude the decision and that it was a matter for the HSE, nevertheless wrote:
The need to recruit scarce specialist staff and the location in London and the South East of most oil companies will require that a major part of the operation will continue to be based in London".
I wholly refute that. I do not understand why, if executives have to travel to London, they cannot be expected to travel to Aberdeen. The fact that the oil companies have a substantial part of their headquarters in London does not negate the fact that the operational headquarters—which is what we are considering—are in Aberdeen. That is where most of the people concerned with safety in the industry are based.
That idea is reinforced by the survey Commissioned by the Aberdeen centre for offshore safety, of which I am sure that the Secretary of State and the Minister are aware. The centre was recently set up by a number of bodies, including Grampian regional council, the trades council, the chamber of commerce and Aberdeen city council. It is a fairly representative body, which has, I accept, a clear objective—to persuade the HSE to make Aberdeen its location. It has asked most operators in Aberdeen for their views and preferences and, bearing in mind what the Under-Secretary of State for Employment said, there seems to be a contradiction.
The survey states:
71 per cent. of the sample … confirmed that the key leadership locus for the Formal Safety Assessment Task Force structure is, or will be, in Aberdeen.
In addition, 67 per cent. of the sample reported that the previous interface in Aberdeen with the Department of Energy was inadequate because of inadequate levels of skill and the inadequate seniority of the Aberdeen staff. If we are to be told that the HSE must locate its operations in London because the Department of Energy has not transferred its key personnel to Aberdeen, then we have the cart the wrong way round in relation to the horse.
There is a supposed commitment to move civil servants and jobs out of London to the regions and provincial centres. Logic dictates that that is the way it should be done, and that it is a practical way of improving the efficiency of the operation in every sense, as well as transferring the centre of gravity from London. The Secretary of State has already said that it is a matter for the HSE, but I hope that it will read the report of the debate and take on board what has been said.
We accept the role of the skilled people in Bootle and the role of London, but I for one am wholly unconvinced that that means that the centre of gravity must be in London rather than in Aberdeen. I believe that we are entitled to press the case, as we in the north-east are doing.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: Would it not enhance the operating level of those who work in the oil companies in Aberdeen if the senior level of control of the offshore installations were in Aberdeen too? Would not that contribute to a greater commitment to safety at senior levels in the oil companies?

Mr. Bruce: I wholly agree. My point is that, if the Department of Energy and the HSE inspectorate were to make a move, the oil companies would be forced to follow through. Some already have, and are complaining that that is where their centre of gravity is and that too many people have to travel south. The right hon. Gentleman is correct to say that a move would bring everything together. The efficiency of the industry would be enhanced, and it would seem to be in everyone's interest. The industry could concentrate on developing particular aspects of the safety regimes.
Another relevant issue is the relationship between oil company workers and workers in the contracting companies, which has become a major bone of contention. I was pleased to hear the Under-Secretary of State for Energy say in Aberdeen that we needed to ensure that the status of all offshore workers was indistinguishable. That was the purpose of my intervention on the Secretary of State. There is considerable worry about the way in which the relationship between the oil companies and the offshore contractors has developed and its effect on the morale of the workers, which I am sure has implications for safety as well as for efficiency.
When the previous downturn in oil prices took effect the oil companies put a real squeeze on the contractors, which had several consequences. They invited contractors to make bids for maintenance work, for example. A price may be based on man hours or it may be fixed—there are various ways in which to proceed, but the prices are very hard fought. In such circumstances, the contractors are often forced to change the working conditions of offshore workers. They often made the workers self-employed so that they would not enjoy holiday pay or sickness benefits in full or, if they did, they had to pay for them themselves.
That caused considerable resentment among many of those people. When they found that the oil companies were looking after their own and putting on the squeeze further down the line, it created a real problem. It made blacklisting, which arose in the industrial dispute last year, a particularly offensive issue. Shell ultimately realised that it was counter-productive for its corporate image. Companies told contractors, "We invite you to provide a competitive tender to do a job on our platform. You must determine the parameters of that contract, whom and how many you employ, as long as you meet our price and conditions." Then they said, "However, you cannot employ certain named individuals because we don't regard them as desirable."
Apart from the very dubious legality of such behaviour, the morality and ethics are extremely questionable. That is beside the point, in a sense. The effect on the relationship, on the climate and on the way in which different workers see themselves is negative and has contributed to a deterioration of morale and industrial relations offshore, which must be sorted out.
I want to mention an issue which may seem tangential, but which is of concern to me and relevant to offshore safety as it relates to helicopters. The House will be aware that there is a severe shortage of air traffic controllers throughout the country, which has led to some pressure on staffing levels. I accept that that has happened to try to ensure that training is carried out to bring the level up to acceptable standards. However, I represent Aberdeen airport and I am not at all happy about the cuts that have been imposed there. I have had extended correspondence with the chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority on the

matter. Suffice it to say that we are now agreed on the facts. We have 28 controllers out of a full complement of 32—in other words, we are four short in practical terms, without going into the details.
That shortage affects helicopter training at the airport. The air traffic controller in charge has to say to helicopter companies, "You may not be able to carry out training at certain times of the day, because we do not have enough air traffic control cover to do it." I am not suggesting that there is an immediate safety problem at Aberdeen airport. I am assured that there is not and I accept that assurance. However, if, by definition, helicopter companies are having to cut training activity, safety in the offshore environment must be affected. I know that colleagues who represent neighbouring constituencies are well aware of people's concern that the means of transport to work offshore is helicopters.
Helicopters are an inherently less safe method of travel than fixed-wing aircraft are. It is interesting that the experiment with the idea of long-haul helicopters, embarked on a few years ago, has been substantially abandoned in favour of going back to using Sumburgh and Unst for the northern field, with fixed-wing aircraft and transfers. That minimises the time that has to be spent in helicopters.
I am anxious that there should be no compromise on helicopter training at Aberdeen airport as a result of general cuts in air traffic controllers. It is unfortunate that that should happen at a time when Aberdeen is the only airport in the United Kingdom that is enjoying a growth in traffic. Yet it gets a share of the cuts, which does not seem to take account of that growth.
My most important point is to suggest that, given that the safety regime will continue to change and that the implications of the Cullen report will take some time to put in place, we need some other body to try to ensure that offshore safety is monitored, developed and advanced continually. I should like further consideration to be given to the recommendation, which I have made before, of establishing an independent offshore safety trust. I put forward that idea some months ago.
I have written to a number of interested bodies, such as the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association, the trade unions and oil companies, to suggest that the idea should be given serious consideration. The response has been by no means hostile. It has led to a certain grinding of axes—perhaps predictably. Trade union interests have tended to say, "We believe that offshore trade union recognition is the determinant of offshore safety. That is what we are campaigning for, and we do not wish to be sidetracked from that." I must make it clear that I support the campaign for trade union recognition. My idea would not get in the way of that. However, I do not accept that trade union recognition could be the sole determinant of the offshore safety regime, although I believe that it could make a contribution.
By the same token, the employers have tended to say, "We think that the offshore safety committees are the answer." Again, there is some doubt about the full role of offshore safety committees. The hon. Member for Rochford has pointed out that such committees have not yet been fully implemented.
The idea of an offshore safety trust, located in Aberdeen, which would draw representation from across the spectrum—from oil companies, from trade unions, from local authorities and from the Health and Safety


Executive—would provide a useful focus for monitoring offshore safety. Any individual or company could report concerns about safety, whether they related to design, or to operating standards and practices, with absolute anonymity and knowing that there was protection. Concerns could be investigated and people could be identified if they wished, but only at their discretion— anonymity would be guaranteed otherwise.
The avenue of the Department of Energy has not wholly worked, and the Department is not seen to be sufficiently detached. The body that I suggest could produce a quarterly report which would summarise the issues that had been raised with it. That would help to identify the areas of concern, raise standards and ensure a focus of debate. It is a constructive suggestion. The cost would be minimal in relation to the industry and it could be financed by all those who took part.
I want to anticipate any questions. The fact that we have had the Cullen report, that its recommendations have been accepted and that various measures are in hand is not enough. We need another vehicle through which safety can be channelled and to which people feel that they have absolute security to report concerns. They will know that those concerns will be investigated and that their own position will be protected. I commend that idea to the House.
In one sense, this debate is overdue. However, I accept that, from the point of view of the Secretary of State, other matters need to be reported as we go on. It has been established that regulation does not solve the problem, and that everyone involved in the industry must accept total responsibility for safety. That requires a degree of trust across the board. I have raised some of the issues that undermine that trust and that must be addressed if full trust is to be established. It is not healthy to have continuing industrial disputes, to have low morale and to have inequality between oil company representatives and contractors. All those issues need to be resolved, and they will not be resolved quickly. I have made some constructive suggestions about how we can advance safety and ensure that we have a continuing and dynamic debate so that we never experience such a catastrophe again.

Mr. David Porter: The hon. Members for Gordon (Mr. Bruce) and for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) referred to north-east Scotland as the front line of the United Kingdom oil industry. I am sure that Ministers will not accept that as the whole picture. Clearly, north-east Scotland is the front line, but I hope that hon. Members do not mean to imply that the southern North sea sector is only the back end of the industry. As with the fishing industry, Scottish Members surely recognise that other parts of the United Kingdom are involved in similar activities. The oil industry is an example of that. The lesson of the Cullen report is vital to every part of the North sea sector.
It has been suggested that Aberdeen should be the base for the Health and Safety Executive. Although I represent an East Anglian constituency, I have no objection to it being sited in Aberdeen, provided that it is borne in mind that the field extends to take in most of East Anglia as well. It is important that I contribute to this debate to put the view of the southern North sea sector.
In my own constituency and in Great Yarmouth, the oil industry has been one of the biggest employers for many years. In addition to the point made in the Cullen report, it must be said over and over again that for many people, often in the comfort and safety of their armchairs, the North sea is just a sea—an attractive asset to an east coast seaside holiday, or a tiresome hurdle to be crossed before one can enjoy a European holiday.
From time to time, however, there is a dramatic and devastating tragedy in the North sea. Those of us who live by it and work by it, or who live on it and work on it, have learnt a healthy respect for that sea. Whether we are talking about fishing in it, defending our shores from its ravages, or extracting gas and oil from it, we must realise that the North sea is, as has been said, a very hostile environment. In that environment, safety can never be absolutely guaranteed. It is right that we bring the matter to public attention today.
A new safety culture is abroad in the population at large. It rightly pervades much public thinking. However, there has always been a certain safety culture and a strong safety incentive among those who work offshore. It has been, and must continue to be, a mutual incentive. In effect, if a working practice endangers one man, it endangers all men. That covers every aspect of the operation—from the helicopter out, to the use of the accommodation modules once the men are at sea. However, there is never an ultimate level of safety. Safety can always be improved. The lessons from Piper Alpha have been an important lever with regard to all aspects of the industry.
Shell UK has had an exploration base at Lowestoft in my constituency for 25 years. Its contribution to the local economy has been immeasurable—running into millions of pounds, directly and indirectly. Its contribution to the social, cultural and educational fabric of the area is equally immeasurable—running into hundreds of thousands of pounds over the years. I am not here as the mouthpiece of Shell UK, or any of its partners in EXPRO, but I have to say that I am very grateful to it and am impressed by its commitment to the local community and to the wellbeing of its work force, among other things. Shell UK made a submission to the Select Committee on Energy in connection with that Committee's inquiry into the management of offshore safety. The submission opened with the following words:
The nature of the regulatory regime, as envisaged by Lord Cullen, in our view, correctly places responsibility upon the operator to competently conduct his operations, utilising appropriate procedures and equipment, together with appropriately trained people, to design, construct and operate the facility.
The key phrase is "places responsibility upon the operator"—in Cullen, as before Cullen.
The preparation of the comprehensive safety case—of which mention had been made—with regular reviews, will widen confidence in the safety regime for all men who venture offshore. To that end, EXPRO has set about implementing the recommendations with some gusto. Management has taken a direct interest in ensuring that the company, at all its levels, meets all its operator's requirements. It has highlighted a key conclusion in Cullen —that flawed procedures and practices were a greater contributor to the Piper Alpha disaster than was hardware. With total commitment of staff, and with training, it is possible to improve procedures faster than to finalise hardware modifications. The respective roles of the


safety committee, the safety representatives and super-vision are recognised as vital, and all contractors must have easy access to that chain.
I am not persuaded by the argument about victimisation. I have had no evidence presented to me, but I have heard the remarks of hon. Members in this debate. It has been said that people have been victimised for raising a genuine safety worry. The hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) mentioned the so-called climate of fear. As I have already said, safety is interconnected. It is not in the interests of management that any plant should cease production for any reason whatever—and that includes a disaster. I believe that EXPRO itself will have implemented all recommendations in due course, and without any regard to cost.
In this context, recognition of the links in the safety chain are essential for every person. To this end, I welcome the advent of a single regulatory body—the Health and Safety Executive. I am a great believer in the principle of one body, one buck-stop. I take every opportunity to promote one body—the National Rivers Authority—to take full responsibility for national sea defence. However, returning to the question of offshore safety, I should like to put something to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State. Does not relative confusion sometimes inevitably arise over safety and general regulatory functions? I refer to the fact that the Department of Energy, the HSE, the Department of Employment, the Department of Transport, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, and the Department of Trade and Industry all have their fingers in the North sea pie.
A large number of jobs in Waveney depend on the standby-vessel aspect of the industry. Boston Putford Offshore Safety, which markets the safety services of shipping companies, Britannia Marine, Putford Enterprises, Warble Shipping and Breydon Marine have just won a £10 milion three-year safety contract with Shell UK. It is a welcome deal, on which they are to be congratulated, and it will secure the jobs of about 100 seamen. Under this contract, there will be three main mother ships capable of launching fast daughter craft for close in-cover work next to the platforms. The mother ships are all highly manoeuvrable converted supply boats, in line with the Cullen recommendations. Three conventional former trawlers will provide additional standby cover.
We heard about converted trawlers earlier in the debate. In recent months, a spate of mishaps and unhappy experiences involving other converted trawlers for standby work culminated in the loss, around Christmas, of one Lowestoft-based vessel in heavy seas. This all now raises the question of the validity of old fishing boats being used, and the need for purpose-built standby vessels. In view of the fact that there are shipbuilding facilities in my constituency, I certainly do not object to the argument that all boats should be purpose-built. However, old trawlers have served us well and should not be contemptuously dismissed. I understand that the use of these old boats in the North sea has resulted in the saving of about 100 lives since Piper Alpha. They were, after all, built to withstand the rigours of the North sea.
Some time ago, in response to the debate about new-build, Putford Enterprises produced a paper which

argued that new vessels should be designed not only to service offshore installations but also to serve likely purposes of the Royal Navy—for instance, minesweeping. The paper was submitted to my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement, who has argued that the Royal Navy has identified sufficient vessels for all assumed purposes. That is the kind of short-term answer that I would expect, but I hope that it will not be the last word. The long-term needs of any ocean-going activity must surely be considered with reference to multi-purpose vessels.
It is reasonable to say that the findings of the report have been widely welcomed. We are dealing with a widespread industry, encompassing many skills, and as virtually all the southern North sea sector is serviced from Waveney and Great Yarmouth, it affects every corner of life there. There is a heliport at Ellough, near Beccles, and there are the supplying and equipping back-up industries in Lowestoft and Yarmouth. I have already mentioned the standby vessels. There are engineers and electrical and specialist oil and gas workers. SLP Limited has the only major offshore module fabricators south of Teesside. The Lowestoft college has one of the best offshore survival training courses in Europe. Myriad large and small firms depend wholly or partly on the offshore industry. Safety is the binding thread which links all those separate parts.
We can never say that there will not be another major North sea incident like Piper Alpha. We can never say that a couple of young men from my constituency will not be tragically killed when an unexpected wave pushes a davit to crush them while it is being raised to the mother ship. However, we can take all reasonable and realistic steps. By accepting the Cullen recommendations, the Government have shown that they are prepared to give a lead. That, of course, will have to be reflected throughout the industry, and not just within Shell. The Government are to be congratulated.
Like the hon. Member for Gordon, I hope that the Government will not rest on their laurels but will move forward as fast as possible to ensure that safety remains the top priority. Technology apart, safety culture apart, human training and error apart, there is environmental evidence that the North sea is getting rougher. Technology, safety, training and human factors must take account of that. Although neither the weather, the wind nor the sea itself destroyed Piper Alpha, they must never be underestimated.

Mr. Robert Hughes: This is an extremely important debate. I hope that the House will forgive me if I start on a note of disappointment. I pay tribute to hon. Members who have spoken already. They have displayed great sincerity and a deep interest in this subject, but I have to express personal dissatisfaction that there are so few hon. Members in the House. The subject is far more important than is suggested by the attendance. I confess that I was one of the hon. Members who lobbied hard for a two-day debate. I am grateful to the Government for tabling a motion that enables us to continue to midnight. I understand that there is much pressure on the time of hon. Members on both sides of the House. Perhaps everyone thought that so many hon. Members wanted to speak that there was little prospect of being called.
The imprint of Piper Alpha is for ever seared on our minds. We are reminded of it in all sorts of ways—some of them totally unconnected with the North sea, although clearly connected with the oil industry. I hope that hon. Members will not think me parochial when I tell the House that the first thing that the television pictures of the burning oil wells in Kuwait brought to my mind was Piper Alpha. That is a reason for great sadness for those who, like me, are distraught at what happened in the Gulf. None of us wanted to see such events, although we knew that they were necessary. The image of the burning oil wells brought to mind the image of Piper Alpha on fire.
I join those who have already paid tribute to Lord Cullen, his staff and all who gave evidence to the committee. It has already been said that it was an extremely comprehensive report. It was well argued and well laid out. Although I do not necessarily agree with all its conclusions, I recognise that the report was extremely valuable in concentrating our minds.
Several questions arise out of the Piper Alpha tragedy. Could the accident have been foreseen? Could it have been avoided? Can a future tragedy be prevented? What lessons can be learnt for general offshore safety in the aftermath of Piper Alpha? If we are realistic, we must accept that we can all be wise after the event. There has never been an accident or incident where people have not drawn conclusions afterwards which they might not have drawn beforehand. In all honesty, the ferocity of the explosion and the extent of the damage were beyond all imagination. Everyone was shocked by it. However, the answer to my second question is yes, Piper Alpha could have been avoided. It could certainly have been avoided if sub-sea isolation valves had been fitted from the beginning.
It is true that emergency shutdown valves have been relocated in a safer place on almost all platforms. Some sub-sea isolation valves have been fitted, but very few. One of the most important steps that must be taken is to fit every platform, both old and new, with sub-sea isolation valves. I accept that it is an enormously expensive programme, but it is vital. A tragedy of such proportions must never happen again if anything can be done to prevent it.
The four questions which I asked at the beginning of my speech run into one another. They are all interlinked. Certainly, we believe and fervently hope that a similar tragedy can be avoided in future, but one inescapable conclusion cannot be overridden or forgotten; it is proved by both the technical report and Lord Cullen's major report. It is that the tragedy occurred as a result of the failure of safety procedures in the first instance. That was the cause of the whole episode. The echoes and multiplications of the explosions occurred as a result of that failure.
Anyone in engineering should know that failures in safety procedures often occur at shift changeover periods. We all understand that. It is a considerable number of years since I worked in industry but I recall, because it has stuck in my mind so vividly, an incident that occurred when I was an engineering apprentice in a rubber factory in South Africa. One of the jobs that we had to do from time to time was to replace the guards which prevented rubber from being squeezed into the bearings. It was normally a 10-minute job done as part of routine maintenance but occasionally there was a failure and the job had to be done immediately.
I remember one Friday evening at 10 minutes to five —I was 17 or 18—when another apprentice and I were told, "The number two bearing guards have gone. You had better go and put them back." We were washing our hands. I do not want to spell out in detail the thoughts which passed through a 17-year-old's mind late on a Friday afternoon. The last thing on our minds was work. We went down to replace the guards. The safety procedures were clear. We would throw the switch off, open the fuse box, pull out the fuses, put them in our overall pockets, shut the box and hang on the machine a notice saying, "Do not start this machine" and go to work on the machinery.
The two of us were sitting working away between the big rolling mills. As was inevitable, the holes had not been bored exactly right. Instead of simply slipping in, the bolts were awkward. When one has other things on one's mind at the age of 17, the job becomes more difficult. Every engineer knows how difficult it is to finish the job when one becomes irritated.
We could not smoke in the building because of the volatile fluids used for mixing the rubber. I said to my mate, as people have probably heard me say more recently, "I am going for a smoke." We nipped out to a safe place and had a cup of tea and a smoke. The shift changed at 6 pm and when we came back the mill was running. We had not pulled the fuses out. It was a chance that we went for a cigarette. Cigarettes are not always lethal. If we had not gone for a cigarette, I would not be here and my mate would not be alive either.
That simple episode shows how easy it is for strict safety procedures, which we all know and understand, to be forgotten and for fatal damage to result, especially at shift changeover times. If the shift had not changed the mill would not have been started. The operators on the previous shift knew that we were working there because they had reported the breakdown. Shift changeovers are extremely difficult.
We should not delude ourselves that if it had not been for the sequence of events, unparalleled in the offshore industry, the failures in safety procedures, while still serious, might have been comparatively less significant. At one time people might have said that Piper Alpha was a freak accident which could never happen again. They might have thought that they did not worry too much because there was only a chance in 100 million, or whatever, of it happening again. We are also concerned about general safety procedures. Every life lost is one too many and every preventable injury gives rise to serious anxiety among all of us.
All operations on production platforms must be meticulously examined. Those examinations must be carried out, as I know that they are. By operations, I mean not just equipment but labour. The safety assessment or risk analysis survey—call it what we will—must be carried out on the basis of envisaging the worst consequence. Every function must be subject to a failsafe examination. For example, the systems must be examined. If equipment A fails, is equipment B adequate and satisfactory to limit the damage? If item B is also put out as a result of the damage, is equipment C capable of stopping the damage from spreading? Every single function, however simple or complex, must be worked through.
I know that to some extent such functions are being examined. Oddly enough, although we have been


extremely critical of oil companies, especially in the wake of Piper Alpha and the evidence from offshore, and of the way in which safety functions have been examined, we must remember that some things have been done properly and well. It appeared that they were done properly and adequately before Piper Alpha.
I went to one platform. We were told and shown that the fire control systems which operated the deluge system were situated in a different module from where the deluge system was located, so if a fire took place and it was recognised that there might be an explosion, the control system for the deluge could be operated from another module and would not be affected immediately. The control was separate from the equipment, so it should have been possible to operate the equipment. The irony is that in some cases such matters have been examined carefully. Nevertheless, the most pessimistic approach has to be brought into play in the necessary reassessment.
It is often argued that there is little difference now between the oil companies, the Government and the Opposition about the need to ensure that safety is paramount.
The oil companies got as big a shock as anyone as a result of the incident. All the oil company people to whom I have spoken since Piper Alpha have said, in effect, "We thought our systems were safe and that we had done everything we possibly could." When they examined the systems on Piper Alpha and other platforms, they said, "In the light of Piper Alpha, we have suddenly realised how far we have to go." That was an honest admission and those who made it should be given credit for being honest. Clearly, Piper Alpha has had an enormous impact on people's perception.
We must make sure that the overall safety assessments and provisions and the way in which they operate and are monitored, supervised and controlled are satisfactory. For some years, great dissatisfaction has been expressed in question and answer sessions across the Floor of the House about the Department of Energy having both the production responsibility and the safety remit. Concern has often been expressed lest conflicts of interest should arise between the needs of production and the need for safety. That theme—the possible conflict of interest of operators in terms of production and safety—has existed throughout, the fear being that production needs will override safety needs.
I do not believe that anyone in industry says, "We don't care if this is dangerous. You must do it because production needs come first." Nobody in industry has ever said that to me, but in many ways the position is more sinister. The attitude among those concerned builds up to their believing, "We must get this production out and we can't afford to shut down." I fear that such a sentiment can impinge on the thoughts of all involved in production. I repeat that we must be sure that there is no conflict of interest between production and safety.
Lord Cullen recommended—I concede at once that the Government have accepted the recommendation—that the Health and Safety Executive should now assume direct responsibility for offshore safety. It is sometimes forgotten that the Department of Energy undertook the safety remit as an agency acting for the HSE in the first instance. In any

event, it is now universally accepted that the transfer should take place, and the Secretary of State said that he would make it happen.
I am pleased to say that there is unanimity on that, and the matter was put to Lord Cullen by the trade unions and by the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association. That having been agreed, we are now only awaiting the starting date. On that, the Minister made out the best case he could. He said that he could not say precisely when the new arrangement would start but that it would be fairly soon.
A number of questions remain unanswered. We are familiar with the shortage of inspectors. During the remit of the Department of Energy, there were problems in that respect. The shortage must not be allowed to persist. It is often said that a real shortage of expertise will exist, and the question, "From where will the experts come?" is frequently asked. My hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson) said that money was not the only problem. That may be so, but it is a key to the answer.
While I would like to see the job done entirely by the Health and Safety Executive, and an increase in the number of expert personnel so that eventually we have a sufficient body of expertise, it may be necessary for expertise to be bought in in the first instance, perhaps on a consultancy basis. If experts are available in, say, the United States or Norway, we should bring them in to help. If they cannot be employed directly by the HSE, we should hire experts and pay the price, for no excuse must be allowed to delay the essential work that has to be done.
The Secretary of State, previously and in his remarks today, said that the demands of safety are so imperative that a shortage of money should not inhibit safety supervision, provision and operation. The right hon. Gentleman now needs to be forthright about that. I understood him to say that broad agreement had been reached. I cannot accept that statement in its entirety. I am not satisfied with the reaching of broad agreements on an issue such as this. I want to be told clearly and without equivocation the budget that the Health and Safety Executive requested of the Treasury and the amount that the Treasury agreed to provide for the HSE. There may have been broad agreement, but in terms of civil servants talking to each other and Treasury Ministers talking to departmental Ministers, reaching broad agreement could mean that the Treasury has screwed down the amount of money that will be made available, and such a situation would be wholly wrong.
The Minister should be open with us on this issue, although I accept that it might be difficult for him to do that. Promises are no substitute in this instance for hard cash. We must be sure that the amount of money sought by the HSE has been, and will be, made available. Indeed, we must also be sure that as the HSE carries out the work In the months and years ahead, more money will be made available if it is needed. There must be no equivocation about that.
As some of my hon. Friends have said, we should be told where the new headquarters will be. Hon. Members will not be surprised to hear me say that logic suggests that they should be in Aberdeen. I understood the Minister to say that there would be a substantial presence in Aberdeen, but he could not say whether the headquarters would be established there. Any hon. Member might make a cheap debating point and say that I am expressing the


parochialism of the Scots, in particular those in north-east Scotland. That is not the case. I am simply expressing the logic of the situation.
It is sometimes argued—

Mr. Ernie Ross: It will be.

Mr. Hughes: I think that my hon. Friend has anticipated me wrongly on this occasion. I do not think he intends to argue the point that I am about to make.
It is sometimes argued that modern technology has shortened the lines of communication to the extent that it is not necessary to have people nearby to do the job. There is some validity in that. Indeed, some hon. Members may regret the way in which modern technology has brought us into much closer contact with our constituents. They can get in touch with us too readily, some might say. As irony is never reflected in print, I hasten to add that that comment was made in jest—just in case anybody reads the Official Report of my comments.
There is no substitute for having the personnel and expertise we require close to hand so that there can be adequate communication with them. I say that because we need a stronger hands-on approach to safety in place of the hands-off approach of the past. We need people on the ground. The availability of headquarters staff would provide a permanent stimulus to safety. That is probably the best practical way to foster safety in the future.
Some may not accept my view that a more definite hands-on approach is necessary. Indeed, some may say that we have not had a hands-off approach in the past. I believe that we have. The oil companies have argued —I believe that they still argue that—the problem of safety in the North sea arises in part because of the detailed regulation. Perhaps they are not arguing that the problems arise because of detailed regulations. However, they certainly are arguing, as they argued before Lord Cullen, that the detailed regulations instil a negative philosophy and a negative psychology towards safety.
I need not read into the record all the references to that in the Cullen report, but it is referred to in paragraphs 21.40 and 21.42. In the latter paragraph, Lord Cullen, following up the oil companies' idea that regulations lead to less safety rather than more, recalled the evidence of Mr. McKee:
Regulations need to be less prescriptive and detailed, more objective and broader based. Over time as you layer more and more prescriptive types of regulations onto the overall regime it probably takes away from the overall objective of total safety.
I do not accept that. Nor do I accept the oil companies' implication that operators decide that, provided they have satisfied the regulations as a minimum, they need not do any more.
The oil companies identified that danger. They said that if companies simply followed the regulations, they might stop thinking about safety beyond what is written on paper. There may be a case for strongly attacking the oil companies for that, but I would restrain myself from doing so. I believe that that is an interesting admission about the psychology which may have developed.
I want to consider a counter-proposition from UKOOA—that the operators should accept responsibility for total safety with a minimum of detailed regulation. I have always accepted, and will always accept, that employers have a legal and moral duty to ensure the safe operation of their industries for the benefit of their

employees, the company and, in the case of onshore installations, the safety of those who reside in the vicinity of dangerous operations.
The responsibility is and always has been that of the companies involved. On the other hand, we should not conclude from that that the detailed regulations should he diluted. I hope that the Secretary of State or the Minister will assure us that detailed regulations will remain in force and that, as and when necessary, new regulations will he laid.
Regulations on safety and necessary procedures must be set out clearly. There can be no serious dispute about that. There must also be unanimity that safety depends on those who must implement the system. I accept what several hon. Members have said—that there is a joint responsibility. Managers, operators, owners and workers have a combined responsibility. None of us can escape that responsibility.
Safety is a state of mind. We are all familiar with the syndrome in which there is a heightened interest in safety or security after a major incident, but that is followed by sad and serious lapses as the incident fades from memory. There is a cycle in which people suddenly become interested in safety after an accident, but that interest wanes as the memory fades.
I do not intend to be derogatory about those who work in industry when I say that they cannot maintain the fever pitch of interest in safety that follows a major incident. It is a natural function of human resilience that the capacity to overcome danger allows us to set those dangers aside; otherwise, we would become too scared to do anything. My thesis is that we should encourage all organisations and harness all our energies towards safety.
The involvement of the trade union movement is of paramount importance. It is essential to improving general safety. The Government have maliciously cultivated an image of the trade union movement as short-sighted and concerned solely with immediate issues, such as wages and protecting its own power base. That is a wholly malevolent image which is ill deserved and a perversion of the truth.
Of course trade unions are interested in wages and conditions. They must have an interest in improving the standard of living of our members. When I say "our members", I should declare an interest as a member of the Amalgamated Engineering Union. I declare that interest not defensively, but as a matter of pride.
Trade unionists have always had a legitimate and abiding interest in safety at work. They have always run safety courses for shop stewards and other members, many of which are at local and national levels and sometimes even at international level. There has been a lamentable lack of understanding, perhaps even hostility, between the oil companies and the trade union movement. I cannot understand why that has happened.
Many of the oil companies that function in the North sea have onshore installations or onshore projects in which they coexist quite happily with trade union membership, where trade union membership is the norm, where there is trade union recognition and where there is much union-management co-operation. No one has been able to explain to me why a different view should be taken with regard to activity in the North sea. That is completely beyond my comprehension.
However, I believe that attitudes may be changing. I am grateful to UKOOA for meeting my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford, East (Mr. Orme), my hon. Friend the


Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Eastham) and me and for the further invitation to meet us again with representatives of the AEU executive council. I hope that that meeting takes place soon and that, no matter what harsh words have been spoken here today, the cooperation and dialogue that has started over the past few months will not be set aside.
I hope that our discussions will continue and that they will be fruitful and co-operative. I hope that those discussions will lead to proper trade union recognition. No one is saying that everyone must be a trade union member. We seek proper rights to be trade union members and proper recruitment rights and co-operation by the oil companies to allow recruitment in the North sea.
I do not blame people who have been offshore for a fortnight if they make a dive to get home as soon as they get off the helicopter and do not wait to speak to the trade union representative who wants to recruit them. It is ridiculous to claim that the opportunities to recruit offshore workers are the same as those to recruit onshore workers.
I hope that we will no longer hear stories about particular platforms on which the number of trade union members is growing, and where, if one or two of those members begin to show some militancy, they find that they are not required for two or three months or are split up on to different platforms where there are very few, if any, trade union members. I hope that the oil companies will allow opportunities for recruitment. It is in their interests as much as it is the interest of the offshore workers.
I am optimistic that there is a change of understanding and a belief that the trade unions have a place and must be recognised. However, having said that, I remain convinced that the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974 should be extended offshore.
In paragraphs 21.84 and 21.85, Lord Cullen accepts the value and validity of trade union membership and representation providing a backup and a bolster for those who might be afraid of dismissal or afraid that they might not be taken seriously. He accepted the validity of the argument but qualified it by saying that most of the evidence came from the trade union movement; but it could not come from anywhere else. I regret that he did not recommend that the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 should apply to offshore installations and that he did not deal with the issue of industrial relations. I ask the Government to put that piece of the safety jigsaw in place. It fits with the general thesis that safety is everyone's responsibility and with the legal requirement, which should be as clear as possible, to make safety an issue about which workers are not afraid to speak out.
The awful impact of Piper Alpha will be with us for ever. We are constantly reminded of it, as we were recently by the burning of Kuwaiti oil wells. Piper Alpha should not have happened and must never happen again. No opportunity should be left unexplored in the drive to achieve the highest safety standards. If the lessons of Piper Alpha are learnt and applied, life offshore will be safer for those who earn their living there.

Mr. Ernie Ross: I recall contributing to the debate on the Burgoyne report on 6 November 1980. I have quickly read the five or six-minute speech that I made. I hope to speak tonight for eight or 10 times as long.
The trade union to which I belong was heavily involved in the early 1980s in the offshore and onshore oil industry. It made recommendations which almost second-guessed the tragedy that was about to happen. My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, East (Mr. Prescott), who was concerned about transport matters, and I wanted to establish a charter for offshore workers in the North sea. Many of my constituents were employed on offshore installations.
The Burgoyne committee was established by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) when he was Secretary of State for Energy. If the Conservative party had not won the 1979 election, many more of Burgoyne's recommendations would have been im-plemented. For instance, more attention might have been paid to recommendation 564.
Although I have much admiration for the right hon. Member for Kincardine and Deeside (Mr. Buchanan-Smith) and for others who worked for the Department of Energy at that time, they must carry the can because they were responsible. They failed to understand the need to separate responsibility for the running and the financing of North sea oil and the way in which that running and earning was administered on behalf.of the people who did the running and earning and who o tragically paid with their lives on Piper Alpha.
To give an example, paragraph 5.64 of the Burgoyne report says:
One of the 'grey' areas referred to above is the overlap in responsibility between the PED and the Certifying Authorities, in respect of the pipeline riser and other pipeline equipment on the installation. Although forming an essential part of the pipeline system, it clearly has a bearing on the integrity of the installation.
Nothing could be more relevant to the debate than that paragraph. The failure to ensure safety allowed that grey area to turn into the Piper Alpha disaster. Conservative Members cannot hide from their responsibility. Those grey areas were highlighted in the Burgoyne report, but nothing was done to ensure safety inspections.
In the debate in 1980, I expressed my concern about a Department paying public funds for another arm of Government to carry out work on its behalf without checks being made to ensure that those public funds were being well spent, and that safety inspections were being carried out. I have told the Health and Safety Executive and the Health and Safety Commission numerous times when they have appeared before the Select Committee on Employment that they will have to carry the responsibility for the breakdown of safety, because they paid money for the petroleum engineering division to carry out work on its behalf which, as Piper Alpha showed, was not done as it should have been.
At long last, 11 years after the debate in 1980, the Government have accepted that responsibility for safety should pass to the Health and Safety Executive and the Health and Safety Commission., which will perhaps prevent tragedies in future. That does not help those people who lost their lives on Piper Alpha.
In the early 1980s, my union, Manufacturing, Science and Finance, was two separate unions—the ASTMS and


TASS. One of the assistant general secretaries of the ASTMS, Roger Lyons, was involved in producing a minority report because he disagreed with the decision to contract out responsibility for safety to two arms of Government. If his comments had been noted, we might not be holding this debate.
Cullen's recommendations have significant implica-tions for the resourcing and staffing of the Health and Safety Executive. Because of its expertise, some of its staff will have to transfer to the new offshore division. We are concerned to ensure that the remainder of its staff do not suffer as a result of that transfer and that the new division is not financed from its current budget. The Secretary of State sought to assure the House that the HSE and offshore workers would be all right, but Lord Cullen identified Mr. Rimington, the director-general of the HSC, as the person who would be held responsible. However, as a civil servant he will be unable to say to the Treasury, "We need more money".
I am not confident that the Secretary of State for Employment will have that ability. Therefore, I am concerned about the financing of the new division. It will take more than the honeyed words of the Secretary of State for Energy, who will be giving up responsibility on 1 April, to reassure me about the proper resourcing of the new division.
We are also concerned that the new division may seek to draw staff from other parts of the Health and Safety Executive. For example, the CIMAH inspectors, who deal with the control of major accident hazards, are the most likely people to be drawn into the new division. That would immediately affect the necessary work that that part of the HSE is carrying out.
Can the Minister tell us how the discussions are going? What numbers of staff are we talking about? If the Minister thinks that I am exaggerating, he need only ask his hon. Friend the Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Stevens), who was a member of the Select Committee. We regularly heard from Dr. Cullen, when he was chairman of the HSE, and Mr. Rimington that they were finding it difficult to attract health and safety inspectors in the numbers and with the experience that they required. I notice that the hon. Member for Nuneaton is slumping slightly. Obviously he does not intend to intervene to disagree with me. He knows the position, and he can tell the Minister about it. He might even get the Select Committee minutes, which would show what was said.
The Health and Safety Executive has increasing difficulty in attracting properly trained staff to carry out its functions. It will be in the full glare of publicity with its new responsibility. I am not suggesting that it should not place major emphasis on getting the new division Up and running, but that cannot he at the expense of any other part of the HSE. We want to know what the Government are doing about investigating that problem. We should like assurances tonight.
If we are to attract staff of the proper calibre, the remuneration must be right, as the right hon. Member for Kincardine and Deeside pointed out. Remuneration of offshore inspectors has been given as the principal reason for the inability of the Department of Energy to maintain a full complement of inspectors. The remuneration should be high enough to ensure that high-calibre, qualified candidates are attracted to the work.
The right hon. Member for Kincardine and Deeside identified the need for the inspectors to be of sufficiently

high calibre to raise issues, where appropriate, with the highest management of multinational oil companies. If they cannot do that, we will have no confidence in their ability to carry out their functions. Cullen's emphasis on safety management requires an inspectorate which is confident about its role, determined to seek a real operating culture and unperturbed by the industry and the Department, which are often united in formidable opposition to safety requirements which are likely to inhibit the work of contractors.
I hope that the Minister will assure us that the salaries being offered will attract the highest calibre of staff. As my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) said, if that means seeking assistance on a temporary basis, I do not think that there would be opposition to that. That should not stop the Minister telling us that a training programme is already under way to ensure that highly qualified staff will be available quickly.
Recommendation No. 1 is that operators should submit a safety case for each installation. That means that the new division must have considerable expertise in safety management and risk assessment. The Cullen inquiry showed only too clearly that that expertise was not present in the Department of Energy. The new division must be able quickly to build up expertise in that essential area. How will the new division attract suitable candidates? Can we have an assurance that the existing expertise of the HSE will not be diluted and left unable to deal adequately with major hazards onshore?
On the size of the inspectorate, we do not believe that its effectiveness should be measured by the frequency of visits to platforms and rigs. Each installation should have a full inspection at least every year, with further inspections being dependent on the results of that inspection and on the number of accidents, complaints and near misses reported to the inspectors. Those requirements should be the only determining factors for the size of the inspectorate.
The inspectors in the Department of Energy did not show evidence of a strong approach to enforcement—for example, in the issuing of prohibition notices and the institution of legal proceedings. Indeed, we believe that the culture within the Department of Energy did not encourage the use of the full range of legal powers available to inspectors under section 20 of the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974, on the powers of the inspectorate. We want a guarantee that the Minister will insist that they use all their powers. Not only should the Minister say so, but the culture within the Department should change. Cullen identified the fact that the culture did not exist in the Department.
Inspectors may require further legal training to enable them to make full use of those powers. The use of legal powers has significant resource implications. The change in the approach to enforcement of health and safety requirements offshore must be recognised by increased resources for the new division. We want to hear whether the Government have taken that into account when they have been discussing resources with the Treasury.
With regard to the role of the certifying authority, Cullen did not make a specific recommendation. The current system needs reform. The new offshore division of the Health and Safety Executive should have a specific role in licensing the certifying authorities. The present relationship between the offshore operator and the


certifying authorities is too close. Such an additional role for the HSE would also have resource implications which the Minister may deal with later. The Norwegian system, where certification is carried out by the regulatory body, is very resource-intensive.
With regard to consultation with employees' represen-tatives and the disclosure of information, we will expect the new offshore division to carry out full consultation at national, regional and installation level. Extensive and valuable consultation takes place at present with the Health and Safety Executive. That should be extended to the new division.
At installation level, we will expect inspectors to carry out their duty to disclose information to employees in accordance with section 28(8) of the 1974 Act, whether or not there are trade union representatives on the installation. We also expect employees or their represen-tatives to receive, as a matter of course, copies of any enforcement notices issued and written details as set out in section 28(8) of the Act.
We are concerned at the lack of adequate disclosure of information to employees and their representatives offshore. In view of the remote location of offshore installations, we believe that contact with workers is extremely important. Consultation and disclosure have resource implications, but their inclusion in the Health and Safety at Work, etc Act shows the importance that Lord Robens believed that they should be given.
I am sorry that my hon. Friend and close colleague the Member for Aberdeen, North is not present at this moment; however, I see that my hon. Friend and close colleague the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran) is here. I do not subscribe to the belief that the health and safety offshore division should be transferred to Aberdeen. I do not deny that I speak as the chair of the MSF parliamentary group, whose membership extends through-out industry.
We are concerned about the Health and Safety Executive and the Health and Safety Commission. They have their own culture within that organisation. I have served my time in a shipyard and part of the culture of becoming a tradesman was working with other tradesmen. We do not believe that it is in the best interests of the new division to be simply moved to Aberdeen. We have identified London and Bootle as places where it might work best. That is where the majority of the Health and Safety Executive is. Clearly, the division needs a big expansion on the ground in Aberdeen to show the Government's determination, but we do not believe that it is not in the division's best interests for it to be moved to Aberdeen. If that were to happen, there would be the possibility—I put it no higher than that—that we might make the mistake that we made with the Burgoyne report. It might be too much like an extension of the Department of Energy. The new division is most likely to find its roots if it is clearly within the HSE, within that culture, in the same offices, with inspectors who deal with other hazardous areas. However, we do accept that there needs to be an increased presence in Aberdeen. I hope that I have not lost two friends.
I come now to the response of management in the oil companies to Cullen's recommendations on the manage-ment of oil safety. Cullen's recommendations affecting

offshore operators can be divided into three broad categories. First, there are the recommendations upon which immediate action can be taken without waiting for regulations or interim guidelines from the enforcing authority. Secondly, there are recommendations for regulations to be made, but which operators can act upon when provided with interim guidelines by the enforcement authority. Thirdly, there are recommendations which require regulations to be made but to which operators should be considering and planning their responses.
The Secretary of State has said that he is not willing at this point to tell us how everything will work. We want to spell out some of the areas to which we want the Minister to respond today or to which we want responses when the Secretary of States gives us his considered opinion. I therefore come to some of the key recommendations of the Cullen report and the action that we believe operators and the Department of Energy should have taken.
We believe that the Department of Energy should, immediately after the publication of the Cullen report, have made clear in writing to all operators the recommendations upon which it expected immediate action to be taken. Most of those recommendations require action to be taken, in the words of the Cullen report, forthwith—without the need for regulation or interim guidelines from the Department. The Department of Energy should have drawn up interim guidelines on some recommendations and required operators to take action to implement the advice. Has that occurred, and if not, why not?
The Department of Energy should have given operators a clear timetable for the above steps to be taken and, in the event of such steps not being taken, enforcement notices and, in particular, improvement notices should have been issued under sections 2 and 3 of the Health and Safety at Work, etc Act 1974. To date, we have not heard of any such notices being issued and we are concerned that the timetable for Cullen's recommendations to be complied with may be lax.
We are also anxious that inspectors should use their full powers under section 20 of the Health and Safety at Work, etc Act to ensure that the immediate improvements recommended by Cullen are implemented. A clear programme and timetable for the legislation recommend-ed by Cullen could and should have been drawn up and published so that the consultative process could be put fully into action. I hope that when the Minister replies he will tell us his views on that.
Recommendation 54 concerns the fire risk analysis. Companies should have been instructed by the Department of Energy to undertake fire risk analysis and given a date by which that should have been completed. Companies not complying with the date should have been issued with an improvement or prohibition notice. Has that happened, and if not, why not?
Recommendation 76 concerns the evacuation, escape and rescue analysis. Companies should have been instructed to complete the analysis forthwith. The Department of Energy should have agreed the timetable for completion, taking into account Cullen's recommenda-tion that it should be completed quickly, and at least by November 1991. Are they on schedule, and if not, why not? The Minister will understand that that applies to operators with a large number of installations. We need to know just how far that timetable has got and how effective the Minister and the Department of Energy have been.
Enforcement notices should have been issued where companies have not responded positively and with sufficient urgency.
Recommendation 60 concerns smoke and gas ingress assessment. Companies should have carried out forthwith an assessment of the risk of ingress of smoke or gas into accommodation and fitted smoke and gas detectors and implemented ventilation shut-down procedures as in recommendation 57. Has that happened?
Recommendation 69 concerns an emergency systems review. Companies should have carried out a review forthwith of the ability of emergency systems to withstand severe accident conditions. Has that happened, how often and where? If not, why not, and what has happened since then?
Recommendation 44 concerns sub-sea isolation valves. Although Cullen allows a safety case to demonstrate whether sub-sea isolation valves are required to be fitted, there are some cases where the need for them to be fitted is in no doubt. Those include the main export lines from distant installations which will hold large inventories of gas or oil and where a large proportion would be liberated if there were a rupture. Examples include Forties Charlie to Cruden Bay, Claymore to Flotta, Cleeton to Dimlington, and the Brent export gas pipeline to St. Fergus. Others can readily be identified. Have all those sub-sea isolation valves now been fitted? If not, has the Department of Energy issued enforcement notices? We need to know.
Recommendation 85 concerns personal survival and escape equipment. Has everyone on board an installation now been issued with the equipment detailed in the recommendation—in particular, a personal survival suit, a smoke hood, a torch, a life-jacket, and fireproof gloves? Does the Minister know? We need to know today whether the recommendation has been implemented.
Recommendation 34 concerns permit to work systems. Has the industry drawn up harmonised systems as recommended by Cullen? Is the Department of Energy satisfied with the revised system? We need to know today.
On recommendation 27—safety committees and safety representatives—what steps have companies taken to support and encourage the involvement of offshore work forces in safety, as laid down in recommendation 27? I see the Minister relaxing, but there is plenty more to come. What evidence can companies provide to demonstrate their efforts? What are companies' objectives? Does the Minister know? I look forward to hearing exactly what they are in some detail, and to what extent they have been achieved.
Those are some of the comments which it is important to put on record and which, I hope, will prompt some answers from the Minister during the debate.
Industrial relations, health and safety and the offshore environment clearly affect all hon. Members and the people they represent. They affect people's working lives and, in the case of Piper Alpha, they cost people their lives. We therefore need to know what the Government have to say about those issues. The state of industrial relations has a proven impact on health and safety onshore and its impact can be crucial offshore, as Piper Alpha demonstrated. Pursuit of high levels of health and safety offshore is in part due to the appalling experiences of recent years, but more so than onshore the isolation of platforms and their residential status frequently reminds workers of the potential hazards.
Can the Minister give answers to the following questions? Health and safety committee representatives onshore operate under regulations promulgated under the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974. While the Act applies offshore, regulations under the Act apply only if they say so—there is no such provision under onshore regulations. Until 1989, there were no statutory provisions for health and safety representatives or committees. A number of operators instituted committees on which their own employees were represented, whom they nominated. There was no training for representatives and they had no rights.
There were two exceptions. First, in relation to Phillips Petroleum, my union—the MSF—won bargaining rights for the Hewett field off the Norfolk coast in 1978. The company agreed to set up a safety committee with union-nominated representatives as though it were onshore. Representatives all received time off with pay to attend union-organised safety courses. The system worked well, although contractors were not represented.
Secondly, MSF won representational rights with Occidental Petroleum for the Piper Alpha installation. As a result, a consultative committee was established to deal with all matters, including health and safety. The committee broke up when the company failed to provide representatives with a copy of the report on the 1984 explosion. That may well be one of the reasons why we are having this debate today.
As regards safety committees, where do the difficulties lie at the moment? The problem has largely been the relationship between contractor and operator, usually represented on the installation by the offshore installation manager, whose word—as everyone knows—is law. In a few cases, the employee may have had a right established by agreement to raise safety issues, but only with his employer and not with the operator. The contractor-employer then had to raise the issue remotely with the operator and put relationships at risk, which could threaten future contracts and commercial relationships. As a result, onshore arrangements have never been successfully carried offshore. One cannot wonder at that —if there is a possibility of the contractors losing future contracts, there is no way they will push too hard against the wishes of the company concerned.
We need to know what the Government are doing to change that. We need to know how that pressure can be taken off. Clearly, one way is for companies to accept that they are the employer, or to insist that the contractors employ best practices while they are on the platform. If that were part of the contract, we might find that a different relationship existed offshore.
The priority when dealing with health and safety problems has to be the health and safety representative. While committees have a role, they cannot deal with issues which require immediate action. Therefore, represen-tatives must be provided with facilities to do the job. First and foremost is the freedom to perform their role without hindrance or fear. Any representative has to guard against such pressures, but one who works for a contractor has two potential problems. The first is the ending of a contract. The client—the operator—will usually veto all those contractors putting up for any new job and can, without the employee knowing, veto anyone of whom the operator disapproves. Clearly, if the operators have that power there will be pressure upon any individual representative. Those of us who have been trade union


representatives before coming here and have spent our lives representing others know that if one puts oneself forward to represent a group of workers one always has that fear—wondering what the management's reaction will be. In an industry where bad practice exists or which is badly regulated—an industry with old-fashioned equipment where change has to take place—pressure on individuals might take the form of a fear that their careers in the company might quickly end when they stop being representatives. They might think that their careers would end if they took on such responsibilities.
As my hon. Friends demonstrated earlier, we know that an unknown number of persons—there is no record—are now permanently unemployable offshore because they were prepared to take up responsibilities, whether as health and safety representatives or simply trying to represent workers at a trade union level.
Black lists need to be abolished, for the benefit of the industry. If they do not go, the industry cannot function properly. The climate on installations will never improve while the company, through the contractor, can take action against a person rightly raising concerns on behalf of other workers. The Government need to play their part in that.
As we move to the next stage of operations in the North sea, and to the end of those operations, whenever that will be—no one wants it to reach that stage quickly—there will be more and more pressure on companies to ensure that there is little or no opposition to what they want to do. We have to ensure that those problems are tackled.
The second area of concern for a safety representative is the power of the offshore installation manager. I did not meet such a creature on the one visit that I made to an offshore facility. No one seemed to have horns or a tail, or walk about with a big stick, so I am not sure what oil installation managers actually look like. Nevertheless, the stories that I have heard suggest that they can be quite alarming, and their powers are certainly alarming if not exercised properly.
One of the benefits of a debate of this kind is the opportunity that it gives us to cite our wider experience and knowledge. The Select Committee on Employment, for instance, has been considering recruitment practices in industry generally. All the evidence suggests that the way in which an organisation operates depends entirely on the extent to which its chief executive is involved. There can be no improvement unless oil installation managers—who are bound to have responsibilities of one kind or another, and who are directly responsible for recruitment in some instances—are shown that the way in which they operated before the Piper Alpha disaster is no longer acceptable. Their performance must be monitored, and the Government have a role to play in that regard.
Training is essential for health and safety represen-tatives. Even when they are elected, the facilities for their training are largely controlled by their employers. Training is predominantly technical, and involves little instruction in presentational skills. The TUC and individual unions organise onshore courses, and have successfully trained many thousands of representatives over the past 15 years, but offshore representatives are denied such courses. All courses must be approved not by the employer but by the operator, and attendance on an unapproved course could

result in the representative's not being paid. If the Minister doubts that, he should note that Shell issued a directive to that effect to its contractors in 1990. In many cases, not only will representatives be unpaid, but they will not be required to return when their contracts have expired.
Whether Conservative Members like it or not, no offshore environment will change without proper union recognition. The companies and operators concerned must accept that. I remember making many representations to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield about offshore union representation when he was at the Department of Energy; it is a shame that we were not able to achieve our aims before he left the Department.
We are very unhappy about the Government's failure to involve themselves in the issue. The operators have argued that they cannot implement the onshore regulations because there is so little union recognition offshore, implying that that is due to the low level of union membership. However, when it has been possible to test the level of membership by means of checks or ballots, widespread support has been shown to exist. On seven Shell installations, ballots of the work force demonstrated levels of support as high as 85 per cent. As a result of those ballots, Shell agreed to representational rights on conditions and pay, but not on health and safety.
MSF has a long-standing agreement with Phillips Petroleum for the Hewett field, which has almost 100 per cent. union membership—that includes the oil installation managers. Phillips recently agreed to union recognition, in response to the demand of 83 per cent. of its employees on the Maureen platform. According to the management, Occidental's recognition agreement expired when the platform was destroyed, which seems rather tragic.
Conservative Members may feel some concern about our demands for trade union recognition. We have made it clear that we will allow ACAS to ensure that ballots are run properly, and that the questions on the ballot paper are acceptable to everyone. We may even allow ACAS to determine what constitutes significant union membership. I believe that 40 per cent. membership would allow us to claim that a ballot should take place. What is the Minister's view?
We have held seven ballots and won them all, with majorities as high as 80 per cent., but other companies are not prepared even to discuss the holding of such ballots. Following recognition claims made more than four years ago on the Viking Loggs and Hutton TLP fields, Conoco has made it clear that it does not want any third party intervening. We asked the Minister's predecessor—the right hon. Member for City of Chester (Mr. Morrison) —many times to intervene on our behalf, but the Government—who are supposedly so keen to ensure that ballots are held, and that people are allowed to exercise their individual rights—have done nothing to help. At one stage a clear majority of Mobil workers on the Beryl field wanted trade union membership, but the company refused. We asked the Government to help us, but met with no success.
We are also concerned about contract employees. If they are not given the training and representation that they need, they may suffer. I am glad to see that the right hon. Member for Kincardine and Deeside has returned, as I had intended to make this point during his speech. We want a skilled work force in the North sea, and we believe that that will be possible only if that work force is trained and experienced. Continuity of employment is the best way to


achieve that. At present, more and more companies are trying to move towards a single contractor, without considering the implications of the change that that involves.
When employees are employed by a new contractor, they lose their right to redundancy pay and representation regarding pay and conditions. That does not lead to improved skills and the continuity of employment on North sea installations that is required. For example, Shell told Press that it would like it to become the main contractor in the Lemen and Indefatigable fields. One of the contractors at present is McAlpine, which provides good training for its crane drivers and mechanics. Shell has suggested to Press that if it gets the contract it might subcontract some of the work to McAlpine and keep the work force on the platform. If the negotiations do not go well, however, and Press becomes the sole contractor, all the skill and expertise of the work force will be lost—as well as their trade union rights and their right to redundancy pay. Some of these people have served McAlpine for eight years.
Does the Minister believe, as we do, that companies such as Shell should employ their work force directly and ensure that they are given training? They ought, at least, to be made responsible for ensuring that the contractors provide training.
We are happy for the services of ACAS to be used to determine whether there should be trade union recognition on any particular platform. We have never been afraid to use the ballot box so that offshore workers can demonstrate that they want trade union recognition. Furthermore, we have never been afraid to argue that industrial relations are good on platforms where there is trade union recognition. We do not want a repetition of what happened last summer. I met the Minister's predecessor, together with some of my trade union colleagues, and warned him that he faced a summer of problems if he did not do something about trade union recognition. As he was about to visit various offshore platforms, he agreed to look into whether there was any aggro or dissatisfaction. After he had visited those platforms he said that nobody had asked him about trade union recognition. There was an immediate denial of his statement by individuals who, despite the fact that action could have been taken against them, were prepared to identify themselves and say that they had asked the Minister for trade union recognition. The Minister seemed to want to act like the three wise monkeys—to hear nothing, to see nothing and to say nothing—but the issue will not go away and we shall continue to raise it. Moreover, trade union recognition is in the Government's interests as well as in the interests of the economy and industry.
The operators have arranged a cartel among themselves. They provide a package of similar terms and conditions for their own employees, but do not allow contractors to enter into single bargaining agreements. There are only two exceptions. The first relates to the offshore construction contractors. For some years there was a trade union agreement covering the hook-up period. It ran from the contract being placed to the start of production. Even though the same workers were employed to do exactly the same work after production started, they would go on to a set of non-negotiated and worse terms.
The hook-up period was crucial to the operators' cash flow. After that, any industrial action was unlikely to affect

production. The second concerned caterers. An agreement exists covering catering workers—in the northern sector only and even then not on drilling rigs. A combination of industrial action and high labour turnover produced that agreement. For either agreement to work, the operators must agree to accept bids for work only from conforming contractors.
Early in 1990, the principle of an agreement covering all contract workers on the United Kingdom continental shelf was put to a number of bodies, including the Offshore Construction Contractors. Only half an hour before a joint meeting to discuss the proposition, the OCC was telephoned by a representative of UKOOA and told that UKOOA could not agree to go along with it, thus making any agreement worthless. A summer of industrial action followed, and that will be repeated unless such problems are tackled.
A negotiated agreement would provide a number of measures which would have an immediate impact on health and safety. Among them is reduced labour turnover, which would retain skills and experience in the industry, the absence of which leads directly to an unsafe workplace. Improved morale would increase cooperation and concentration, particularly among contractor staff. It would remove the need for the 1989 regulations and enable the 1977 regulations to be used to provide union safety representatives. Such representatives, rather than the employers, would have the right to choose trainers and would receive the backing of their union, thus reducing victimisation and providing the resources and independent advice needed properly to perform the safety role.
Those are small measures, but we believe that if the Government supported them and argued with us that the companies should accept them, we could improve both the environment and the chances of the returns from the North sea continuing to help the economy.
When the recommendations in the Cullen report are finally implemented, all installations will be required to possess a safety case, provided by the operator and vetted by the Health and Safety Executive. It seems likely that the safety committee will have access to it only after it has been agreed. It looks as though, even for existing installations, the safety committee or individual representatives will have no say. For new installations, there will be no safety committee whose representatives can be consulted. In Norway, safety committees are consulted on such issues. For new platforms, the unions themselves are consulted about the initial design philosophy.
As I have said, MSF held recognition for Occidental employees on Piper Alpha. When the replacement platform was being designed, MSF asked to discuss the design philosophy—in particular, its view concerning a separate accommodation unit, bridge-linked. We were told that it was nothing to do with us. The recognition agreement died with our members on Piper Alpha. That is something with which the company and the Government will have to live. I am not saying that the Government were directly responsible for Piper Alpha, but had it not been for their failure to understand that they needed to play a role in convincing the contractors that they—the contractors—should involve those whom they employed on a facility through their recognised union representatives, the Piper Alpha disaster might just not have occurred. The fact that, in this case, we can show that the


accident might not have happened had we been involved is of greater concern and is even more hurtful to the families of the victims, who will read our debate tomorrow.
With such a high proportion of offshore employees being contractors whose employers will not be known until well after the installation is completed, it is vital that union representatives should be involved at the earliest possible stage. The inter-union offshore oil committee represents unions with direct involvement in the oil and gas construction and production industries, and could be a suitable body for involvement in such consultation processes.
The recommendation by Lord Cullen concerning the appointment of offshore safety representatives has been dealt with by my hon. Friends, and I shall not refer to it again.
The haphazard approach to industrial relations led to industrial action being taken during the past few summers. That action did not seek directly to improve safety, but the participants believed that the continental shelf agreement would bring about a safer environment. If we are not to see a repetition of such action, union recognition should be granted where support for it can be demonstrated. We are not asking for something for which we cannot show that there is support, but where such union support can be demonstrated, recognition should be granted. There will then be a willingness and enthusiasm on the part of the work force to be more actively involved in what should be a joint role to improve safety in the workplace. Once recognition is granted, there will be every reason why the 1977 regulations should apply. The safety representatives need the support of those regulations and recognition for the trade unions if they are to perform their vital functions and to assist with the necessary and dramatic improvements in safety.
As I said earlier, I did not intend to be brief because I have been thinking back to my short contribution on 6 November 1980 when we discussed the Burgoyne report. We all stand accused of not working harder and of not pressing the Government harder on that occasion. Those of us who were part of the trade union side which produced the minority report, and the Opposition Members who agreed with that minority report and said that changes should be made, will never know whether we could have achieved what the minority report recommended if we had been able to demonstrate the case and to articulate it more clearly in the Chamber at that time. What we do know, however, is that Piper Alpha occurred.
Although the Government have said that they will accept Lord Cullen's recommendations, we must ensure that they examine them closely. As the right hon. Member for Kincardine and Deeside said, with the support of one of his hon. Friends, although the Government accepted quite a lot of the Burgoyne report, but not the minority aspect, Piper Alpha occurred. There have also been other accidents, but not quite so bad as Piper Alpha, such as helicopters going into the North sea and incidents on other platforms. This time we in this place had better ensure that we do not allow our enthusiasm for Lord Cullen's report and its worthwhile recommendations to blind us to the fact that we need to ensure that those recommendations are sufficient. My hon. Friends and I will continue to make the points that I have made today on behalf of my trade union

and those whom we represent. Unless we do so, we believe that, although Lord Cullen's report will always be a good report, the implementation of its recommendations will not really do the job that we are convinced that Lord Cullen intended.

Mr. John Greenway: It is to the credit of the House that we are debating this issue almost three years after the Piper Alpha tragedy. That shows the extent to which the House recognises the importance of the issues that it raised and the lessons that we need to learn from what happened on 6 July 1988. I first raised this matter in the House on 19 December in one of the debates on the Consolidated Fund Bill. There has been more interest in this matter tonight than there was then, but I had expected that more hon. Members would wish to participate.
As has been said, all hon. Members have constituents who work in the North sea. They are spread right across the United Kingdom, and travel out to Aberdeen and other parts. As my hon. Friend the Minister is aware, both my father-in-law and my brother-in-law have worked at various times in the North sea. My father-in-law worked for 25 years for the Kuwait oil company. I am sure that he would want me to place on record the fact that he is sickened by the devastation of all the oil wells in Kuwait.
Lessons can be learnt from the Piper Alpha incident, and we must keep certain aspects in perspective when deciding what should happen now. We should recognise that offshore installations present unique safety problems. A production platform is a community. Within a small area of just 100 ft each way there are drilling operations, a refinery and all the facilities of a hotel. On land, those operations would cover tens of acres. Oil platforms are not only compact; they must be self-sufficient in an emergency. There is no question of waiting for the fire brigade or other emergency services to arrive. Means of survival while staying on the platforms are crucial and critical, as are means of escape and evacuation.
The House must recognise that oil and gas platforms are extremely complex pieces of technology, sited in a uniquely hostile environment. When I look out to the North sea from my constituency on the north Yorkshire coast, particularly in some of the grey sombre weather that we have had this winter, I am amazed that oil and gas installations can be maintained at all when one considers the weather with which some of those chaps must contend.
Many tragic incidents involving loss of life have occurred over the years—I dare say too many—of which the Piper Alpha disaster was perhaps the worst. It is important to stress that when the Cullen report was published on 12 November last year, the Government immediately accepted all of its recommendations. As my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State will no doubt confirm tonight, there is no question of picking and choosing between Lord Cullen's recommen-dations.
Many of us feel that the Piper Alpha tragedy, in which 167 men lost their lives, was the worst in the history of oil exploration and extraction, not only in the North sea but in the world. As I said in our brief debate in December, such a disaster must never happen again. Too many tragedies have occurred in the North sea. I refer to the incident on the Shell Brent Alpha platform, which was


evacuated after a gas explosion, the serious fire on the Ocean Odyssey, several helicopter crashes and the Safe Gothia incident.
Since oil and gas exploration began in the 1960s, some 500 lives have been lost in the North sea. That is a daunting and tragic total. As I am sure many other hon. Members have said, the whole House pays tribute to the bravery of the men who help our economy and put up with such dreadful conditions. Moreover, we again extend our sympathy to the families and loved ones of all who have died in the North sea over the years.
I have always felt that the tragedy of the Piper Alpha disaster, like so many disasters, is that if more had been done beforehand, the accident might have been avoided. That is part of the benefit of hindsight. However, if Lord Cullen's recommendations had been in place beforehand, the disaster might have been avoided. That is true of so many other disasters—one thinks of the two dreadful accidents that occurred in football grounds at Bradford and Sheffield, of the Clapham train crash, the King's Cross fire and of the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster. Had greater attention been given to safety details, loss of life could have been prevented. Conservative Members part company with one or two Opposition Members about what conclusion should be drawn from that. I do not believe that one should simply blame the Government. As I said, we have the benefit of hindsight.
Today we heard an extraordinary explosion from the hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson), who seemed to say that, because the Government did not implement the minority Burgoyne recommendations, the Ministers in office in 1980 were responsible for the disaster. I hope that when I reread the Hansard report I will find that I have got that wrong, but I listened to the hon. Gentleman and that is my impression of what he said.
When I intervened during the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside (Mr. Buchanan-Smith) I said that, on balance, the Government accepted the majority recommendation of the Burgoyne report. I do not see how the Government could be expected to accept both the major recommendation and the minority recommendation. There seems to be a contradiction.
I listened with interest to the hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Ross), who clearly studies these matters in considerable detail. In 1980, the Government did what they could and accepted the majority recommendation. I do not see how they could have been expected to do more. As the hon. Gentleman said, the minority recommenda-tion clearly contained a valid argument. The hon. Member made that point forcefully in his speech, and hon. Members who took part in the debate 10 or 11 years ago were right to make that argument. We warned that there was a problem, but we differ from them over whether the Government should be blamed for accepting the majority, rather than the minority, view.

Mr. Ernie Ross: Having spoken for so long earlier, I hesitate to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but I ask him to reflect on this point. We thought that it was wrong that the Government should ask the same Department that had responsibility to maximise the financial potential of the North sea to regulate and inspect itself. There was clearly a possible conflict, and we argued then that it existed. We

accept that our view could have been right or wrong, but in the light of that experience we do not want the Government to make the same mistake again.

Mr. Greenway: I said that the hon. Gentleman had made his point well, and now he has made it twice. The majority Burgoyne recommendation was that, on balance, it was better to leave safety in the North sea to the Department of Energy, which is what the Government did. We cannot blame the Government for accepting that majority recommendation. The view of the hon. Member for Dundee, West is that, with hindsight, that was perhaps the wrong recommendation and the minority one was correct. That is something on which the House, people in Scotland and those whose loved ones were killed on Piper Alpha will want to reflect. No blame attaches to the Government for accepting the majority Burgoyne recommendation to leave safety as a matter for the Department of Energy.
Now, 10 years later, Lord Cullen has recommended that there is a case for transferring responsibility to the Health and Safety Executive.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy (Mr. Cohn Moynihan): On balance.

Mr. Greenway: Yes, on balance, but there have been changes in the past 10 years. The Health and Safety Executive has developed its expertise beyond that which it had 10 years ago. In addition, in his report, Lord Cullen found no evidence that the Department of Energy put production matters before safety matters. That seems to be the burden of the argument of the hon. Member for Dundee, West.
I hope that the House will agree that the Government were right to send the report about whether Occidental should be prosecuted to the Lord Advocate. Lord Cullen has concluded that there were significant flaws in the way safety was managed by Occidental. I know that the hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras asked my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State today to comment further on whether Occidental would be prosecuted. I do not believe that we can press the matter. We must leave it with the Lord Advocate, although many of us believe privately that perhaps there is a case for prosecution.
We have looked back—what must be done in the future? The House will want assurances that North sea operations will be safer than they have been and that safety will be paramount. We all recognise the inherent dangers of working in the North sea, but we must not take unnecessary risks with other men's lives. If the Piper Alpha disaster suggests that we may have done so in the past, we certainly must not ever do so again.
The House has rightly given a warm welcome to Lord Cullen's most impressive and penetrating report. He has provided the most comprehensive analysis possible of conditions necessary for the safe management of offshore installations. I am sure that the report also contains lessons for the safe management of. other industrial activities. It rightly concludes that safety in such a demanding environment as the North sea cannot be secured by fixed rules or off-the-peg solutions, but that it needs a flexible approach and the ability to evaluate what is the best compromise between often conflicting safety objectives.
The solutions that are implemented must take account of the varying circumstances of individual installations.
That is why Lord Cullen was right to say that every installation must be assessed. He outlined some of the ingredients that would help to ensure that a safety management programme was as comprehensive as it should be—the organisational structure, management, personnel standards, training for operations and emergencies, safety assessment, design procedures, procedures for operations and maintenance modifications.
The involvement of the entire work force is especially important and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State made that point strongly. The entire work force—operators and contractors—must be involved in accident and incident reporting, investigation and follow-up, the monitoring and auditing of the operation of the system and in the systematic reappraisal of the system in the light of the experience of the operator and of the industry. The important objectives, which Lord Cullen rightly identified, place the responsibility where it belongs—with the owners and the operators of the installations.
The oil industry is one of our most dynamic industries and has shown great inventiveness and resourcefulness, not least in maintaining the economic viability of North sea production when world prices fell sharply in the mid-1980s. The Government also deserve credit for keeping an open mind on taxation and for making adjustments when necessary. Genuine adaptability and ingenuity have been shown by the Government and by the oil industry as a whole.
It is tempting to say that there should be definite rules and a clearly prescribed approach to safety in the future, but such an assertion would be unwise. In real life—in the practical world—reasonable safety objectives often conflict with each other and Lord Cullen has recognised that. The better standards that we want depend on our achieving the best trade-off between those conflicts and not having a prescriptive, rule book approach.
There must be proper controls and monitoring of safety standards in the North sea. As I have said, they must be more flexible than they have been in the past. We can still learn a lesson from the findings of the Robens committee, which began its work 20 years ago. It highlighted the disadvantages of over-detailed legislation.
It is accepted by hon. Members of all parties that companies must involve all their workers. The hon. Member for Dundee, West made a strong argument about union recognition on North sea installations. I believe that that is a separate issue from safety. Whether members of staff, employees, production workers or sub-contractors, and whether members of unions or not, all on installations must be properly involved in safety. I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will have something to say about the right of representation of every worker on a safety committee. That is the Government's argument about safety and it is somewhat different from saying that people must be members of a trade union to have their safety interests represented.
Every worker must also perceive his own proper contribution to safety, and must have the knowledge and training to play his part. That must mean better communication. When we ask ourselves why the Piper Alpha disaster happened, the one conclusion that we reach is the one that Lord Cullen put his finger on. He said:
From the evidence I conclude that this"—
the failure of the system—

was due to a failure in the transmission of information under the permit to work system and at shift handover.
We must learn the lesson from that. Even at the most mundane level of operations, communication between staff, with each member of staff understanding the other's role and the importance of every procedure that other members of staff carry out, cannot be given too high a priority. Safety must not be sold merely as a philosophy or as some vague concept by exhortation to the worker. Dialogue with the worker and involvement in everything that he does is essential to a safe working environment.
The Cullen report is especially to be welcomed because if faces up to those difficulties and tackles them squarely. It proposes a framework that is flexible and avoids detailed prescriptions. There must be real dialogue and not a rigid imposition of predetermined rules. It is no good having a manual of principles, endorsed by management, standing on the shelves or in the workplace gathering dust. The principles must be put into, and kept in, effect.
The Piper Alpha disaster was an offshore incident. I recognise that part of the difficulty has been whether offshore installations are as safe as those onshore. Right now in my constituency, the reverse question is being asked. People ask, "Are onshore operations as safe as they should be?" As the Minister knows, a consortium headed by Kelt UK Ltd has sought planning consent to build a gas-fired electricity generating station on the road between Malton and Scarborough, which would harness various pockets of gas, mostly sour gas, which are to be found throughout the Vale of Pickering. The sour gas, which is the majority of the resource, has 1,250 parts per million hydrogen sulphide which, as my hon. Friend knows, is an extremely dangerous substance. The proposal is that the gas would be piped over several miles and that it would be used to fire two gas turbines to generate electricity for the national grid.
I am not exaggerating when I say that, because of what happened on Piper Alpha as much as because of anything else, local people are petrified by the risks that may be associated with the process. Time and time again, one hears a question consisting of three short words—"Is it safe?" My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State and his colleagues say that, according to the Health and Safety Executive, it is safe. My constituents are demanding much more definite assurances.
My hon. Friend was closely involved in the passage of the Electricity Act 1989. That Act provides for these matters to be considered at a public inquiry before a decision is taken. Having considered all these issues over a period of several months, I believe that a public inquiry is essential before any planning permission is granted in respect of the West Knapton site. Ministers in the Department of Energy deserve some credit for the introduction of this new procedure, but it is there to be used, and it would be in the public interest for all the issues relating to this application to be fully considered and fully challenged at a public inquiry.
The delay that such an inquiry would involve is inconsequential when set against the risks associated with such an operation, including the risks to the economic interests of the area. Agriculture and tourism are dependent on a pollution-free environment. It has been suggested by some critics of the proposal that the technology that would be used is relatively untried, as sour


gas contains such high quantities of hydrogen sulphide. The prospect is not one that my constituents view with much relish.
Then opening this debate, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said that, for every serious accident, there were many minor accidents from which important lessons could be learnt. On land, there must not be any accidents involving facilities surrounded by farms, homes and villages. I accept that the scale of what is proposed at West Knapton is considerably smaller than platforms in the North sea, but I am sure the Minister agrees that nothing should be left to chance and that any risk is unacceptable. The whole safety issue must be dealt with exhaustively at a public inquiry. I hope that my hon. Friend will be able to confirm tonight that, should a public inquiry cast any doubt on the safety of this operation, he will not hesitate to refuse consent.
Many chapters of the Cullen report deal with emergencies and with the action that should be taken when emergencies occur: with this application, one question does not seem to have been properly tackled; what emergency arrangements do we need to have in place in north Yorkshire to deal with a potential disaster involving gas pipelines? Moreover, how much will it cost and who will pay?
In reply to the debate that I initiated on 19 December 1990, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State outlined a number of crucial matters relating to pipeline safety. He said that
apparatus … for the testing, inspecting or maintaining of the pipeline shall not be introduced or recovered from the pipeline, unless such introduction or recovery is essential to maintain the safe operation of the pipeline."—[Official Report, 19 December 1990; Vol. 183, c. 395.]
The operation is referred to as pigging, but pigging creates problems. As my hon. Friend the Minister said, there is a potential safety hazard in the opening and closing of pipelines and pressure valves. Pigging is a cause of great concern among my constituents in the Vale of Pickering, not least because of the hydrogen sulphide content of the gas. I do not think that any of my constituents are satisfied that the problem of pigging has been considered properly. I think that my hon. Friend agrees that a public inquiry would be a good means of dealing with the problem. I apologise to my hon. Friend
the Minister for being so robust and forceful about the Vale of Pickering project, but he will understand that safety is paramount. My constituents expect nothing to be left to chance.
The hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) made a telling point in his interesting speech when he said, about Piper Alpha, that we thought that we had done everything that we should. That is what worries my constituents about the West Knapton project.
The oil and gas industry is important to our economy. It has made a major contribution in the past decade and I am sure that it will continue to do so in the next decade and into the next century, but it is a dangerous industry. We must maintain proper standards in a dynamic system capable of growing and being flexible. The Cullen report provides the basis for ensuring safety. We must be under no illusions about what it will cost. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has painstakingly said at every opportunity that cost will not be a problem.
The House has had an opportunity tonight to consider matters which are crucial to the people who work out in

the North sea. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Minister recognises that the work that they do demands that safety is not left to chance and that we must never again have a repeat of the Piper Alpha disaster.

Mr. Alex Salmond: I join in the general praise for Lord Cullen's report. The document becomes all the more impressive each and every time that it is read. I also join the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) in saying how disappointing it is to see such a low attendance for tonight's debate. It should be put on the record that the hon. Members for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) and for Greenock and Port Glasgow (Dr. Godman) were anxious to contribute to the debate; perhaps if slightly more consideration had been shown by one hon. Member in particular earlier in the debate, they would have had that opportunity.
I intend to make a brief speech, because, along with other members of the Energy Select Committee, I shall have the opportunity to pursue these matters in the inquiry into offshore safety management which we shall begin a week on Wednesday. I look forward to closely questioning Ministers, the Health and Safety Executive, the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee, the trade unions and other interested bodies about progress or otherwise in implementing the Cullen recommendations, and some important issues which go beyond the Cullen inquiry.
Like many hon. Members who have spoken tonight, I have constituents who died in the Piper Alpha disaster. Also like other hon. Members, I decided that the best, indeed the only, thing that I could do in memory of those constituents was to seek to ensure that such a disaster would never happen again, that the Piper Alpha inquiry would be used as a springboard to take matters forward and make the environment in the North sea safer. I decided that the fact of the disaster should indeed make a difference, which is the only proper and fitting memorial to those who died.
I wish to raise three matters which must be taken forward. First, there is a general and unanimous welcome for the Cullen recommendation, which will be implement-ed, that the safety inspectorate should be independent of the Department of Energy. I agree that the perception of independence is as important as the reality. It is important that oil workers have confidence in the inspectorate. We should not blind ourselves to the fact that the previous arrangements came in for trenchant criticism in the Cullen report.
I intend to argue along with other Members from the north-east of Scotland that the geography and location of the nerve centre and headquarters of the safety inspectorate are important, However, I want Ministers to understand that it is not just an argument about geography. It is also an argument about the psychology of the industry and the degree of commitment that the safety inspectorate has to being part and parcel of the sharp end of the oil industry in Aberdeen and the north-east of Scotland, as opposed to being headquartered where the oil companies' headquarters and executives are, by and large —in London.
I hope that the Government paid attention to the remarks of the hon. Member for Gordon (Mr. Bruce) about a survey conducted by the Aberdeen centre for offshore safety which showed that 70 per cent. of the


companies operating in the North sea believed that their personnel primarily concerned with safety matters were located in the north-east of Scotland. I see little argument for tolerating a safety inspectorate which continues to be cocooned in London, away from the sharp end of the industry.
Many people in the north-east of Scotland have suspicions about the attitude of the Department of Energy to these issues because successively, in discussing the location of the petroleum engineering division or the offshore licensing division, good arguments about locating them in the north-east of Scotland and Aberdeen have been turned aside for what seems no more than civil service prejudice to be close to the political decision-makers in London.
It would be a lost opportunity if such prejudice were to affect the decision on the location of the headquarters of the safety inspectorate and if solid arguments for putting that inspectorate where it belongs—in the north-east of Scotland, along with the front end of the industry and the oil workers—were overruled because people wanted to hang on to their London base.
Of vital importance is the question of human relationships in the North sea. There is a general admission that, regardless of the safety regime and the recommendations, in terms of the safety equipment in the North sea, unless there are satisfactory human and industrial relations in the area, we shall never have an environment as safe as it could be.
Many people had hoped that the Cullen report would herald a new era, a fresh initiative and a new dawn for industrial relations in the North sea. Indeed, when Shell in December agreed to relinquish the formal blacklisting of trade unionists involved in the industrial action of last year, we hoped that the companies had realised that this was a time to start to create that new atmosphere in the North sea.
It is with sadness, and some anger, that I report, from the offshore information centre, the belief that, while the formal blacklisting has ended, it continues informally through contractors in the North sea. The centre is documenting 73 cases which it believes show that there is a continuing blacklist, with continuing discrimination and victimisation of oil workers who took part in the industrial action of last year.
The Secretary of State said that the Government took a grim view of victimisation in the North sea. Will the Government promise that, when those 73 cases have been documented by the information centre, each case will be investigated to see if victimisation can be substantiated and that, if it is, the Government will back up their fine words with action to ensure that the practice is rooted out? There can never be a satisfactory safety environment in the North sea until human relationships between workers and companies are improved to a position of greater trust than exists now.
The question of trade union recognition has been raised by several hon. Members. I was surprised to hear the Secretary of State argue that somehow the Cullen report had been a setback for the cause of trade union recognition. On the contrary, I should have thought that, given the strictures and limitations on the remit of the report, what Lord Cullen said, particularly about trade

union representation on safety committees, went a long way to show that he believed that the most satisfactory thing would be for trade unions to have representatives on safety committees. Paragraph 21.84 states:
I am prepared to accept that the appointment of offshore safety representatives by trade unions could be of some benefit in making the work of safety representatives and safety committees effective, mainly through the credibility and resistance to pressures which trade union backing would provide.
In that statement, Lord Cullen showed a keen appreciation of the central difficulty in terms of safety reporting in the North sea. Many offshore workers believe that to be concerned with safety is a blight on one's career and job prospects.
I want to refer to correspondence that I received this afternoon. By way of caution, I must state that I have not had an opportunity to investigate the case fully. However, it is worth referring to as an example of the fears expressed by offshore workers at the moment.
I have received a copy of a certificate of election in the name of Mr. G. Moore of Moodiesburn in Glasgow. On 17 February, Mr. Moore was elected as a safety representative on one of Aker Lasalle's platforms in Morecambe bay. I also have a copy of a document dated 21 February which notifies Mr. Moore of the termination of his contract of employment. I do not know whether those two events are totally connected. There may be other reasons for that sequence of events. However, I am absolutely sure that Mr. Moore and many other offshore workers believe that to be active in safety matters in the North sea when employed by some companies—and I stress "some companies"—is a passport to being left ashore when the present trip ends.
Until that atmosphere of fear and trepidation in the North sea is properly overcome, we will not have the safety environment for which hon. Members on both sides of the House have called this evening.
It is very easy for hon. Members to use fine words and say that we must make safety a priority in the North sea. This is a very comfortable and secure environment in which to say that. I suspect that the perception is completely different for someone working offshore on a platform. Those workers still believe that being involved with safety matters is not conducive to keeping one's job or securing career prospects. I suspect that we are talking about only a few companies, but until that atmosphere is confronted and overcome, there will not be a genuinely safe environment.
I accept that there is a multitude of contractors and indeed unions operating in the North sea. It is not easy to find a quick way forward in terms of trade union recognition. However, I am convinced that, if the Government could guarantee a secret ballot of offshore workers now, the overwhelming majority of them would want to be represented collectively rather than individually before their employers.
How do we secure that collective representation? It is not good enough for the oil operators to say that that is not their concern but that of the oil contractors, and then for the oil contractors to say that they would have conceded trade union recognition, but they believed that that would penalise them with regard to the oil operators. It is then not good enough for the Government to say that it is a matter for the companies involved and not for Government policy. There should be a genuine attempt to secure for offshore workers the same rights that are


expected and demanded by onshore workers. Why should offshore workers, who work in an insecure and unsafe environment, be denied the rights that we would guarantee onshore workers, who work in most cases in a safer environment?
There have been 25 years of continuous oil development in the North sea. We have taken a long time to learn some of the lessons that are so clearly spelled out in the Cullen report. The self-congratulatory nature of the Government's comments since Cullen reported shows that there is every danger that once again complacency is setting in. The empty Benches tonight show that that is true; hon. Members should know better. It would be a betrayal of those who died on Piper Alpha and of those who still work in the dangerous environment offshore if tonight's low attendance were to show a lack of concern among hon. Members about the safety of offshore installations.

Mrs. Margaret Ewing: In my brief speech, I shall not rehearse the technical arguments that have been advanced so eloquently by hon. Members but will remind the House of exactly what happened on the night of 6 July 1988 and why we as elected representatives must quickly take firm action.
The television pictures of what was Piper Alpha are indelibly imprinted on our minds. We remember the deaths that occurred and the harrowing faces of the relatives of those who died and of those whose bodies have never been recovered. Hon. Members who attended the memorial service in Aberdeen had the harrowing experience of meeting mothers, fathers, sons and daughters, wives, grandchildren, nieces and nephews who could not comprehend what had happened.
Hon. Members who lost constituents in the Piper Alpha disaster are aware of the survivors—young men who hear the physical and psychological scars and who wonder why they escaped while their friends died in tragic circumstances. I pay tribute to the social work of the voluntary and statutory organisations in the north-east of Scotland and elsewhere in the United Kingdom, who have done so much to help those people, and to the nursing and medical staff who attended the victims as they were brought to the shore. Those memories should never be forgotten.
Hon. Members must act to ensure that such a disaster never happens again. It is often said, "We hope that it will never happen again", but I hope that there will be genuine commitment to implement all the Cullen recommenda-tions speedily and effectively.
Offshore workers in the oil and gas industry are angry because the industry generates millions of pounds for the Exchequer, yet they are asked to work in the most difficult circumstances without guarantees of health and safety. One need not be a first class honours economics graduate from the university of Harvard to understand that oil and gas mean a great deal of money, yet those workers are being asked to work in difficult circumstances.
Mothers and wives have asked me, "Is it safe for my husband or son to work offshore?" Piper Alpha has destroyed the confidence of many families in the industry. Therefore, I ask the Minister to emphasise to those people that the safety aspects will be given priority. When the oil industry started in the North sea there was a desperate

rush to have access to the wealth of the industry. The speed with which we went ahead to extract the oil was measured against the prospect of ensuring a pace of development which would allow safety as well as environmental aspects to be taken into account. Surely it is not contradictory to balance the wealth of the industry against the safety of the workers and the future of the environment.

It being Ten o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Ordered,
That, at this day's sitting, the motion in the name of the Prime Minister for the Adjournment of the House may he proceeded with, though opposed, until Twelve o'clock.— [Mr. David Davis.]

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. David Davis.]

Mrs. Ewing: The issue of union recognition on rigs and platforms has also been raised. Those who have fought hard and long for union recognition have not done so because of a selfish attitude but because they genuinely want to enter into a dialogue with the oil companies about how the best working conditions can be achieved, as well as considering other aspects such as wage levels, hours and so on.
Many workers in my constituency believe that since they took industrial action they have been blacklisted. That is difficult to prove. When one writes to a company about an individual case, the company claims that it is not blacklisting the individual, because he has been subcontracted through another organisation. Trying to establish what has happened is like punching at cotton wool.
Union recognition on rigs and platforms would go much of the way towards resolving the problem. So long as there is a feeling that blacklisting operates, people will not have confidence in the system. I have written to various companies about constituents; I believe that there is blacklisting, and that many people have been struck off lists, although no one will admit it.
Reference has been made to the establishment of a centre for safety. I cannot agree with the hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Ross) that it should not be established in Aberdeen. Aberdeen is the oil capital of Europe. Given that it was the centre from which most of the men who worked on Piper Alpha flew to their fate, one of the most fitting memorials that we could establish to those men and to their families would be to set up in Aberdeen a centre for excellence, which would attract the best people from all over the country to work close to the oil industry. That is an important aspect of the debate. It would do a great deal to restore confidence in the oil and gas industries if the Government were to announce that that centre will be established in the oil capital of Europe.

Mr. Frank Doran: We have had a useful debate on an extremely important subject. There have been speeches of extreme value from both sides of the House. I do not want to criticise the size of the turnout. The main point is that all hon. Members who have spoken have shown a deep interest in and a deep knowledge of the subject. I prefer quality to quantity. It is important to make that point.
The subject is important because of the huge amount of revenue which the country has earned and is still earning


from the North sea and because of the dramatic consequences of the events of 7 July 1988 on the lives of many people.
There are more than 35,000 workers in the oil industry in the North sea and they all feel the impact of that disaster. The relatives of the victims will never forget what happened on that night. They will bear the scars of it to the end of their days, as will the survivors, most of whom will never be able to go back to work, certainly offshore. I feel tremendous sympathy and empathy for the relatives and survivors in view of what they have to bear and will continue to have to bear. I have regular contact with many of them.
The issue has dragged on for a long time. I blame no one for that, but since the disaster in 1988 the relatives and survivors have had to cope with the strain of intense publicity of all events offshore. A rash of incidents seemed to follow the Piper Alpha disaster, the most serious of which were the death of Timothy Williams on the Ocean Odyssey and the Brent Spar helicopter disaster. There were a number of other deaths on various platforms offshore. All have meant a constant awareness of the way in which a relative has been lost or the way in which survivors have lost their livelihoods and many of their friends and colleagues. They have also had to cope with the glare of publicity that was focused on Lord Cullen as he went about his work so ably in Aberdeen during his inquiry.
The issue of prosecutions, which was referred to by the Secretary of State in the debate on the report when it was published in November, is still outstanding. The papers were referred to the Lord Advocate at that time and we were informally led to understand that a decision on whether prosecutions would be proceeded with would be made some time in January. The latest date is April. I urge the authorities to speed up and to ensure that there are no delays. It is important that all these public matters are dealt with because of the trauma that they cause relatives and survivors, quite apart from all the other reasons.
Many tributes have been paid to Lord Cullen for his report. I have paid such tributes publicly and they have been echoed today. They are well deserved. However, when we rush to congratulate Lord Cullen and wallow —as one hon. Member suggested—in the new-found attitude to safety in the North sea, we should not lose sight of the real importance of safety. It is easy to become complacent and there is already a sense of that creeping into the industry.
I want to spend most of my time tonight considering some of the things that have happened since the Piper Alpha tragedy and trying to look ahead. It is important to recognise the status of the industry. Opposition Members frequently refer to the amount that the Government have earned in oil revenues from the North sea—more than £80 billion since they took office in 1979. I shall not make the usual comment about where that money has gone, but it is clearly a significant amount. There is a huge amount of employment associated with the oil and gas industry. The most recent survey, referred to earlier by the hon. Member for Gordon (Mr. Bruce) and published by Grampian regional council, which suggests itself to be the most thorough recent survey, shows that more than 100,000

people in Scotland are employed in the industry, more than one in 20 jobs in Scotland. That is a significant proportion.
Lord Cullen recognised the importance of the industry. It is important to take such points on board because when we talk about the problems of the industry, we are not talking about an industry which is isolated from the rest of the country, as it effectively has been legally by the way in which the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974 has been operated, certainly by this Government. All the oil companies which have operations offshore have operations onshore and they cope with the onshore legislation effectively and adequately. That is a point which I shall emphasise later.
The hon. Member for Ryedale (Mr. Greenway) referred to the Burgoyne report. That is part of the history of the matter and has been mentioned frequently tonight. Certainly it was referred to at length by Lord Cullen. The hon. Member for Ryedale seems to have some difficulty understanding why we criticised the Government. It is correct to say that the Government accepted the recommendations made in the Burgoyne report. I have read statements made in the House by the Minister of the day, now Lord Gray of Conting, when he introduced the report in 1980. It is clear that the Government accepted the report but that they did very little about it.
On the day of the Piper Alpha disaster, numerous agencies were involved in offshore safety. The Department of Energy's petroleum engineering division was respon-sible for health and safety, the Department of Transport was responsible for fire fighting, safety, standby vessels and deluge equipment on the platforms, the certifying authority was responsible for the integrity of the platform, and the pipelines inspectorate was responsible for the integrity of pipelines.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Ross) referred to paragraph 5.64 of the Burgoyne report —in which Burgoyne drew attention to the grey area at the interface between the pipelines inspectorate and the certifying authorities. He referred to that, because ignoring that advice, and the note from the Burgoyne committee, led to inefficiency, which led directly to the Piper Alpha disaster. The gas risers blew on that platform and that is the reason for the scale of death' and destruction.
We are perfectly entitled to point to Government inadequacy. It is fine for the Government to say that they accept this or accept that, but they did not do what they said they would do, and the Burgoyne report was not implemented as fully as it should have been. For those reasons, my hon. Friends, including my hon. Friends the Members for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson) and for Dundee, West, were perfectly entitled to point to the Government's guilt, and I do not demur from that.
Many serious problems still exist in the North sea. It is important to continue to draw attention to them. We shall do that. Standby vessels were mentioned in an intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Greenock and Port Glasgow (Dr. Godman). I did a survey of standby vessels last year and asked certain questions of the Department of Transport. At that time there were 154 registered standby vessels in the British sector of the North sea, only seven of which were less than five years old. Nearly half of the fleet —54 vessels, or 48 per cent.—were more than 25 years old and 28 vessels were more than 30 years old. The oldest standby vessels which are still in operation, I understand, are the Euan, which was constructed in 1936 and is


operated by Garcia Limited; the Grampian Osprey, which was licensed in 1937 and is operated by George Craig and Son; the Tamito, built in 1945 and operated by Tamis Limited; the Silver Pit, which has now changed name and owner and was referred to at length in Lord Cullen's report, registered in 1947; the River Grampian Rose, built in 1949 and operated by George Craig and Son; the Grampian Hawk, built in 1950 and operated by George Craig and Son; and the Deveritel, which was built in 1953. Those boats still operate in the North sea as standby vessels.
We have heard of efforts by the Department of Transport to review regulations and guidance notes which apply to those boats. It is my understanding that a draft document was published in May 1987. It was revised in March 1988 and, obviously, everything went on ice after the Piper Alpha disaster. In August 1989, a further draft was published and there was yet another in September 1990. When I pressed the Department, asking what had happened about standby vessels, I was told that it was considering the Cullen report. Here we are two years after the Piper Alpha disaster, at least four years since the Department of Transport saw fit to review the regulations, and nothing has been done.

Mr. Malcolm Bruce: The hon. Gentleman will recall that the hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson) read out the criteria that Lord Cullen recommended as the basis upon which standby vessels should perform. Will he acknowledge, and will the Minister take this on board when he replies, that it is impossible for the boats that he has described to meet those criteria, and that the Government must say why they continue to operate?

Mr. Doran: Although it is not his direct departmental responsibility, I hope that the Minister will reply to valid questions like that, which are relevant to safety in the North sea. As long as the Government continue to dither —whichever Department is involved—we shall continue to doubt their sincerity.
We have heard a good deal about health and safety representatives. The Opposition have argued for a long time that the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974 should be extended to cover the North sea. The Government, or at least the Minister's predecessor, used to come out with the standard response that the Act had already been extended in 1977. Of course we knew that. What we wanted was the extension of all onshore regulations to those working offshore, and we saw no reason why that should not be possible. Of course special circumstances exist on offshore platforms, just as they exist inside chemical works and refineries, but I for one have never been able to understand why companies such as British Petroleum are able to operate separate regimes onshore and offshore.
Eventually, the Government decided to produce regulations in 1989. We criticised those regulations at the time, and we continue to do so. They are a much watered-down version of the onshore regulations, and they do nothing to deal with offshore problems. Lord Cullen rightly recommended a review of the regulations, arid I wish that that could happen sooner—there is another year to go before the review is undertaken.
One of our main objections to the regulations lies in the exclusion of the statutory trade union representative. 'The

Government accuse us of being interested only in jobs for the boys—in protecting our union colleagues. That is very far from the truth. I strongly believe that every individual should be entitled to belong to a trade union, and to be represented by that union. We have the example of the onshore regulations, which allow the union statutory involvement and require the HSE to take a tripartite approach to safety. That has led to a considerable improvement in safety measures.
We have argued that there are two strong reasons for the unions to be involved. First, they are independent of the employers, and have the resources to set up training courses. They also have the technical expertise to advise workers and to provide advice on technical matters. That independence is crucial. The second major benefit is the support and assistance that unions can provide to prevent the intimidation of elected representatives. That operates very effectively onshore, and there is no reason why it should not operate just as effectively offshore.
The hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond), who is not in the Chamber now, mentioned a letter that he received from the offshore information centre in Aberdeen. I received a copy of the same letter. It concerned Mr. Gordon Moore, who was employed by Aker Lasalle. On investigation, I managed to find out that Mr. Moore was a time-served tradesman—he considers himself to be a craftsman—with 12 years' offshore employment and a considerable track record. He decided that he wanted to be elected as a health and safety representative for the platform where he worked, in Morecambe bay. Having sought election, he was duly elected and appointed, and the necessary certificate was signed and issued by the installation manager.
On 22 February, Mr. Moore was sent a letter by his employers, which was signed by Mr. A. B. J. Kammer, human resources manager. The letter said:
Further to discussions with the writer and our Mr. Allan Cunningham, we regret that we are unable to retain your services on the Morecambe Bay Contract due to unsatisfactory references being obtained from your previous employers.
Mr. Moore has tried to find out what those unsatisfactory references were. His employer refuses to tell Mr. Moore about them. He has therefore come to the inevitable conclusion that he has been victimised because he decided to try to become a safety representative on an offshore platform. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Mr. Moore is justified in feeling that he has been victimised.
Three workers on the Brent Bravo platform decided to stand as safety representatives. Mr. Jake Boyle, Mr. Graham Macdonald and Mr. Dave Glen sought election and were elected. Within 10 days of their election they were made redundant, despite the fact that there were numerous vacancies. Indeed, there was an upmanning on that platform.
In a statement, Mr. Boyle said that he started his employment on Brent Bravo on 3 October 1990, that there were hardly any safety representatives on the platform at that time and that, on his second trip—on 5 November —he took out nomination forms and was duly nominated. He returned for his next trip in December. He noticed that there were still notices for safety representatives, but he had received no intimation of what had happened to his nomination. When he inquired, he was told that his form had been lost. He left the platform after being renominated. When he returned on 27 December there was


still no nomination on the board, so he approached the installation manager who told him, "I've lost your form." After he complained very strongly about that, the form was mysteriously found and he was told that if there were no other nominations he would become a safety representative on 23 January.
On 19 January he received a letter from his employers, who were contracted to Shell, saying that he had been downmanned, despite the fact that upmanning had occurred on the platform in his trade. There was no particular reason for him to be sacked. Therefore, he has reached the conclusion, as have Mr. Macdonald and Mr. Glen, that they were sacked because they sought to represent the work force.
In recommendation 30, Lord Cullen recommended that protection similar to that contained in the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 against unfair dismissal for membership of a trade union be extended to employee representatives. Both the Secretary of State and the Minister say that they accept in full Lord Cullen's recommendations. I hope that the Minister will say that that recommendation will be enshrined in legislation. I hope that he will also say when it will be enshrined in legislation and what he intends to do about people such as Mr. Boyle, Mr. Macdonald, Mr. Glen and Mr. Moore.
Mr. Boyle took matters into his own hands. He decided to write to the Department of Energy, he was so concerned about the situation in which he found himself. He received a reply to his letter on 5 February 1991 signed by Mr. R. D. Jenkins, who described himself as a senior inspector in the petroleum engineering division. The letter says:
I have spoken to the management of the Brent Field on this subject, and I am informed that it is considered that you were down-manned for operational reasons—i.e. Vauldale"—
who were the employers—
had considered that your employment was of a short term nature and you were replaced by someone who had different conditions of contract.
There has been no investigation by the Department of Energy. No protection has been offered to Mr. Boyle. I appreciate that the Department is to give up its responsibility for safety fairly soon, but I assume that Mr. Jenkins, together with the other inspectors, will be transferred to the Health and Safety Executive. Such behaviour should not be tolerated. These cases must be investigated.
The Department of Energy accepted the version of events provided to them by the employers without carrying out any further inquiries or investigations. That is unsatisfactory and is not conducive to safety. If Mr. Boyle's case is as accurate as I think it is after my discussions with him and those who represent him, it is no wonder that Opposition Members and offshore workers have no confidence that their interests will be protected by the Department of Energy. They want major changes to be made when responsibility for safety is transferred to the Health and Safety Executive. We certainly intend to pursue those issues.
I said that I intended to discuss the operation of the Department of Energy. The Minister will be well aware that I have had—and have deliberately sought—a high profile on offshore safety issues. That was a personal

decision, consistent with the interests of my constituency, where there are a large number of offshore workers and where many of the major companies are located.
Over the years, as I have presented cases such as those of Mr. Boyle, Mr. Moore and the other gentlemen I mentioned to successive Secretaries of State for Energy, I have had no confidence whatever that they have been properly investigated by the Department. Secrecy has been endemic in the Department's approach to its tasks. It has been impossible to escape the impression that there is connivance—almost collusion—with the oil industry.
I do not make that charge lightly. I know that officials at the Department of Energy are anxious to do their job properly. I know that they find it difficult because they are thoroughly under-resourced and have been for many years and have received no political support. Nevertheless, the responses that I have received from various individuals who have occupied offices in the Department have not filled me with confidence. Their approach has been offhand and they have left me with no confidence that any attempt was being made to take complaints seriously.
With one exception, I have never presented a case to the Department without thoroughly investigating it myself. Every time I have presented a case, I have done so because I have been satisfied that there has been some cause for the complaint. I can recall no case on which I have received a satisfactory response from the Department.
Mr. Vaughan Mitchell, a welder employed offshore, was sacked because he refused to do a job which he strongly believed was likely to lead to serious problems on the platform. We investigated the case thoroughly, took statements and presented all the evidence to the Department. The response, after an "inquiry", was that the Department was satisfied that no injustice had occurred. Mr. Mitchell, through his trade union, is now pursuing the matter legally. He attempted to get support from the Department—to find out the results of its investigation at least—but the Department has consistently refused to release the papers.
There is also the recent case of the Ocean Alliance. Just over a year ago, I wrote to the then Minister, drawing to his attention a catalogue of problems associated with the conversion of the Ocean Alliance drilling rig, which had been secured on contract by BP and which was lying at Invergordon undergoing a major refit to make it suitable for deep-level drilling in the North sea—a process that required the installation of a lot of high-pressure equipment. The allegations were checked again. I spoke to the individuals involved. A full submission was made to the Department, and I also contacted BP as the eventual operator of the installation. I received the same reply from both sides—"There is no problem; there is nothing wrong."
My views and the responses that I received were then fed back to the health and safety committee, which raised merry hell with the employers. A new catalogue of complaints was received and submitted to me. I passed the information on to the Department of Energy and to BP. This time, some honesty had to creep in. We received apologies from BP, and even BP's house magazine had to carry the tale that there were things that were badly wrong with the drilling rig. I raise that case because when I first referred the matter to the Department of Energy there was virtually no response and, so far as I could see, no serious investigation.
Another case which the Department was forced to take seriously was that of the Amoco, Montrose and Arbroath platforms. The Department took that case seriously only because a Department of Transport inspector had managed to visit the Arbroath platform and had discovered a collection of problems which were detailed in a long memorandum that found its way into my hands. Eventually, the Department took action. It could not refute the evidence because it was specific, but that is one of the few cases on which we have managed to stir the Department of Energy into some action.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West referred to the report into the incident on Piper Alpha in 1984. It is important to consider that report in the context of what I am saying now because it was held in secret by the Department of Energy, which refused to release the papers. We have found it difficult to understand why. The existence of that report was certainly known prior to the 1988 disaster. I am intrigued to know why it has not been brought into the public domain, given the disaster on Piper Alpha, because it may have had some relevance to the explosion in July 1988. A lot of pressure was applied. I spoke privately to the Secretary of State about releasing the report, but he refused to do so.
However, on the day that Mr. Petrie's interim report was released in September 1988, the Department sneaked the 1984 report into the public domain. I already had some idea about what was in the report because I had spoken to some of Occidental's executives, who had given me the shocking news that there had not been a Department of Energy investigation into the 1984 Piper Alpha explosion. I was staggered by that news, but I was bound by confidence not to do anything about it because it was a private discussion.
When the report was published in September 1988, I saw why the Department had not been keen to release it. Under the heading "Legal Conclusions", it had concluded that there was a catalogue of four possible or probable breaches of the various regulations that would have justified a criminal prosecution. However, the Department's own inspector, Mr. Bainbridge, who is still a departmental inspector based in Aberdeen, concluded in paragraph 5.2:
had we decided to institute proceedings it would have been proper to conduct our own research rather than to rely entirely on the research findings of Occidental. I therefore propose no further actions other than a letter to Occidental.
I repeat that after a major explosion on that platform which, as we know, was destroyed in July 1988, the company had carried out its own investigation. I gather that it employed outside consultants to carry out that investigation and to prepare two reports for the Department. When the Department's inspector had reviewed the matter, it was concluded that there were several possible or probable breaches of the regulations, but those papers were not passed to the Procurator Fiscal for prosecution or brought into the public domain so that lessons could be learnt. Why? Because the Department of Energy had not held its own inquiry. We can envisage the embarrassment that that would have caused.
I concluded not long ago that there was no longer any point in taking up these matters with the Department of Energy. It is easy to get a cheap press headline bringing a "shock, horror" story to public attention, but when one batters one's head against a brick wall with virtually no sign of the brick wall yielding, no matter what pressure is

applied, one eventually decides that it is a waste of time to continue to raise such matters with the Secretary of State for Energy because the Department seems to have no interest in dealing properly with them or in acting as a public inspector of safety in the North sea. It seems to be assumed that any complaint is unjustified if the oil companies say that it is unjustified.
I have taken a different approach. I have decided to contact the oil industry direct. Whenever a problem occurs on a platform or a drilling rig, I make every effort to persuade the oil company that those allegations are well founded and that it should take action against its contractors, employees or whoever is working for it.
I can give a recent example of the way in which that method operates. I recently had occasion to complain to an oil company about the operation of a drilling rig, the SEDCO 706. Unfortunately, there was a death on that rig after I had made complaints to the oil company involved, although it was unconnected with my complaints.
About a fortnight ago I telephoned a senior manager in the company and listed the complaints to him. He replied within about 15 minutes and told me that the company was sending a team of medical experts and environmental specialists to check out the complaints and that he would report back to me as soon as possible. He did so, and told me that many of the complaints were founded and the company was dealing with them. That was a refreshing approach, and not one that I have ever had from the Department of Energy. I hope that it is a sign of what will happen to the oil industry, particularly when it comes under the supervision of the Health and Safety Executive.
The most recent information that I have about the SEDCO 706 is that Total, the oil company involved, has decided to bring the drilling rig back into Invergordon so that proper remedial work can be carried out. That is a refreshing approach that contrasts starkly with that generally taken by the Department of Energy. I am pretty confident that if I had gone to the Department, no attempt would have been made to make a serious investigation. All credit should go to Total for the way that it operated.
For the future, we want a completely new approach from the Health and Safety Executive. We want openness, the dispensing with the secrecy that has surrounded safety, and public scrutiny and control of safety in the North sea. I hope that we will get that. After my discussions with Dr. Cullen, the chairman of the Commission, and Mr. Rimington, I have no doubt that they share my hope that we will be able to open up the industry. If an industry operates in a vacuum without proper scrutiny, terrible things can happen, as we saw on Piper Alpha. The approach taken by the Department of Energy has been totally discredited, not only by my experiences, but by Lord Cullen's report.
The oil industry has raised concerns with me about the transition to the Health and Safety Executive. I am extremely disappointed that, this close to what we all expected to be the transfer date, the Secretary of State was unable to make any positive statement about the arrangements. I understand that negotiations must take place and must be concluded. I was pleased that he said that finance was not a problem and that there would be proper resourcing, but I thought that we would have had some more positive information from him about a start-up date and what detailed arrangements are to be made.
At no time has the Department sought to give any programme for the implementation of the Cullen


recommendations. It would not be beyond it to produce a detailed programme of how it sees the legislation being introduced and dealt with, and how Lord Cullen's 106 recommendations are to be implemented.
The oil industry is entitled to a little certainty about the future and an idea of what to expect and in what time scale it has to operate. Huge investments and many jobs in the north-east of Scotland depend on the industry. We want that industry to thrive; we do not want it to be worried. We want investment programmes and to have some idea of how the safety regime is to develop over the next few years. It is clear that that is the time scale involved. Will the Minister give us some idea of the time scale that he envisages for implementation of the recommendations? We need a little more than the vague suggestions that have been made.
As the Minister and his predecessors have frequently made clear at Question Time and on other occasions, the North sea has a bright future. Many marginal fields are being developed and many proposals are being presented to the Department for approval. I had a discussion earlier this week with a senior executive from one of the major oil companies. He was deeply concerned that the system that operated well for his company—and, I am sure, for other companies—seemed to be in some difficulties because of the transition.
Before the submission of an annexe B application, it was normal to have preliminary discussions with the Department, and among the issues discussed would be safety and the implications of the design. At that stage, it was normal for the Department to give an informal view of the design and how it saw its safety implications. The Department would then say whether the design would be acceptable.
At present, the Department seems not to feel able to give informal directions. I have a major worry—which was not expressed by the individual with whom I spoke this week—that the Department's approach may inhibit investment in some of the marginal fields, on which many jobs depend. If the Mininser cannot say anything about that today, I should appreciate his looking into the matter and seeing whether there is any justification for that suggestion.
Several hon. Members have talked about the location of the offshore safety division. I will briefly put my Front Bench hat aside because I have a personal interest in that I represent Aberdeen, South. I want merely to say that I do not accept the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West, who spoke from a particular perspective. It is important to stress that if the HSE is successfully to implement the safety regime that we want in the North sea, it must be visible. The place where it must be visible is the centre of the oil industry, which is the city of Aberdeen.
Clearly there will be facilities elsewhere. I have had discussions on the matter with representatives of the Commission and of the executive. They have made it clear that they intend to have a substantial presence in Aberdeen. We are looking for more than that. We want to see a high profile there, and I want the headquarters to be based in Aberdeen, which would make a significant improvement to the attitude to safety. We know that if the headquarters are based in Aberdeen—and certainly if the

Labour party's dispersal programme is implemented and we are able to transfer the petroleum engineering division jobs to Aberdeen—there will be a follow through of oil industry jobs as headquarters are moved to the centre of the industry. In this day of instant communications, there is no good reason why the headquarters cannot be in Aberdeen. If I can come to this place at the beginning of every week and go back at the end of every week, I am sure that the oil industry, Government officials and HSE officials can manage.
We must look ahead. Various issues need to be dealt with. I and other hon. Members have mentioned the problems of the contract labour system in the North sea. I do not want to go into too much detail on that because enough has been said already, but we must recognise that the root of the safety problems that still exist in the North sea is employment practice. I understand fully why oil companies use contract labour and why they do not want to have a permanent staff, whom they would have to recruit and lay off, when they can buy in the expertise. It makes for good management in their terms. However, it has a serious impact on safety, especially when we are dealing with such a hostile environment and such a stressful occupation.
We must also recognise that many employers in the North sea are good employers, and many are based in my constituency. There are also many bad employers. I have come across two examples recently of appalling practices. They concern two catering companies—Trinity Catering and Caterae. Both are small-scale catering companies which have managed to win contracts in the drilling industry. There are many problems with those companies, but I want to mention one practice that they have in common.
The offshore survival certificate is mandatory. Most employers in the North sea ensure that their staff have such a certificate. The companies pay for it because they recognise that it is mandatory and they want everyone to have the best training. The Robert Gordon institute in my constituency provides what many regard as the best training in that respect—certainly it is the best in this country. The two companies in question, to cut their labour costs, have decided that employees will pay for the certificate. The companies take on the men, put them through the course, pay for it, and then deduct the cost from the men's wages.
I and the trade unions have tried to get some response from the companies about their practices. They refuse to give the men itemised statements, so the men cannot claim tax rebates. They are totally disillusioned with their employers. Of course, they have the option of giving up their jobs, but this is the first employment that many of them have had for some time. They are being totally exploited. I suspect that, so far as the Inland Revenue is concerned, something is happening. I realise that that is a serious accusation, but I have no inhibitions about making it. The way in which these companies operate—including their failure to provide itemised statements and to respond to any reasonable requests for information—strikes me as questionable. An investigation is needed. When he is considering offshore safety, the Minister must ask what contribution companies that exploit their work force in this way make to safety in the North sea.
There are similar companies operating in other parts of the North sea. I have other examples that I do not intend to mention tonight. Such companies have men on every


platform, and they cause problems on every platform. The problems have nothing to do with the attitude of the men, but it is difficult to keep the morale of a work force high when it is being exploited.
The contract system will have to be examined carefully. I know that certain companies have already started on that process. I have already paid tribute to Shell and BP—the two largest operators in the North sea—both of which have instituted programmes of long-term contracts. They are also providing training for the staffs of their contractors, with a view to improving skills to meet company requirements. That is certainly the way ahead.
I have no doubt that, as long as such companies make an effort and can show how the benefits of long-term contracts work their way down to the ordinary offshore worker, there will be significant improvements in the offshore safety system. It is an attitude that needs to be adopted by other companies. I know that firms such as Chevron and Conoco have a fairly enlightened approach to safety. Their approach is rooted in continuity of employment, and they make serious efforts.
The problems of stress offshore must be considered. I have made inquiries about the research being done in this area. Sadly, I can find no record of any Government-sponsored or oil company-sponsored research. Mrs. Joy Sutherland of the University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology has done some work, and a social worker in my area recently sent me a document detailing stress effects, but it is an area that needs to be studied. I should like the Minister to say something about what efforts the Department will make, and what efforts it will encourage the HSE to make, to find out more about the problems of stress offshore. The working conditions in the North sea are unique, as are the stress factors. I am thinking in particular of offshore workers who have had to cope with the serious problems of accidents and deaths on their platforms.
There are several other isssues on which I should like the Minister to comment. On 14 July 1988, I wrote to the then Secretary of State on the subject of sub-sea valves. I received a very encouraging response from Mr. Petrie and one of the then Ministers concerning the Department's attitude. Since then, the attitude has been watered down. I understand that Mr. Petrie still insists that the Government intend at some stage to introduce regulations on sub-sea valves. However, we have heard very little. We have seen regulations providing for the relocation of the

emergency shut-down valves. That is not the safest method in all cases. It is accepted that sub-sea valves provide the safest method. I should like to know exactly what is happening in that regard.
Funding of the Health and Safety Executive has been mentioned. The Secretary of State said that finance would not be a problem, but it is important that we should know how the Minister views the future of the HSE, and what improvements he thinks it will make in the existing system.
I have a severe case of the wobblies about safety cases. I accept the philosophy and Lord Cullen's reasoning behind them but it is not the only answer or the only solution. I want to hear the Minister's views on what other steps are necessary to ensure that safety cases do not become a simple panacea and that people do not become complacent because safety cases are in order.
We are well aware that serious problems with implementing Lord Cullen's recommendations are caused by the shortage of skills in safety matters on not only the public but the private side. I know that the industry is trying to get up speed quickly, but the resources are limited. It will be important to ensure that the safety case is properly scrutinised and that there are experts on the public as well as the private side.
We have raised the issue of trade unions and health and safety committees. All the statements which have been made by the Secretary of State and the Minister were about the operation of the present system, which is under their control. What are the views of the Health and Safety Executive? Do Ministers expect that, as part of the legislative process that we shall experience, there will be a full extension of the onshore provisions?
As I said earlier, this is an important debate. Important things have been said by hon. Members on both sides of the House. It is important that we do not become complacent. A genuine sense of frustration and anger lingers in the north-east of Scotland and among oil workers. It is felt that the position of employees is riot taken seriously. There have been industrial disputes in he past two years. There may be another one this year. That would have a serious impact on the oil industry. We all want to avoid that. The best way to do that is for the Government to use their power and authority to ensure that the grievances of North sea workers are dealt with.
Lord Cullen's report presents one way forward. It is one that we are all prepared to support, but it demands not merely words but action from the Government.

Piper Alpha (Cullen Report)

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy (Mr. Colin Moynihan): I agreed with the comments of the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes), who is not in his place—he sent his apologies that he had to leave the Chamber—about the attendance this evening. I hope that he agrees that, with remarkably few exceptions, what we have heard in the Chamber has been much more than merely useful—it has been salutary. Many speeches from hon. Members on both sides of the House brought into sharp focus the human dimension of offshore safety, and I am glad that they did so. It was right, because all our debates on the subject and almost every action that has been taken on offshore safety since 6 July 1988 stand in the shadow of the terrible event of Piper Alpha. The human dimension of Piper Alpha always comes first to our minds and remains with us when the precise course of events or the technical implications are no longer to the fore.
The human dimension is no more than shorthand for the personal needs, fears and concerns of the 30,000 and more men and women who earn their living in the face of these hazards, and the needs, fears and concerns of their families and friends. It is right to focus on the human dimension because, at the end of the day, securing safety depends on the responsibility and watchfulness of individuals at every step of the process and every level of the organisation in question.
I was grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside (Mr. Buchanan-Smith) for paying tribute to the Rev. Andrew Wylie. All those who know Andrew Wylie will be aware of the enormous contribution that he has made. It is no mere chance that when, with the Under-Secretary of State for Employment, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Worcestershire (Mr. Forth) and my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Energy, I visit several platforms offshore in a few weeks the first stop that we shall make will be to see Andrew Wylie. It was right to pay tribute to his knowledge, courage and humanity. When he retires, which will be all too soon, I hope that he will not be lost to offshore workers.
It has been clear from the outset that radical and far-reaching changes in the system of regulation of offshore safety must and will result from the implementation of the recommendations of Lord Cullen's report. Lord Cullen was given a wide-ranging remit and was able to probe matters to whatever depth he thought appropriate to identify the initial cause of the disaster, to understand how it escalated and to consider how similar incidents could be prevented. I firmly believe that the Government were right fully to accept Lord Cullen's conclusions. I confirm that in response to a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Ryedale (Mr. Greenway). We fully accept all the conclusions, together with the recommendations that Lord Cullen made for the future.
There are five key goals in offshore safety, and they have been voiced in the debate. They are to improve the management of safety on offshore installations; to improve their design and equipment; to improve planning and provision for emergencies and for evacuation, escape and rescue; to strengthen the involvement of the work force in safety; and to strengthen the regulation of safety.
The Government have acted with consistency and dispatch in responding to the report. The Department's

director of safety wrote to operators on the day the report was published requesting them to undertake action forthwith, without waiting for legislation, on a number of Lord Cullen's key recommendations, dealing with fire risk analysis, smoke and gas hazards, emergency systems and evacuation, escape and rescue.
Further action was highlighted by Mr. Petrie in the same letter on work related to the implementation of improved safety measures covering standby vessels, drills, exercises and precautionary musters and evacuations, personnel survival and escape equipment, pipeline emergency procedures, hydrocarbon inventory rises in pipelines, control of the process, permits to work, safety committees and safety representatives. I list those for the hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Ross), who asked what action had been taken on many of the issues. In fact, action was taken, and rightly so, within 24 hours on those key issues.
A great deal of work has been done since then. Inevitably, detailed work is involved to effect the transfer of responsibility to the Health and Safety Executive, but that work is already well advanced, thanks to the tremendous amount of work undertaken by officials in all the relevant Government Departments. The Department of Energy's safety directorate has been upgraded to an independent division within the Department in a way which will facilitate the transfer to the HSE.
Much has been said in the debate about the important role of engineers, and I am particularly pleased that such a distinguished engineer as Tony Barrel] has joined the Department from the HSE to be the first head of the new division.
I utterly reject the comments of the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran) about lack of political support from Ministers for the staff who work so assiduously and competently in the Department of Energy. Anyone who studies the Official Report will have witnessed time and again our commitment as Ministers to the outstanding civil servants who serve us and the country so well. I shall explain shortly how strongly I reject the allegations made by some hon. Members against the inspectorate.
As a result of the work that we are doing, we now hope to effect the transfer in April of this year. When the transfer has taken place, formal responsibility for offshore safety will pass from the Secretary of State for Energy to the Secretary of State for Employment, in whose domain the Health and Safety Commission and the Health and Safety Executive fall. My right hon. Friend made it clear earlier, and I repeat, that the new division will have the resources that it needs to continue to enforce the existing regulatory regime for the time being and to develop and implement the new regime.
The hon. Member for Dundee, West should accept that from the point of view of the HSE, Lord Cullen, Mr. Rimington and all the staff of the HSE, there is no way that the HSE would be prepared to take on the important functions of offshore safety that it is being asked to accept if the division were not adequately resourced. Those concerned have been parties to all the detailed discussions at official and ministerial level which have been taking place day after day to meet the earliest possible date for transfer. That is why my right hon. Friend said that at this stage broad agreement had been reached—not final


decisions, because we must carry with us every party to the discussions in order to effect the transfer. As soon as those final decisions are made, the transfer will be effected.
Had we made them by today, we would effect the transfer as soon as possible, for we have no desire to hold up the important process of the HSE taking over responsibility and implementing Lord Cullen's recommen-dations. We have put a great deal of time and effort into that, and to meet our April target would be a considerable achievement that should be recognised as such by hon. Memberss in all parts of the House. I promise hon. Member who have raised that issue that we could not have acted faster—[Interruption.] I have obviously had a dramatic effect beyond hon. Members present in the Chamber, but it appears that all is now under control.

Mr. Ernie Ross: It is clear that the Government team do not want to answer the question or are not sure how to answer it. I will try again as the Secretary of State failed to answer me earlier.
Mr. Rimington was identified by Lord Cullen as the responsible person. On 12 December, when talking about resources and finance, Mr. Rimington said to the Select Committee on Employment:
please forgive me if I seem a bit vehement, I am not intending to be rude in any way—of the need to secure enough money to discharge the offshore responsibility, which as a matter of fact Lord Cullen has laid explicitly on me.
That is unfair. I cannot see how Mr. Rimington can possibly be held accountable. That responsibility must rest with the Secretary of State for Energy or with the Department of Employment. Mr. Rimington believes that he is responsible and that is not fair. He cannot possibly be responsible. That was the point that I made earlier.

Mr. Moynihan: In fairness to the hon. Gentleman, his interpretation of that exchange must be broader than that. He would be the first to realise, as all hon. Members realise, that the HSE is taking over responsibility for offshore safety. We have been debating that all evening. The HSE's resources are not directed to one individual to decide how he wants to spend that money. They are directed to the HSE. It will have to put a case together and have the support of its sponsoring Department. In turn, we will have to be satisfied before we hand over the safety divisions that we are handing them over to a body that is well resourced—adequately resourced at the present time —which had clear responsibilities and a clear programme to implement in respect of the Cullen report. If I have helped to clarify the position for the hon. Member for Dundee, West, I shall have achieved an objective. It is not the Government's intention to place all responsibility for offshore safety in the hands of one individual. It is our intention to hand it over to the HSE as soon as we can, and I hope that we can achieve the April target.

Mr. Ernie Ross: I hope that the Minister will consider my other points. The whole issue makes no sense because at the moment the HSE has difficulty recruiting staff. The total package that we are considering is for the whole department. Cullen has identified specific expenditure required for the new division. That is where there will be conflict.

Mr. Moynihan: The hon. Gentleman is talking rubbish. The report does not mention specific expenditure. It is the duty of Ministers to read the report and, having accepted

the recommendations and conclusions, to work out an appropriate budget to implement those recommendations. We are doing precisely that as swiftly as we can.
As hon. Members have made clear, the key task for the new division in implementing the recommendations of the report will be the introduction of requirements for the new safety cases. That is the cornerstone of the new system. It is not the Government's view that the safety case, in its own right, is what Cullen suggests. We believe that the safety case is critically important, but the need to bring forward regulations as soon as possible is also critically important in the implementation of the recommendations of the report.
The report contains many other recommendations that do not fall directly within the safety case legislation. They will have to be implemented and some of them will require Government regulations. They will be brought before the House as soon as the HSE has had the opportunity to assess in detail the timetable and its implementation.
The safety cases should show that operators have met defined objectives on the adequacy of the company's safety management system, on the identification and control of risks to personnel from hazards arising from the hydrocarbon inventory on the installation and from other potential major hazards and on provision in a major emergency of a temporary safe refuge for all personnel on an installation and a means for their safe and full evacuation, escape and rescue if needed.
Specific matters to be demonstrated in the safety case include the minimisation of hazards from hydrocarbons, the minimisation of the exposure of personnel to accidental events, the endurance of the temporary safe refuge, and analysis of fire risks and of the effectiveness of the arrangements for evacuation, escape and rescue.
In the meantime, all the existing legal requirements remain in force, and it is important that they are maintained. They will continue to be effectively enforced by the staff of the offshore safety division.
Lord Cullen welcomed the introduction of emergency shut-down valves, which led to regulations being introduced and a tough implementation regime, which was welcomed by the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South. The fitting of those valves is rigorously monitored. Lord Cullen suggested that it would be inappropriate to introduce sub-sea isolation systems across the board. He felt it important to consider them and their valves within the safety case for each platform, because of the wide differences between platforms. Therefore, an analysis of each platform under the safety case will determine whether it is necessary to implement a sub-sea isolation system. For some platforms they will not be required on safety grounds.
It has been made explicit on a number of occasions —it should have been made explicit on every occasion—that annex B approval conveys no formal or informal safety approval or clearance. The approval has been discussed, not least with my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Employment, my officials and myself. We regard it as a priority that where operators make proposals which are in the design stage and have safety implications, it should be a priority of the inspectorate to be as helpful as it can in providing information so that there is no delay in design techniques or a specific design. It will not be possible to ensure that in every case, because certain issues are being rigorously debated, but where possible we have asked the relevant


inspectors to be as helpful as they can, given the concerns that the hon. Member for Dundee, West rightly drew to the attention of the House.
Few operators have operations offshore and onshore, partly because of the petroleum revenue tax implications. A growing number of small companies are operating onshore and I shall happily provide the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South with the details of that. It would be inaccurate to say that the two overlap to the extent that he suggested.
My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Employment has accepted that the Government should implement recommendation 29. It will naturally be a matter of time before a final decision is made. My hon. Friend has not taken over responsibility for these matters yet, but the Department of Employment accepts that recommendation. We shall let the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South know as soon as a decision is made.
Lord Cullen considered the possibility of immediately implementing the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations, but explicitly rejected it. It is a critical point. He concluded that what was required was a new offshore regime that would differ from any onshore regulatory system. He went much further; he argued that in many areas, drawing broad parameters for all platforms would have been unwise and that a safety case needed to be designed for each platform. Clearly some prescriptive regulations would apply to all, but the thrust of his argument was that a safety case should be drawn up and each platform taken individually. To replicate the CMAH regulations offshore was explicitly rejected by Lord Cullen, as hon. Members know.
The hon. Member for Gordon (Mr. Bruce) rightly spoke of the sensitivity of the work forces of contractors and operators and the need for developments to bring the two together, for example, in accommodation and recreational facilities, rather than having a two-tier approach, one for the operator's staff and the other for the contractor's work force. I agree that it is important that that is achieved, for better industrial relations and for a better environment on all platforms. I hope that operators will respond to the points that the hon. Gentleman has raised on that issue and which I endorse.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned an offshore safety trust. I have not looked at that in detail, but I shall be happy to consider any suggestions from hon. Members about improvements to safety, though I would not want to deflect attention from the work of all who are involved in the implementation of the Cullen report. That must be a top priority. If there were a mechanism for enhanced safety which did not deflect from that work, we should consider it.
The location of the new offshore safety division led to three conflicting views. My hon. Friend the Member for Waveney (Mr. Porter) was reasonable not to demand that Lowestoft should be the site, given its proximity to so much gas activity in the southern North sea. I emphasise, as my right hon. Friend did earlier, that the location is a matter for the HSE and the HSC. The chairman of the HSC has said that he sees a need for a substantial increase in staff numbers in Aberdeen. That has been welcomed by hon. Members. I cannot pre-empt decisions to be taken by the HSE or go to the extent that some hon. Members

would like on location. Undoubtedly there would be real difficulties in a comprehensive relocation of existing staff; some of the difficulties have been touched on in the debate, not least by Labour Members.

Mr. Salmond: The Minister will have to spell out what the difficulties are. What he should have heard from all parts of the House was the great virtue in having the nerve centre of the new operation located at the nerve centre and front end of the oil industry. Although the Minister cannot pre-empt the decision, he could give the House the assurance that the arguments have been well heard and understood, that the final decision will not be based on prejudice or on the previous practice of locating the headquarters of such bodies in London, and that he will take account of the arguments presented by hon. Members who represent the bulk of the oil and gas industry.

Mr. Moynihan: There is no doubt that the arguments that the hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members have put forward in the debate will be taken into account by the HSE. I will make sure that those arguments are noted. The issue has been widely debated inside the House and outside.
There are real conflicting problems, not least the amount of work that members of the division do in London, given that many of the operators have their headquarters based down here and that they would be travelling down from Aberdeen on a large budget to do their work. If it was proven that if inspectors and the whole division moved to Aberdeen, all the operators would follow, that is the sort of argument that the HSE would consider in the future.

Mr. Malcolm Bruce: rose——

Mr. Moynihan: Some hon. Members have made lengthy speeches and, with permission, I should like—[Interruption.] I will give way once more.

Mr. Malcolm Bruce: I did not make the point in my speech, but the argument that somehow the centre of gravity is in London is disputed by the industry itself, which complains that its staff have to travel to London. The industry wants the centre to be based in Aberdeen. It is not satisfactory for Ministers to say, "We are sorry, the centre of gravity is in London," when the industry itself denies that.

Mr. Moynihan: I am not saying that the centre of gravity would necessarily remain in London for years to come, but when we looked at the costings we found that 80 per cent. of the work is currently done in and around London. That may well change. I simply say—I hope that it is a reasonable response—that if there are difficulties and arguments they will be listened to carefully by the HSC in due course.
A number of hon. Members have referred to the Burgoyne report. In 1980 the Government acted in line with its majority recommendations. It would have been impossible to act in line with the majority recommendations and with the minority recommendations as well because they disagreed, but we took on board the point made by the minority group that the role of the HSE should be enlarged.
Ten years later, the HSE has developed considerable expertise, which was no doubt one of the issues relevant to Lord Cullen's consideration of the changes that had taken


place on which he reached the conclusion that, on balance, it was the time to move. Burgoyne decided to the contrary. We agreed with both, and a great deal has changed in the past 10 years—not least our responding to the concern put forward by some members of the minority group who argued that that should be taken on board, as it was. It has been a real factor in the Government's consideration of the acceptance of Lord Cullen's recommendations and the move across to the HSE.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ryedale referred to the current application for power stations. The planning application is with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and my hon. Friend will not expect me to anticipate the outcome of his considerations. However, my right hon. Friend's decision will be based on all the relevant factors and the issues that my hon. Friend has raised this evening are exactly the type of issues that the HSE will consider, because it is currently being consulted. My right hon. Friend will not make his decision until it is satisfied. I understand that my right hon. Friend has written to the district council and if it chooses to object to the application, a public inquiry will be mandatory.
The hon. Member for Dundee, West made an important point with which I wholeheartedly disagree. Lord Cullen found no evidence to suggest that the Department had put production considerations above safety or was not independent. I assure the hon. Gentleman that no such conflict has ever affected our determination to give top priority to safety. Lord Cullen's recommendations for a transfer to the HSE is made on organisational grounds, not to secure independence.
The hon. Gentleman's argument was therefore redundant and inaccurate. It would not have persuaded the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn.) when he was Secretary of State for Energy, and it certainly does not persuade us. If there were even a grain of truth in it, the hon. Gentleman would surely accept that Lord Cullen would never have suggested, as he did, that the inspectorate, which currently does excellent work in the safety division, should be the same men and women who will go across to form the safety division within HSC. He would never even have considered that if the safety inspectorate were jeopardised in terms of putting safety first. For that reason, I wholeheartedly reject what the hon. Gentleman says. It is an appalling slight on the outstanding work that the inspectors have undertaken for many years.
It was argued today that the operators were opposed to applying the 1977 onshore regulations offshore. In fact, that proposal was considered and rejected by Lord Cullen. It could not he right in the industry, in which union recognition is of limited extent, for the nomination of safety representatives to be entirely in the hands of the trade unions. There is no bar to members of trade unions becoming safety representatives if they are elected by the work force.
When the safety committees are reviewed this summer, as it will be two years on from their introduction, one of the key factors to be considered will be the arguments put forward by hon. Members today, including those put forward by the hon. Member for Dundee, West on behalf of his union. One consideration will be whether the safety committee structure has been effective in representing each and every member of the work force on each and every platform. Every platform has a safety committee and its representatives reflect each constituent part of those

platforms. What is important is that their concerns are aired in the safety committee and responded to by the operator or, if response does not come forth, that they have an opportunity to contact the Department of Energy and the inspectors onshore. The proof of the effectiveness of that system is that they often do, and every time they do, those complaints and concerns are taken up. It does not matter whether a person is unionised or not—what matters is that that person's concerns are aired on the safety committee and there is a response to them.
Opposition Members and all who have equated trade unionism with enhanced safety—an equation which I wholeheartedly reject—will have the opportunity to put their case to the HSE when the regulations are reviewed this summer. We are committed to undertake that review this summer and it will take place. No doubt, during the review the very same arguments that have been aired today will be aired again. It was interesting that Lord Cullen accepted that this was no time to change union representation on the safety committees and that it was right to wait until this summer to assess the effectiveness or otherwise of the committees.
In conclusion, I shall turn to the last few substantive issues——

Mrs. Margaret Ewing: Could the Minister give his observation on recommendation 21.84, in which the Lord Cullen recommends that there would be a benefit from the recognition of trade unions? Surely he must agree that the atmosphere in which people operate is critical to building confidence in the regulation. By recognising unions, an atmosphere of confidence would be established, which would surely help everyone.

Mr. Moynihan: In the Cullen report there are three paragraphs which concentrate my attention virtually every day. One is 21.84, which has been quoted extensively today and which cites evidence and states that it admittedly came almost entirely from trade union witnesses—[Interruption.] Hon. Members may scoff at Lord Cullen's words—I am simply quoting from the report. He was prepared to accept that the appointment of offshore safety representatives by trade unions could be of some benefit in the making the work of such representatives and committees effective. He goes on to say, however, that the position offshore is affected by a number of issues, which he quotes extensively in 21.85. Having weighed the evidence, he concludes:
I consider that it would be inappropriate for me to recommend any change in the method by which safety representatives are chosen.
Time and again today we have heard the first two paragraphs quoted, but never the conclusion, in which Lord Cullen rightly weighs up the evidence and draws his view. Time and again we hear just one set of evidence which is reported in here. The report also states that there are a series of other important issues:
trade union membership is still relatively limited in relation to the total offshore workforce; trade unions have been `recognised' only to a limited extent; and the employment of offshore workers is fragmented between a number of different employers",
and a whole range of other factors. Nevertheless, Lord Cullen reaches that important conclusion. He then says that we have an opportunity to review the matter when we consider the effectiveness of the safety committees, and we


shall be able to do that—we give that commitment today —when a full review is undertaken two years after implementation of the committees.
I hope that that satisfies the hon. Member for Moray (Mrs. Ewing) about the process that we are pursuing, as it is entirely the process that Lord Cullen put before the House in the report, and that we have accepted.

Mr. Dobson: Does the Minister intend to reply—as far as is possible in the time available—to the questions that I asked about the Cam Spirit, alias the Silver Pit?

Mr. Moynihan: I am always keen to assist the hon. Gentleman, so I shall do that now.
The hon. Gentleman is right—the court found the Silver Pit to be deficient in a number of respects. It is the responsibility of an owner to maintain his ship to acceptable standards and, in the light of the court's report, the Department of Transport took action with regard to ad hoc inspections undertaken by marine surveyors. It was made absolutely clear at the time that the vessel acting as standby for Piper Alpha that night had been praised by the court for its role in the rescue, although it found that the boat's general state of repair had been poor. It placed no responsibility for those deficiencies on the master.
The hon. Gentleman said that the Silver Pit was operating in the North sea, and that that was a disgrace——

Mr. Dobson: Will the Minister give way again?

Mr. Moynihan: No, I am going to answer the hon. Gentleman's question about the Cam Spirit.

Mr. Dobson: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I did not say that. I posed a question—in the interrogative mode, as I believe it was called when I was at school. Is it true? It has been reported to me and we have pursued it. We have tried to find out the facts from the owners, but the owners have been unwilling to give us the facts. I asked the Secretary of State for the facts—I did not assert that what I asked about was the case.

Mr. Moynihan: I apologise. There was, however, a clear implication to that effect, which was heard by my hon. Friends and, I am sure, by Opposition Members.
The Cam Spirit has been out of service for a major refit. It cannot and will not go back into service until it has been examined by Department of Transport surveyors.

Mr. Dobson: Since being in service—and, with its crew and master, performing an admirable task on the day of the disaster—has the vessel been in operation in the North sea?

Mr. Moynihan: I apologise to the hon. Gentleman. I tried to obtain the details of the answer to the question that he has asked—in the interrogative mode. I obtained the answer, but I will find out more details.
Whatever those details are, however, I must tell the hon. Gentleman that it is incumbent on the Department of Transport to finalise the revision of the standby vessels code. We accept that. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has made clear, the important issue is that future regulative requirements in respect of standby vessels will be matters for the HSC and HSE as part of the overall programme of implementing the Cullen report. I

am advised that, to meet the standards in the new code, vessels will have to satisfy the technical requirements set out in recommendation 89. The hon. Gentleman read out the requirements at length, and I am sure that he will welcome that initiative.
In an extensive speech, the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Eastham) referred to permits to work. The Department's technical investigation identified possible failings in the generation of Occidental's permit-to-work system as an element in the disaster. The system had also broken down in the case of an earlier accident—the Sutherland fatality, in 1987—for which Occidental was prosecuted and fined following an investigation by my inspectors. There have been detailed regulations governing permit-to-work systems since 1976. The Department issued a statement of intent in August 1989, proposing that they be updated. The proposals, which were presented to the inquiry, have been generally welcomed. Lord Cullen recommended greater harmonisation of the key features of permit-to-work systems, but not standardisation. He realised that each system needed to recognise individual circumstances.

Mr. Salmond: I know that the Minister would not want to end his speech without picking up the point about the 73 cases of suspected blacklisting documented by the offshore information centre. I believe that he vastly underrates the importance of the fear of victimisation and informal blacklisting in the North sea. Will he give a guarantee that, if such cases are documented by the centre, some of the firm action referred to by the Secretary of State will be taken against the companies responsible?

Mr. Moynihan: All hon. Members take allegations of victimisation and blacklisting very seriously indeed. It is incumbent on all Ministers to take up cases brought to their attention by any hon. Member. There are other means of recourse outside the House—not least the employment legislation and industrial tribunals. If there are specific examples of extant blacklists, I urge the hon. Gentleman, and all other hon. Members who referred to them in the debate, to draw them to our attention. We cannot act in a vacuum.
The hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson) argued that the Shell list was a list of people whom Shell refused to re-employ because they had disobeyed the offshore installations manager. I reject the description of offshore installations managers given by the hon. Member for Dundee, West. It is critical for safety reasons that offshore installations managers be obeyed. After a while, Shell decided to rescind the ban on the employment of those individuals. No evidence was brought to our attention of a blacklist distributed to other companies by whichever operator—[Interruption.] If there is evidence, it should be drawn to our attention. We should certainly act on it.
The whole House heard the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South say that he does not wish to bring these cases to the attention of Ministers. He prefers to go directly to the operators. I made the offer to him again today, as I have on previous occasions, that as a Member of Parliament he should bring details concerning his constituents to my attention. We shall certainly pursue those cases, as we have in the past, and as we shall continue to do in the future. The hon. Gentleman is right about going to the operators to discuss employment matters


directly with the employers and their employees, and he is also right that there is recourse to industrial tribunals. Those two avenues should equally be pursued on a case-by-case basis.

Mr. Doran: I made my comments on the basis of my experience with Department of Energy Ministers, and I do not intend to withdraw them. The Minister has no understanding whatever of how the Shell blacklist operated. Every contractor who wanted to employ someone on a Shell platform had to check with Shell, whose computer system recorded against the name of every registered individual a mark which indicated that that individual was unacceptable. Shell admitted that publicly. When we raised the matter in the House, the Minister and his colleagues ignored it.

Mr. Moynihan: I have said to the hon. Gentleman on many occasions that that dispute was between Shell and its employees. The premise of the dispute was disobeying the instructions of an offshore installations manager. That had important safety implications which have now been resolved. We examined that case in detail and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Energy answered questions on it, as I did. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to draw further cases to our attention, we shall certainly look at them.
In conclusion, I hope that the House will accept one issue above all others. Our commitment to implement the Cullen recommendations is complete. Our determination to implement them as soon as possible is full. We shall continue to approach this issue with vigour. We hope to achieve the early deadline of April. We are doing everything that we can to do so. I hope that every hon. Member recognises that safety must be, and will remain, the prime consideration. It will underpin all the work that Department of Energy Ministers do.

Mr. Sydney Chapman (Lords Commissioner to the Treasury): I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

PETITION

Fishing (Tie-up Scheme)

Mr. Alex Salmond: I rise to present a petition on behalf of Fraserburgh harbour traders—fortuitously in the presence of the Minister with responsibility for fisheries. This is one of a number of petitions that have been collected around the coast of Scotland. It represents the seething anger in the fishing communities about the imposition of the eight-day tie-up scheme.
The Fraserburgh harbour traders express their concern about the penalties and the severe economic dislocation that will be caused by the Government's unwillingness to allow short trips back from one port to another to be exempt from the scheme.
The petition reads:
'Wherefore your petitioners pray that your honourable House take immediate steps to amend the legislation to allow vessels to return from their landing port to their home port without incurring any additional tie-up time over and above the eight-day period commencing with the date nominated by the vessel at the landing port. And your petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.'
It is signed by John Wallace, the chairman of the Fraserburgh harbour Commissioners, by George Masson, a partner in John S. Pirie and Co., and by 63 other traders representing all the trades in Fraserburgh harbour.

To lie upon the Table.

Horticulture

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Wood.]

Mrs. Marion Roe: As the House will know, I have always taken a keen interest in horticultural matters—particularly in my capacity as chairman of the Conservative Back-Bench horticulture committee and as parliamentary consultant to the Horticultural Trades Association, which appears under my name in the Register of Members' Interests. I am most grateful, therefore, to have the opportunity of an Adjournment debate to raise with the Minister a number of important challenges that the production sector of British horticulture faces today.
The total farmgate value of horticultural production in this country is estimated to be £1,600 million, and the retail value of that produce is at least twice that amount. Outdoor vegetables account for around £600 million, flowers and plants for around £400 million and fruit for £240 million. I often feel that, overall, horticulture is undervalued in Britain and that is particularly true of its production capacity. As I hope to show, other nations are perhaps less indifferent to horticulture than we are.
It is a measure of the importance of the industry that it employs about 60,000 people—half as many as are employed in the entire agricultural industry in Britain today. It is worth recalling how horticultural production was often limited to a certain season and a modest number of products, whereas now the seasons have been extended —as in the case of autumn-fruiting raspberries—and exotic crops such as sweet peppers or bean sprouts are on offer from domestic suppliers. The British grower must seize those challenges, plugging the trade gaps in certain product lines.
I believe that British growers have shown real enterprise and initiative in ensuring that Britain has one of the most competitive and technically advanced horticulture sectors in the world. From my knowledge of the industry, I do not believe for a moment that the people who work in horticulture expect special favours from Government or the erection of obstacles to competition. British growers know full well that foreign producers may benefit from lower wage costs and a more favourable climate. They accept the fact that improvements in transport have intensified competition.
Certainly those factors cause our producers problems, but, thanks to the technical sophistication of our industry and the quality of the produce it provides, I have confidence in its ability to compete and to excel. However, to employ a rather overused phrase, British producers should face the competition on a level playing field. It is crucial that our industry is not disadvantaged, especially by unnecessary red tape and obstacles to innovation at home.
I hope that the Minister will be able to consider a number of issues, all of which will have an impact on prospects for British horticulture. The use of peat in horticulture is the first of these. Peat is a vital element in ornamental horticulture, as a growing medium. As any gardener will tell you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, peat is unique in that it has a number of key characteristics: it is disease-free, has an ideal mixture of air and water, holds water exceptionally well and can be easily adjusted in formulation for different plants and locales. There is not a

single other material combining all these qualities that is available in sufficient quantity. Quite simply, given our current state of knowledge, peat is irreplaceable as a growing medium for young plants. As the Horticulture Development Council peat report points out, however, peat is less essential as a mulch or soil conditioner.
In the past couple of years, there has been increasing concern about the risk of damage caused by peat extraction to wildlife habitats and scientific areas. Fortunately, new technology has found some alternatives to peat for soil conditioning and surface layering. As yet, however, no commercial substitute has been found. Research is currently under way to find new substitutes, but we still have a long way to go before we can find something that is both cost-effective and non-polluting.
I wholeheartedly applaud the growing consciousness of environmental issues, but I think that it is wrong that horticulturists should bear the brunt of having to find peat substitutes in response to wider political concerns about the environment.
What is needed is more money to fund research. Until then, British horticulture has no choice—regardless of its own environmental concerns—but to continue to rely on peat. I hope that the Minister may be able to give the industry some reassurance on the important issue of research and development in peat substitution.
Another subject of concern to the industry is how it will be affected by the European single market. One of the great achievements of British horticulture is that this country currently has one of the most stringent plant health regimes in the European Community. We have been able to maintain this through tough regulation and import inspection and control. With the single European market will come harmonisation of plant health standards. Many in the industry find that very worrying. The European Community proposes to maintain health standards through two key mechanisms: the establishment of special plant health status and the introduction of plant passports. Each plant or batch of plants will have to have its own safety inspection record, and this record will constitute a plant passport which will allow the plant to move freely within the Community.
All this seems thoroughly sensible in theory. However, the proposal at present is for such a system to apply to movement not only between member states, but within member states. A passport, plus inspections, may thus be required for shipments of plants between Athens and Acton or between Lincoln and London. This could lead to serious administrative problems and heavy costs, with little demonstrable improvement in plant health status.
With each plant requiring its own passport, the scope for red tape, bureaucracy and burdens on business is limitless. It is also worrying that the EC may adopt standards below our current national standards, which could seriously jeopardise the health of the plants in Britain. I am concerned that some other Community countries will not be willing or able to maintain the levels of plant health to which we in this country are accustomed, and that standards will slip, especially as controls will rest with the exporting country, with no customs checks at point of entry. Does the Minister agree that it is imperative that the Community recognises the importance of maintaining high standards designed to achieve the very best, not just the average, standard of plant health?
Possibly the most serious threat to horticulture in the longer term is the progressive loss, and lack of


replacement, of plant protection products. With the loss of advisory services' routine screening of pesticides, the greater registration costs, which act as a disincentive for manufacturers to invest in developing plant protection products for horticultural crops, and the progressive reduction in Government support for near market research into novel pesticide applications, there is a serious and imminent danger that horticulture will lose the ability to control important pests and diseases. Much has been done by the industry in funding essential work to support "off-label" uses of pesticides, and by industry and Government in developing alternatives to chemical control methods.
However, the industry must rely on the help of pesticides for the foreseeable future, but it cannot fund the enormous costs involved in developing and registering pesticides. Unless serious reconsideration is given to the level of support given by the Government to enable the development of such control methods, the industry may collapse through the lack of such essential techniques. Surely it is for the public good for the United Kingdom to have a viable horticultural industry?
The third issue I wish to raise tonight is that of garden festivals. Horticulture has given wholehearted support to the concept of garden festivals. Needless to say, they provide a forum for marketing the products of the industry, but they have also proved a catalyst for urban regeneration in some of our most rundown inner-city areas and they offer horticulture an opportunity to apply its expertise to making the urban environment more pleasant for the people who live and work in cities.
The Government's imagination was instrumental in getting the idea of garden festivals off the ground. I hope that, having seen the beneficial effects, the Government will continue their support. Government financial aid for garden festivals expires in 1991. If there are to be further festivals, as I hope there will be, a Government decision is needed immediately on whether they will continue to support national festivals. It takes several years to put together a first-class garden festival. It would be a tragedy if we wasted time. I very much hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will feel able to look favourably on supporting and funding a continued programme of British garden festivals, so that those important public events will be able to endure.
I am sure that my hon. Friend the Minister has heard a great deal from the industry about the fourth issue that I wish to raise tonight, but I hope that he will bear with me while I go through the arguments, as the issue is crucial to horticulture. Like all business men, growers are being affected by the slowdown in the economy. They are also being hit by rising costs, but none is rising quite as fast as natural gas. Gas is very important for greenhouse growers, because it burns efficiently and does not emit pollutants, as the CO2 is used to enhance plant growth.
It is a major cost for hundreds of growers and, quite frankly, its price has risen at an alarming rate. It now costs 50 per cent. more to heat a glasshouse in Britain than to heat one in Holland. Some growers have seen their natural gas bills rise 25 per cent. during the past year. When British Gas was privatised, it was hoped that increased competition would result, pushing prices down. Sadly, that has not happened. British greenhouse growers are suffering from extremely disadvantageous gas prices, which are in turn affecting their ability to compete, and biting into profits.
Caught between high gas bills and high interest rates, growers could be forgiven for feeling that they are truly between a rock and a hard place. Can anything be done to ease the burden of high gas prices which so many of our producers now face? How does the Minister intend to tackle the problem of soaring costs for British growers?
Finally, I turn to the issue of soft fruit imports from eastern Europe. During the past few years, Britain has imported a great deal of semi-processed soft fruit from Poland and Yugoslavia. Those two countries have the advantage both of low labour costs and favourable rates of exchange to export. Moreover, until recently, a system was in place that guaranteed minimum soft fruit price levels for goods imported into the United Kingdom. However, that system broke down last year, resulting in a severe fall in prices.
To the critics of a price support system, I would argue that the mechanism aids not only British fruit growers, but eastern European ones. The eastern European countries could earn more for their soft fruit exports with the agreed minimum price. The price support system was extended on a temporary basis for three months from 1 January 1991, but that is clearly not long enough to provide any sort of security for our growers or, indeed, the eastern European countries that compete with them. Does the Ministry intend to extend the price support system into a viable long-term mechanism that can provide security to everyone?
British growers can compete well in an international environment if they are only given the means by which to do so. I emphasise that this is not an industry on the look-out for handouts or preferential treatment, but it needs a fair deal from a sympathetic Government. During the past 11 years, the Government have transformed prospects for the business in this country. They have shown that they understand the problems and challenges that horticulture faces—notably through the help they have lent with replacement heated green houses.
I hope that British horticulture can continue to count on the understanding and help of a Government and a Ministry that have proved themselves good friends to it during those years. We must address those problems and give the British grower a chance to prepare for the future.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. David Curry): My hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mrs. Roe) has raised five issues and I will do my best to respond to them. She discussed the use of peat, soft fruit from eastern Europe, plant health, gas prices and garden centres.
I know that the question of peat preoccupies the industry. Professional horticulture accounts for about half our usage in the United Kingdom; the other half is split between the retail market and the landscaping contracting sector. Professional use has declined. Tomatoes, for example, are now grown on rockwool, perlite or NFT. Even with 100,000 hectares in England and Wales, and 800,000 hectares in Scotland, peat constitutes a limited resource, especially as some of the area is not exploitable.
The Department of the Environment has made a firm Government commitment to examine the question of peat, including working licences and the availability of substitutes. Neither we nor the industry can be complacent. I appreciate that any restrictions on the


current uses of peat would present problems, although it should be possible to develop effective and acceptable alternatives, especially in the ornamental sector.
Our strategy for horticultural research and development identifies work on alternatives to peat as a high priority area. We are already committed to substantial spending on strategic work. We are liaising closely with the Horticulture Development Council, Horticulture Research International and others in developing further programmes. It is in the industry's interests to take a constructive role in encouraging the use of acceptable alternatives. The Peat Producers Association and the Horticultural Trades Association have a role to play in this respect.
The Department of the Environment recently issued a leaflet called "Wake Up", which was launched just a few days ago and which advised gardeners to avoid using peat where substitutes were available, as my hon. Friend said, as mulches and soil conditioners, for example. There is a Horticulture Development Council seminar on peat scheduled for 26 March, which is a welcome initiative enabling the industry to explain its current position on peat use and to consider the next steps.
The gas pricing policy is a matter for British Gas. However, I recognise that the price of Dutch gas is a long-standing issue. The United Kingdom cited the Netherlands case before the European Council and it obtained a ruling which still stands. We must get better value for money from the use of gas. My right hon. Friend the Minister has pointed out at the "British Growers Look Ahead" exhibition that energy efficiency is vital for business and for the environment.
The Government are surprised by the low uptake of grants of up to 40 per cent. under the farm and countryside grant scheme for the installation of more energy-efficient glasshouses and equipment. We should like growers to come forward for the grants while they are still available. There are already things that can be done to help growers to get better energy use in their greenhouses. Where we have clear evidence of continuing problems of unfair competition, we shall take that evidence to the European Commission and ask that action be taken. I recognise that garden festivals have proved popular with the industry. Nobody could ignore their effects on urban regeneration. As my hon. Friend has said, no decision has yet been taken on the future of the garden festival programme after Ebbw Vale, which is scheduled for 1992.
We have had a report on the festivals in Liverpool, in Stoke-on-Trent and in Glasgow, which was published just before Christmas. It is true that it showed that there was a fast reclamation of derelict and polluted sites, that there was economic benefit from the jobs and that there was an improved image for cities. That was, of course, at some cost—we reckon about £20 million at today's prices over and above the cost of reclamation. We will review the programme of garden festivals in the light of the balance of benefits and costs. The views of the industry will weigh heavily with us during that review.
I recognise that the most important issue raised by my hon. Friend may have been plant health and the single market. I subscribe entirely to her belief that the single market must not lead to a lowering of our plant health standards or status, or to excessive financial and

administrative burdens on the industry or the Government. Controls on plant material entering the United Kingdom centre on plant health certificates, which are issued by authorities in the country of origin. Certificates are checked at the point of entry by customs officers and, where necessary, by our plant health inspectors.
After 1992, the system will continue for trade with non-Community countries, but a new system of control will be needed for intra-Community trade.
The proposals are still being thrashed out in Brussels, but we can see the outline of what is likely to emerge. It is clear that there will be significant changes in the way both we and the industry work. There will be more frequent visits by plant health inspectors to growers of planting material, leading to the issue of the so-called plant passports.
As my hon. Friend said, the passports will apply for trade within member states, as well as between member states. After 1992, in principle, there will be no distinction between internal trade and trade between member states —apart from the so-called isolated zones. Plant passports will be needed for material travelling between Lincoln and London or, indeed, between Broxbourne and Basildon. This is intended to ensure that all material circulating within the Community meets certain standards.
We are conscious of the need to minimise red tape. It is inevitable that the introduction of Communitywide changes will result in certain changes in the regulatory framework, but it is not our intention to impose on ourselves a burden that is not necessary, and least of all do we intend to impose on the industry a burden that is not necessary. A great deal of our negotiation is directed at making sure that we have the lightest regime that can be effective. If one demands that there should be a level playing field—that the law should be enforced equally everywhere—a certain number of inspectors and a certain regulatory framework are necessary. We have to be able to manage and police the system.
We supported the establishment of the European plant health inspectorate, which is the kernel of the Communitywide supervising system that will oversee the enforcement of the new rules. A great deal of negotiation has still to be done in this sector, but we are particularly conscious of the need to preserve the special status that the industry in the United Kingdom enjoys, because of our high health standards. Of course, that is a consideration which extends beyond the plant and horticultural sphere; it affects the agricultural and fisheries sectors also. We wish, in all those cases, to preserve the status that we have built up over the years.
The final issue raised by my hon. Friend—the import of east European soft fruit—has caused some difficulties. I have been very closely involved in the negotiations. I can confirm that we have sought an extension of the safeguard action—the minimum import prices—beyond the end of this month to cover the new season. We do not have the ability to impose that ourselves. It is not a unilateral decision; it has to be agreed by the Commission. However, at the Agriculture Council meeting at the beginning of this week, my right hon. Friend raised the matter before the full membership. I, too, raised it at a number of meetings last year.
That has been followed up with a letter to the Commissioner within the last few days. Our officials have been given instructions to pursue the matter with all


vigour. We recognise its importance to the industry in my hon. Friend's constituency, in other parts of England and, of course, in the lowlands of Scotland, whose important horticultural industry has felt a serious draught from these imports.
We have not moved from our long-standing position that effective voluntary arrangements with Poland and Yugoslavia are best, and that reasonable price levels serve both us and them. It is perfectly true that undercutting prices and failing to maintain discipline does the United Kingdom's industry no good. It is equally true that unfair competition does not do very much for the revenue of those exporting. The exporters do not get the sort of returns that would benefit them in the long term. We do not deny, and I think that my hon. Friend does not deny, that there is a place in our markets for Polish and Yugoslav products. For example, they are used in jam production.
We think that it is very much in our interests to have a rapid reintroduction of the informal pricing arrangements, with improvements—for example, differentiated prices and better monitoring, which the Commission promised more than a year ago but has not been able to deliver. We shall continue to press this important issue. The east Europeans, if they have any sense, will recognise that, if they do not deliver the sensible disciplines that we seek in this sector, our outlook will be influenced when it comes to seeking further liberalisation in other sectors.
My hon. Friend said that she was very optimistic about the future of the industry. In general terms, I share her optimism. Where the industry is forward-looking and competitive, it will have our full support. But, as my hon. Friend said, it faces challenges. Nineteen ninety-two will ease the trade between member states and in 1996 we shall see the end of the Spanish transition. Both events will result in greater competition. Several years ago people

assumed that Spanish entry would somehow bring an Armageddon-like attack on the industry, but that has not materialised. Our competition is still predominantly from the northern European states, which have climatic conditions similar to ours.
Successive Ministers have reminded growers about the importance of marketing. It is important to keep hammering home that message. I am sure that my hon. Friend does so in her constituency, which is so important in horticultural terms. Quality assurance, presentation, continuity of supply and competitive prices are the important elements for the industry.
My right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food said on 21 February that Food from Britain would address itself to the import substitution problem. Clearly, horticulture has a considerable potential to help in that matter. He also issued a challenge to the industry at the "British Growers Look Ahead" conference in January to come up with ideas to improve competitiveness, and we look forward to seeing those ideas put into practice.
My hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne has raised some important issues for the horticultural industry. It is by no means considered the Cinderella of the United Kingdom industry by the Ministry, despite the fact that it does not have the heavy regimes of other agricultural sectors which command so much time, sweat and tears. The horticultural industry is important. It has a significant future. It recognises that its future lies significantly in its own hands. Where we can assist, we shall do so. With such a joint enterprise, there is no reason why it cannot increase in strength.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at one minute past Twelve midnight.